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ABSTRACT

Biologics and biosimilars represent the promise for more effective treatments of many
diseases. International treaty obligations influenced heavily by the biopharmaceutical
industry and advanced through the international trade agenda may lead to an imbalance
between incentivizing innovation and the public interest. Canada’s implementation of its
obligations into national patent and regulatory laws encourages aggressive biologic
patent protection strategies that, coupled with linked regulatory assessments, may
establish compounding layers of exclusion that disproportionately disincentivizes both
the biologics innovation and biosimilar development. This comparative analysis
addresses the progression of international obligations and the way in which they have
been implemented into Canada’s patent/IP and regulatory frameworks as compared to
the US and EU. A quantitative comparison of biosimilar approvals and launches provides
insight on how international obligations and national legislation have impacted these
outcomes. Patent and regulatory laws must be balanced to incentivize innovation and
promote access to treatments now and tomorrow.
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction
This work is an exploration of Canada’s regulation of biosimilars and its integration with
Canadian intellectual property laws. Specifically, this work explores the evolution and
impact that the national implementation of Canada’s international obligations has had
on the approval and market availability of biosimilars in Canada in comparison to the US
and EU. Essentially, it studies the question of how Canada’s translation of its
international treaty obligations into its national legislative and regulatory framework
has affected biosimilar authorizations and market launches given that these obligations
were initially framed in the pharmaceutical context and promulgated through the
international trade agenda apparatus. This work therefore is an examination of how
international treaty obligations related to the regulation and protection of
pharmaceuticals and biologics have become more stringent over time and linked to
patent and IP considerations as a result of the influence of powerful countries like the
US and EU and their equally powerful pharmaceutical industries, and how Canada’s
chosen modes for the implementation of these treaty obligations have affected the
approval and market launch of biosimilars in comparison to the US and EU.
1.1. Problem
With rapid advancements over the last few decades, the emergence of a new class of
complex therapeutic products, namely biologics, is causing technological, medical,
economic and legal ripples across the globe. Biologics hold the potential to expand the
frontiers of medical treatments for the betterment of global public health. 1 This
emerging class of therapeutics is especially important in the development of treatments
for chronic and often disabling conditions such as diabetes, autoimmune diseases and

1

B. Leader, et al., Protein therapeutics: a summary and pharmacological classification, 7 NAT REV DRUG
DISCOV (2008). T. Liu, Natural and biotech-derived therapeutic proteins: What is the future?, 21
ELECTROPHORESIS (2000).
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cancer, the treatments of which are beyond the capabilities of existing pharmaceutical
drugs.2
However, biologics are increasingly becoming enormously expensive; the Patent
Medicines Prices Review Board3 reported that that in a decade the sales of biologics in
Canada has tripled4 and number of patented biologics costing at least $10,000 annually
made up $5.4B of the $7.7B in Canadian biologics sales in 2018.5 As well, biologics are
complicated, time consuming and expensive to produce all of which contributes to
making the costs of these treatments equally exorbitant.6 Indeed, the economic impact
of the biologics industry is staggering given that this class of therapeutics barely existed
30 years ago. The global biologics market for 2019 has been pegged at USD$255B and is
estimated to grow to USD$457B by 2027.7 Accordingly, it is important to strike the
appropriate balance to achieve the overall goal of promote innovation of new biologics
while providing conditions to encourage biosimilar competition in order to manage the
prices pressures on patients and payers.8

2

D. C. Ohly & S. K. Patel, There is no Orange Book: the coming wave of biological therapeutics, 6 JOURNAL
Biosimilar biologic drugs in Canada:
Fact Sheet - Canada.ca(2016), available at https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugshealth-products/biologics-radiopharmaceuticals-genetic-therapies/applications-submissions/guidancedocuments/fact-sheet-biosimilars.html. United States of America, Biosimilar Action Plan: Balancing
Innovation and Competition 1 (Food and Drug Administration ed., 2018). European Medicines Agency,
Biosimilars medicines: Overview(2020), available at https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/humanregulatory/overview/biosimilar-medicines-overview. Food and Drug Administration, Biosimilar and
Interchangeable Products | FDA, @US_FDA(2020), available at
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products.
3
Established by the Canadian Parliament in 1987, the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB) is
an independent quasi-judicial body with a dual regulatory and reporting mandate. First, to ensure that
prices at which patentees sell their patented medicines in Canada are not excessive, and second, to report
on pharmaceutical trends of all medicines and on research and development spending by patentees.
4
Government of Canada, Biologics in Canada Part 1: Market Trends, 2018 6 (Patented Medicines Prices
Review Board ed., 2018).
5
Id. at, 15.
6
Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., The Future of Competition in the Biologics Market, 31 TEMPLE
JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2012).
7
CMI, Global Biologics Market to surpass US$ 456.83 8 Billion by 2027, Says CMI, Coherent Market
Insights(April 3, 2020), available at https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2020/04/03/2011472/0/en/Global-Biologics-Market-to-surpass-US-456-83-8-Billion-by-2027Says-CMI.html.
8
Blackstone & Fuhr, TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (2012).
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & PRACTICE 464(2011). Health Canada,
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But, what exactly is a biologic? Often characterized as protein-based drugs, they are
therapeutic agents that can be used to treat medical conditions that have previously
been inefficiently managed, or not treated at all because pharmaceuticals were not
capable of doing so efficiently, or doing so at all.9 Biologics are manufactured using
complex recombinant technology using, containing and/or derived from biological
sources such as living organisms including bacteria, yeast, mammal cells and enzymes.10
Pharmaceuticals differ from biologics in very critical ways; they are small molecules that
have generally been identified through a trial-and-error approach with biological
function determined through various biological assays for activities that are, in
comparison, more simple than the methods that are required to determine the efficacy
of biologics. Pharmaceuticals are generally not structurally complex, capable of being
manufactured on an industrial scale, and are comparably thermo- and chemically
stable.11
For instance, Tylenol® is Johnson & Johnson’s branded product containing the active
pharmaceutical ingredient acetaminophen; it has been used for over a century and is
the most commonly used medication for pain and fever in both the US and EU.12
Acetaminophen is small in size (C8H9NO2 – just 20 atoms), very stable in a solid form at
room temperature and well above.13 The manufacturing process for acetaminophen is
chemically simple and is produced on an industrial scale. Insulin, on the other hand, is
one of the first biologics granted market authorization in the early 80s, not particularly

9

Wilkinson Michael Kleinberg & Wilkinson Kristen Mosdell, Current and future considerations for the new
classes of biologicals, 61 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY (2004). E. Philip Johnson,
Implications of biosimilars for the future, 65 see id. at (2008). Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the
biopharmaceutical industry: lessons from Hatch-Waxman and an early evaluation of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 34 NOVA LAW REVIEW 629(2010).
10
Kleinberg & Mosdell, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, (2004). Johnson, AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, (2008).
11
Kleinberg & Mosdell, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, (2004). Johnson, AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, (2008).
12
RICHARD J. PRANKERD, CRITICAL COMPILATION OF PKA VALUES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES § 33 (Harry G.
Brittain ed., Elsevier. 2007).
13
E. Kalatzis, Reactions of acetaminophen in pharmaceutical dosage forms: its proposed acetylation by
acetylsalicylic acid, 59 J PHARM SCI (1970).
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complex in comparison to more recently developed biologics. And yet this relatively
simple biologic is 250-fold larger than acetaminophen and degrades in less than a month
at room temperature and in minutes in extreme heat or with prolonged exposure to
sunlight.14
Biologics are a different beast. Unlike small-molecule pharmaceuticals, biologics are
macromolecules of greater complexity which heavily influence the production process.
Cellular systems, protein composition and concentration, temperature, amino acid
arrangement and folding, and molecular weight all affect the final product.15 Thus and
unlike pharmaceuticals, the concept of a “generic” biologic is untenable as a result of
these fundamental biological and chemical differences. Instead, various descriptors
have been coined, such as “follow-on biologic”, “biosimilar”, “second-entry biologic”,
and “subsequent-entry biologics” (“SEB” or “biosimilar”) which describes a biologic that
is highly similar to and has no clinically meaningful differences from a previously
authorized biologic.16
In an American study in 2019, a survey of employers found that although biologics
accounted for only 1% of all prescriptions dispensed to their workers and dependents,
they accounted for 40% of all monies spent for drugs.17 Thus, stakeholders such as
patients and public and private payers (governments and insurance companies) are
motivated to seek ways to reduce these high costs and promote widespread use of
these exceptional treatments to benefit Canadians. One area of particular interest to
achieve this goal is the strategy to promote the efficient approval and adoption of
biosimilars in Canada; the prevailing thinking is that biosimilars will exert downward

14

PRANKERD. 2007.
Kleinberg & Mosdell, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, (2004).
16
Canada. 2016. Agency. 2020. Administration. 2020.
17
Willis Towers Watson, Leading employers spend 40% of costs on less than 1% of prescriptions (August
20, 2019), available at https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/News/2019/08/leading-employersspend-40-percent-of-costs-on-less-than-1-percent-of-prescriptions. America, 1. 2018.
15

4

pressure on the price of biologics as a result of increased competition which was a net
result in the analogous brand/generic pharmaceutical context.18
Ultimately, however, the true potential of biologics and biosimilars may not be fully
realized where there is imbalance between the following factors that may, to varying
degrees, impede their development:


patent and intellectual property interests of biologics and biosimilar developers
and manufacturers;



regulatory framework for the market authorization process;



commercialization and integration into both the public and private payer
markets;



public and/or private incentivization of R&D efforts; and



public health policy.

International treaty obligations related to the first two factors play a significant role in
the development of regulatory regimes around the world, including their linkages to
patent and IP considerations prior to a biosimilar’s grant of market authorization. The
greatest impact on the adoption and authorization of biologics and biosimilars is the
way Canada has crafted its international obligations at the national level.
Finally, one might speculate whether Canada would have made the same choices and
implemented its national frameworks in respect of pharmaceuticals and biologics in the
same way absent pressure from trading partners and powerful multi-national industry
players.

18

Blackstone & Fuhr, TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (2012). Government
of Canada, Biologics in Canada Part 2: Biosimilar Savings, 2018 6 (Patented Medicines Prices Review Board
ed., 2018). Elena Lungu, Biosimilar in Canada: Current Environemtna and Future Opportunity (Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board ed., 2019).
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1.2. Research Question and Methodology
In the context of the problem set out above, the research question that this work
explores and seeks to answer is as follows:

HOW HAS THE APPROVAL AND LAUNCH OF BIOSIMILARS IN CANADA BEEN IMPACTED
BY THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION LINKING BIOSIMILAR REGULATION WITH
PATENT/IP CONSIDERATIONS AS MANDATED BY THE PROGRESSION OF

CANADA’S
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS, IN COMPARISON TO THE US AND EU?
In order to answer this question, the following methodology will be applied to this
research delving into: (1) an analysis of the evolution of international treaty obligations;
(2) a comparison of the way in which Canada, as compared to the US and EU, has
chosen implement these treaty mandates in its national patent and regulatory
framework; (3) a quantitative analysis of biosimilars approved and launched in Canada,
as compared to the US and EU; and (4) an evaluation of whether and how the
measurable differences in biosimilar approval and launch may be attributable to
Canada’s treaty obligations and/or the way in which these obligations were
implemented in its national legislation.
However, understanding how the approval and launch of biosimilars in Canada has been
impacted by its national legislative implementation of its international obligations first
requires an appropriate foundation upon which to build. This foundation is a description
of the biologics/biosimilars industry and technological realities, the similarities in the
regulation of biologics and biosimilars across Canada, the US and EU, as well as the
harmonization of patent laws and coordination of patent strategies. These concepts are
the necessary underpinnings to give appropriate context to the progression of
international treaty obligations as they relate to the regulation of biologics and
biosimilars and a comparative analysis of the national implementation of those
international obligations in Canada, the US and EU.

6

The industry and technological realities, touched on in Section 1.1 and addressed in
further detail in Chapter 2, affect the regulation and protection of biologics. Each of
Canada, the US and EU have sophisticated and comprehensive laws, regulations and
agencies that regulate biologics and biosimilars. 19 These same bodies – the US’ Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), EU’s European Medicines Agency (EMA) and Canada’s
Health Canada – are the same governmental agencies that also regulate brand and
generic pharmaceuticals. These regulatory efforts are ostensibly governed by each state
independently; practically, however, there is significant international integration of
standards and even reliance between these regulatory agencies. The regulatory
principles applicable to biologics/biosimilars – by and large founded upon the regulatory
principles for pharmaceuticals – are common among Canada, the US and EU and focus
on the safety, efficacy and quality. 20 In the case of the research at hand, the important
aspect of the regulatory pathways in Canada, the US and EU is not their differences, but
rather it is the commonality in the way that each of their regulatory processes are
designed to similarly interact with the patent/IP clearance measures mandated by their
international obligations. For instance: while there are differences in the patent linkage
systems between Canada and the US, the regulatory triggering events, i.e., a biosimilar
approval that may be required to be stayed until the status of patent rights has been
litigated, are the same.
In terms of the harmonization of patent laws, international treaties have encouraged
the adoption of a baseline commonality of patent laws such as eligibility requirements –
novelty, utility, non-obviousness and subject matter – while making modest concessions
for some variability such as accommodation for codified morality or ethical
considerations. Certainly, the Patent Cooperation Treaty and its continuing efforts for
signatories to harmonize and streamline the patent prosecution process prior to

19

Michael S. Montgomery, Generics And Biosimilars: Mapping The Biosimilars Regulatory Approval
Pathway Against The Hatch-Waxman Act And Projecting Futures Effects On The Biologics Market And
Patent Protection, 75 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW (2015).
20
Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding the Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL,
60, 63 (2012).
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National Phase has gone a long way in facilitating industry’s ability to globally strategize
and manage its portfolio.
Prior to the commencing the main analysis, some historical context is also warranted
given Canada’s complicated history with the pharmaceutical industry. For the better
part of the 20th century, Canada was the home of a burgeoning generic pharmaceuticals
industry relying on a “compulsory licensing” model that forced brand pharmaceutical
companies to license its patented inventions to generic manufacturers for low and set
licensing royalties. Generic manufacturers would then manufacture lower cost generics
in Canada without contravening any Canadian patent laws, then sell their products in
other countries. This practice was effectively halted in the early 90s through the
coercive efforts of the US, EU and their brand pharmaceutical industries through the
international trade agenda.
With that foundation set, the first matter in order to address the research question is an
examination of international treaties and free trade agreements to which Canada, as
well as the US and EU, is obligated (as they relate to the regulation and patenting of
biologics and biosimilars), including a review of how these obligations have evolved, as
will become evident, in an increasingly stringent manner. Over time and as a result of
industry efforts, various international treaties and obligations have incrementally
created obligations on signatories like Canada to, instead of compulsory licensing, adopt
domestic laws (1) linking the regulatory authorization of a biosimilar to the status of
existing patents related to an analogous biologic (“patent linkage”) (2) carving out
periods where an biosimilar applicant is precluded from relying on the data of a
previously authorized biologic (“data exclusivity”) and (3) other patent and/or
intellectual property-based considerations including patent term extensions or
restorations, patent re-examinations and reissuance entitlements and “supplemental”
protections that are not tied to patents or data (“additional IP provisions”).
The advancement of provisions crafted to protect pharmaceuticals spread through the
international trade agenda that was first multilaterally enshrined in the Agreement of
8

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,21 (TRIPs). TRIPs was the first treaty
to mandate the adoption of data exclusivity legislation and sought to bring harmony to
patent laws among signatory countries.22 Prior to TRIPs, Canada entered into the North
American Free Trade Agreement,23 where the US first obliged Canada to adopt statutory
data exclusivity and harmonize its patent laws to standards set out therein. Recently
renegotiated and replacing North American FTA (1992), the Canada-US-Mexico Free
Trade Agreement,24 imposes tightened patent linkage requirements, increased data
exclusivity thresholds and introduces the concept of a sui generis rights regime, all of
which was already mandated by the EU arising from the Comprehensive and Economic
Trade Agreement.25 Negotiations were concurrently underway on the Trans-Pacific
Partnership which did not enter into force due to the US’ refusal to ratify the
agreement; the subsequently enacted Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership26 that rose from the ashes of the TPP was the basis for
significant amendment to Canada’s patent linkage regime, but provisions related to data
exclusivity and sui generis rights remain suspended but not potentially reinstable.
After the international context has been established, a comparative analysis is
undertaken to examine how each of Canada, the US and EU crafted their national
legislative and regulatory frameworks related to the regulation and protection of
biologics and biosimilars; in essence, this is an examination of how their international
obligations have been practically implemented. Treaty obligations relating to the
regulation of biologics and biosimilars mandate, either directly or indirectly, the national

21

Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). TRIPS was
negotiated during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) from 1986 to 1994. As an agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), TRIPS is legally
binding for all WTO Member states. Also at the Uruguay Round, the Council for TRIPS was created to
monitor the operation of the agreement and governments’ compliance.
22
Id. at, Article 39.3.
23
North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered
into force 1 January 1994).
24
Canada US Mexico Free Trade Agreement (2020).
25
Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (2017). (“Canada- FTA (2017)”).
26
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. (2018). (“CPTPP (2018)”).
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adoption of patent linkages, data exclusivity and additional IP provisions, but exact
implementation of this mandate is at the discretion of the signatory state. For example,
the US was an early adopter of a patent linkage regime established by the Drug Prices
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”)27 in 1984
which manifested as an in rem action28 forum for pharmaceutical patent litigation.
Canada followed suit in 1993 with the creation of their patent linkage regime through
the Canadian Patent Act29 and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.30
As will become evident, not all implementation strategies were created equal.
Finally, a quantitative analysis of the number of biosimilars approved and launched in
each of Canada, the US and the EU is undertaken as a measure of the success of their
respective national regulatory and patent frameworks and to gain further insight into
the effect that their respective underlying international obligations have had at the
national level. By way of measurement, we will then determine if there is a difference in
the approval and launch of biosimilars between Canada as compared to the US and EU.
There is an important distinction to be mindful of in this assessment, namely approval
versus launch or availability on the market. Based on any ascertained quantitative
differences, an analysis of whether these differences arise from either the international
obligations as they have progressed over time, or the way in which the national
legislative and regulatory frameworks have been crafted by Canada, in comparison to
the US and EU.
The choice to use the US and EU as comparison jurisdictions is based on a number of
factors, the first of which is due to their respective economic importance as the first and
third largest markets for biologics and biosimilars.31

27

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified across various provisions of Titles 21 and 35 of the U.S. Code).
28
Meaning any judgement arising from an in rem action applies across the jurisdiction in contrast to in
personam judgements that bind only the parties to the proceeding.
29
Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4.
30
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133.
31
Grand View Research, Biologics Market Size Forecast - Industry Growth Report, 2018-2025.
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Second, there is a high degree of overlap in terms of the similar language contained in
international treaties to which the US, EU, and Canada are signatories. Canada and the
US are signatories to the Canada-US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement and, up until the US’
withdrawal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Canada and the EU are signatories to the
Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement. All parties are signatories to TRIPs.
Third, there is a high degree of commonality in the regulation of biologics and
biosimilars in each of jurisdiction, EU historically being on the leading edge of the
regulation of biologics and biosimilars. This means that the operation of the treaty
mandated patent linkages, data exclusivity and additional IP provisions will be
implemented in concert with regulatory pathways that look the generally the same in
each jurisdiction.
Fourth, there is a high correlation between the location of innovative companies,
historically clustered in the US and EU, involved in the R&D of therapeutics to where
they will initially seek patent protection and market authorization.32 Not all efforts to
get drugs approved are made equally across the globe; a company is more likely to
advance a patent strategy in the US and EU first, then the will seek patents next in
economically important jurisdictions where there is commercial activity such as
Canada.33
Choosing the US and EU as comparators will mitigate the influence of additional factors,
(such as different market strategies, local partnership/development strategies,
secondary market patent strategies) that may come into play when companies decide to
seek regulatory authorization and advance patent strategies in different jurisdictions.
While no empirical basis is provided for this proposition, in practice regulatory and
patent efforts made in the US are often mirrored or slightly delayed in Canada.

32

Patricia Laurens, et al., Worldwide IP coverage of patented inventions in large pharma firms: to what
extent do the internationalisation of R&D and firm strategy matter, 80 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT, 6, 11 (2019).
33
Id. at, 6, 20.
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Finally, the measure of the impact of Canada’s implementation of international
obligations will be made on the basis of a quantitative comparative analysis of
authorized biosimilars and their market availability, if launched, to determine whether
and how the differences in the way Canada has implemented patent linkages, data
exclusivity and additional IP provisions have impacted the market entry, or lack thereof,
of biosimilars in comparison to the US and EU.
Given the highly coordinated global strategies in respect of patents and regulatory
compliance, one may infer that differences observed are due to differences in domestic
patent and regulatory regimes. While this may be an oversimplification, this research is
of value as a starting point in the identification of the factors and their respective
weights that affect the timing of biosimilar approval and launch in different jurisdictions.
1.3. Structure
This research is crafted to be a thorough analysis of the evolution of the international
treaties, an examination of the differences in their implementation in Canada, the US
and EU, and an investigation of whether any differences in the measurable results,
namely the number biosimilars approved and launched, can be correlated to the
differences in the way in which Canada has chosen to craft its national legislation arising
from its international obligations in comparison to the American and European
experience.
This work is divided into 6 chapters beginning with this introductory Chapter 1 providing
the context of work, an overview of the international and national legal arenas that are
to be examined and the legal methodology to be applied to this research.
Chapter 2 is an important foundation building section that is necessary to put the
remaining material into appropriate context. Specifically, this chapter is an overview of
the technology related to biologics and biosimilars which, as is subsequently addressed,
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directly influences the way in which these therapeutic agents are both regulated and
patented.
Chapter 3 is a thorough analysis of the evolution of international treaty obligations
related to biologics and biosimilars and the way in which patent linkages, data
exclusivity and additional IP protection provisions are approached in Canada, as well as
the US and EU.
Following logically, Chapter 4 is an examination of the way in which Canada, in
comparison to the US and EU, has chosen to meet, or not meet, their respective
international treaty obligations. Finally, the chapter concludes with a quantitative
assessment of biosimilars that have been approved and launched in each respective
market. This data will be used as a measure of success in achieving the goal of
facilitating the approval of safe and efficacious biosimilars while also incentivizing
further innovation.
An analysis and discussion will then follow in Chapter 5 with a view to gleaning insight
into the factors that influence the authorization of biologics and biosimilars based on
each states’ different approach to the implementation of their international treaty
obligations.
There are a number of issues that will be touched upon during the course of this work
that, while exceedingly interesting, is ancillary to the scope of this research. This work
will not be an analysis or assessment of the laws, regulations or policies applicable to
the commercialization, penetration into public and private payer markets (including
considerations of formulary listing, substitutions and interchangeability), incentivization
of R&D and public health policy as it relates to biologics.
Further, this work focuses on therapeutic biologics that have been generated through
living organisms using recombinant technology. This excludes other biologically derived
products regulated by Health Canada pursuant to Schedule D of the Canadian Food and
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Drugs Act (“Canadian Food and Drugs Act”) 34 such as blood and blood products,
vaccines (even when produced by recombinant technology), radiopharmaceuticals and
other biological products sourced primarily by fractioning or purification.35
1.4. Relevance
It is a goal of this work to provide an analysis of the impact that international obligations
have had on Canadian patent and regulatory laws and policies and the resultant
approvals and marketing of biosimilars in Canada. In addition to contributing to the
discourse, this work represents an opportunity for an academic investigation into an
area of private practice that I have been engaged with for almost two decades, the
majority of the first decade of which was predominately pharmaceutical patent
litigation, first brand and then generic, and life cycle management. I remain engaged in
providing advice on the identification, acquisition, management and enforcement of
intangible assets and intellectual property rights in many areas including in the
biotechnology industry.
The biologics and biosimilars industry is rapidly becoming one of the most important
and valuable global industries, but it is profoundly and prohibitively expensive. 36
Developing and facilitating the development and approval of biosimilars is viewed as a
spur for competition which in turn will drive prices down37 in an environment where
both public and private payers struggle with the rising costs of biologics.38
Additionally, the analysis considers how Canadian patent and regulatory laws and
policies may be adapted in the future to positively promote the development of safe,

34

Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-27.
For an overview of the differences in the biological products, please see Liu, ELECTROPHORESIS, (2000).
36
Heidi Ledford, First biosimilar drug set to enter US market, NATURE, January 15, 2015. 2015. Blackstone
& Fuhr, TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (2012). Tao Gu, et al., Comparing
Biologic Cost Per Treated Patient Across Indications Among Adult US Managed Care Patients: A
Retrospective Cohort Study, 3 DRUGS - REAL WORLD OUTCOMES (2016).
37
Blackstone & Fuhr, TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (2012).
38
Gu, et al., DRUGS - REAL WORLD OUTCOMES, (2016). Ledford, NATURE, 2015.
35
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effective and fiscally responsible biologics and biosimilars – thereby facilitating the rapid
adoption of more effective treatments in critically important and often chronic
therapeutic areas – to the benefit of the public both in Canada and abroad. Further,
insights arising from this research may provide direction into how Canada, as a nation
and as a responsible international community stakeholder, can positively contribute at
the international trade level to advocate for measures that work for Canada, not just the
US, EU and the biopharmaceutical industry.
Exploration in this area will be invaluable in understanding how national policy goals –
incentivizing biologics R&D, ensuring economical access to safe and effective biologics
and biosimilars, and the furtherance of biotechnological knowledge for the betterment
of Canadians – are influenced by international obligations and how national patent and
regulatory frameworks may be crafted to achieve these goals in the years to come.
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CHAPTER 2. Biologics – The Current and Future Importance of the
Biologics and Biosimilars Industry

2.1. Introduction
The authorization and widespread adoption of biologics and biosimilars in Canada is of
the utmost importance to the health and wellbeing of its citizens and has far-reaching
economic impacts on the biopharmaceutical industry, public and private payer, in
addition to patients. As will be addressed in the coming chapters, the way in which
Canada has implemented its international obligations at a national level has had a
profound effect on the regulation of this class of therapeutic drugs, the approvals of
which are statutorily linked to patent and IP status. Prior to undertaking that analysis,
however, an appropriate foundation of the biologics/biosimilars industry and
technology, their regulation and the intellectual property considerations pertinent to
biologics and biosimilars must be laid.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 begins by answering the question “what exactly are biologics?” in
order to put this important and valuable industry into context with Canada’s
international obligations and their impact on the regulation and patent protection of
biologics and biosimilars. The technological realities warrant review and contextual
consideration in order to better understand their implications through the progression
of this work. Pharmaceuticals are chemically synthesized in a well-defined and
controlled manufacturing process.39 These manufacturing processes are generally well
established and are accurately and predictably reproducible.40 Consistency of the final
pharmaceutical product is not often a challenge and is indeed the basis for the
abbreviated pathway to approval based on the demonstration of bioequivalency.
Biologics, on the other hand are large complex molecules produced by living organisms
39

Leader, et al., NAT REV DRUG DISCOV, 21 (2008). Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 363(2010).
40
Liang, HARV. J. LEGIS., 371 (2010).
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which are far more complex systems of manufacture.41 One of the final stages of
biologic production is the isolation and purification usually occurring in a series of steps
any of which may actually be more complex than the entirety of a manufacturing
process of a small-molecule pharmaceutical.42 As one will see, these technological
realities have an impact on the patenting and regulation of these therapeutics.
In terms of patents, Section 2.4 provide an overview of patent law fundamentals
necessary to put the regulatory intersection with patent/IP clearance and remaining
work into context; it establishes a foundation for the patent strategies employed by the
biologics industry which is informed by the nature of biologics and biosimilars. From the
perspective of national intellectual property regimes (harmonized through the
international trade agenda over time), the underlying legal principles in each of their
respective patent systems are quite similar in Canada, the US and EU. Also discussed in
Section 2.4, three important legal changes directed by international treaty obligations
have had specific impact on the pharmaceutical and biologics patent strategy, namely:
(1) patent protection must be provided for pharmaceutical products, (2) the term of a
patent must be 20 years from the date of filing and (3) the patent regime must be “first
to file”, not “first to invent”. The complexity of biologics and biosimilars have generally
given rise to more patents claiming “core” inventions (product, formulation and use of
the product)43 as well as “peripheral” patents claiming the underlying development,
manufacturing, administration and treatment monitoring technology.44 This reality gives
rise to strategies for filing multiple, overlapping patents with potentially overbroad
claims that serve to obfuscate the patent landscape for a particular biologic. These
clusters of patents are sometimes referred to as “patent thickets”.45 As will become
apparent in the coming chapters, a given biologic manufacturer’s patent strategy has a
material impact on the market authorization of biosimilars containing the same active
41

Id. at, 370-1.
Kleinberg & Mosdell, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, (2004).
43
Jeffrey Wu & Claire Wan-Chiung Cheng, Into the Woods: A Biologic Patent Thicket Analysis, 19 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 93, 121 (2019).
44
Id. at, 122.
45
Id. at, 109-10.
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therapeutic ingredient given its potential operative effect in the context of national
patent linkage regimes, as well as additional patent-based or sui generis rights arising
from eligible patents.
In Canada, as well as the US and EU, sophisticated and comprehensive laws and
regulations have been established to evaluate and assess biologics and biosimilars both
prior to approval and continued monitoring after launch.46 The agencies responsible for
the regulation of biologics and biosimilars are the same agencies responsible for the
regulation of a variety of other therapeutic products, treatments and devices, including
pharmaceuticals, namely Health Canada, the US’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
EU’s European Medicines Agency (EMA). In respect of the regulation of biologics and
biosimilars, groups within each of the previously named agencies have carriage of these
evaluations, namely Health Canada’s Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate
(BGTD), the US FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the EMA’s
Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) which provides central
authorization for biologics and biosimilars for the European Economic Area.
While each jurisdiction has independent purview over the biologics/biosimilars that are
granted market authorization, practically, there is significant international integration of
standards and even reliance between these regulatory agencies. Thus, Canada’s
approach (as is the case in the US) to the regulation of biologics and biosimilars has
been heavily informed by the EU’s experience and focus on safety, efficacy and quality.
In following the EU’s lead, both the US and Canada have embraced a two pronged
approach to establish the quality, safety and efficacy of a biosimilar; first, an assessment
of biosimilarity based on the biosimilar’s structure and function, and second, relying on
non-clinical and clinical trials to establish that there is no clinically meaningful
46

Montgomery, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW, (2015). Government of Canada, Guidance Document
Information and Submission Requirements for Biosimilar Biologic Drugs (Health Canada ed., Health
Canada - Publications 2017). European Medicines Agency, Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal
Products (Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) ed., CHMP/437/04 ed. October 30,
2005). Leah Christi, FDA's Overview of the Regulatory Guidance for the Development and Approval of
Biosimilar Products in the US (CDER Food and Drug Administration ed.). Government of Canada,
Biosimilar biologic drugs in Canada: Fact Sheet (Health Canada ed., 2019).
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differences in terms of safety, quality and efficacy in comparison to the reference
biologic.
In the case of the research at hand, there is no comparative analysis of the regulation of
biologics and biosimilars in Canada vs. the US and EU. The important aspect of the
regulatory foundation laid out in Section 2.5 in respect of these jurisdictions is not their
differences, rather it is their commonalities that are of greater importance in this
instance; it is critical to understand that the way that each of their respective regulatory
processes are designed is to similarly interact with the patent/IP clearance regimes
mandated by their international obligations and nationally implemented. Introduced in
Section 2.5 and detailed in Chapter 4, after moving through similar regulatory
assessments a biosimilar may still be market barred or subject to an administrative hold
or stay due to (1) existing patents terms, the expiry or clearance of which is linked to
regulatory approval (patent linkages), (2) data exclusivity prohibitions and/or (3)
unexhausted sui generis rights, all of which are triggered at the same point in each
jurisdictions’ regulatory processes as a result of their commonalities. As will become
apparent as this work progresses, patent and IP considerations may be an impediment
not only to the market authorization grant, but also to the actual submission filing in
Canada, as well as the US and EU. Thus, understanding the commonalities of the
regulatory processes addressed in Section 2.4 is the critical foundation to understand
the context of when in the regulatory process the patent linkages, data exclusivity and
additional IP provisions – as mandated by international obligations as described in
Chapter 3 – are triggered, the national implementation of which will be compared by
jurisdiction in Chapter 4.
2.2. The Industry – An Economic Overview of Biologics and Biosimilars
The economic impact of biologics is of increasing global significance for a therapeutics
industry that barely existed 30 years ago. It bears repeating that the global biologics
market for 2019 has been pegged at USD$255B and estimated to grow to USD$457B by
19

2027.47 Of greater importance than the money, however, is the human factor; the
impact that biologics and biosimilars have on public health is astounding as patients
suffering from diseases difficult to treat, or previously untreatable, now have a new
source of hope. But, due to the complexities of biologics and their manufacture, the
costs are extremely high, 48 potentially making the costs to patients and payers
prohibitively high. 49 Strategies to increase the efficient adoption of biosimilars to
promote competition and downward pressure on pricing needs to be cultivated.50
Over time, there has been a shift in the market share of the biopharmaceutical pie that
pharmaceuticals are ceding to biologics. There has been a decline in the applications for
market approval new pharmaceutical drugs since the mid-90s, but a comparable
increase (lower in volume) in the applications for biologics and biosimilars in that same
time period.51
Of the top 10 drugs by annual revenue in 2019, seven are biologics including the
blockbuster arthritis/autoimmune biologic HUMIRA (adalimumab) and breast cancer
biologic HERCEPTIN (trastuzumab).52 Interestingly, in an American study in 2019, a
survey of employers found that although biologics accounted for only 1% of all
prescriptions dispensed to their workers and dependents, they accounted for 40% of all
monies spent on drugs.53
The hope is that efficient adoption of competitive biosimilars will provide costs savings
for patients and payers to not only halt, but reduce the costs of biologics. This strategy
becomes particularly more pressing in light of the tendency for biologic companies to
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significantly increase their prices in the years leading up to the expiry of the biologic’s
patents and the entry of biosimilars on the market place. Two examples of this trend in
the US market: Amgen increased the price for ENBREL (entanercept) by 37% over the
course of 18 months from 2014 to 2016.54 Janssen Biotech, the innovator biologic
manufacture for REMICADE (infliximab), increased its prices by 57% from 2012 until the
availability of the first biosimilar in 2017.55
The pharmaceutical industry has had a long history spanning over a century, tracing its
roots back even further to the chemical industry.

Indeed, many of the current

pharmaceutical industry players today can trace their roots back to these chemical
companies.56 Like chemical companies giving rise to pharmaceutical companies, the
majority in the biopharmaceutical industry are themselves pharmaceutical companies
having expanded their therapeutic agent purview such as Pfizer and Merck. As well,
traditional generic companies, such as Sandoz and Apotex, have moved into the
biopharmaceutical space to not only produce biosimilars, but some have also advanced
innovative biologic programs. Unlike these pharmaceutically-rooted companies, other
ventures like Amgen and Genetech were founded as biotechnology companies that are
now at the forefront of generating innovative biologics, but also engage in
comprehensive

biosimilars

development

strategies.

The

first

category

of

pharmaceutical-grounded biologic/biosimilar manufacturers are more common; the
major pharmaceutical players have been strategically making moves to shore up their
biologics pipelines through development and acquisitions. 57 The second type of
biotechnology-founded companies are less common, but have been driving the biologics
54
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innovation charge since the 1980s until the “big pharma” players began to engage more
meaningfully in the pursuit of expanded pipelines and profits.58
The Interesting twist to the development of the biopharmaceutical activities is the
blurring of lines between traditional “brand” or “innovative” companies with “generic”
companies.59 Of the top 25 biologics companies, about two thirds are traditional
innovator pharmaceutical companies (such as Pfizer, Merck, Roche) where almost half
of those innovator companies have biosimilar (such as Pfizer, Novartis, AstraZeneca)
products and strategies. Similarly, of the two traditional generic pharmaceuticals on the
list (Teva, Mylan), one is engaged in originator biologics development in addition to
biosimilars development.60
Another interesting element is the geographic clustering of the top biopharmaceutical
industry players which, as we will see in Chapter 3, has led to a concentration of
geopolitical influence in the US and EU. Table 1 below sets out the top 28
pharmaceutical companies by global sales over the last decade (some of which have
merged), detailing their founding origins, current headquarters and their current
biologics/biosimilars offerings. Of the 28 top biopharmaceutical companies, 10 were
founded in the US, 9 were founded in the EU, 9 founded outside of either the US or EU.
In terms of headquarters, the concentration remains the US and EU where 14
companies are headquartered in the US and 8 are headquartered in the EU. Only 6 of 28
companies are located outside of the US or EU – 2 in Switzerland, 3 in Japan and 1 in
Israel.
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TABLE 1 – TOP 28 GLOBAL BIOPHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES BY GROSS REVENUE 2010-2020
Company

Traditional
Market

Origin – Place, Founder nationality,
Date

Current
Headquarters

1

Pfizer

Brand
Pharma

2

Novartis

Brand
Pharma

USA – Founded in 1849 in New York
City, NY USA by German immigrants
Charles Pfizer and Charles F. Erhart.
Switzerland – Founded in 1996 from a
merger of Ciba-Geigy (1971) and
Sandoz Laboratories (1886).

USA
New York City,
NY
Switzerland
Basel,
Switzerland

3

Hoffman-La
Roche

Brand
Pharma

Switzerland - Founded October 1896
by Fritz Hoffman-La Roche.

Switzerland
Basel

Biologics

4

Merck US
(MSD)
Sanofi

Brand
Pharma
Brand
Pharma

USA
Kenilworth, NJ
EU - France
Paris, France

Biologics
Biosimilars
Biologics
Biosimilars

6

Gilead
Sciences

Brand
Pharma

Johnson &
Johnson
GlaxoSmithK
line

Brand
Pharma
Brand
Pharma

AstraZeneca

Brand
Pharma

USA
Foster City, CA,
USA
USA
New Brunswick
EU Pre-2020 –
UK Brentford,
England, UK
USA
Cambridge, UK

Biologics

7

German – US Division opened 1891 NY,
USA.
France – Founded in 1973 as result of
merger between Elf Aquitaine and
Labaz Group by French founders.
USA – Founded in 1987 under name
Oligogen by American Michael L.
Riordan in Foster City, CA USA
USA – Founded by Americans in
January 1886 in New Brunswick, NJ
New Zealand – Founded 1873 by
Englishman Joseph Edward Nathan in
Wellington, New Zealand.
Sweden – Founded as Astra AB1913 in
Södertälje, Sweden. Pharma division
split and became British company
Zeneca in 1993. Merged with Astra in
1999 and became AstraZeneca.
USA – Founded in 1888 originally as
part of Abbott Laboratories by an
American in Chicago. Abbott separated
into 2 companies officially forming
AbbVie in 2013.
USA – First formed as Applied
Molecular Genetics in 1980 by
Americans in Thousand Oaks, CA
USA – Founded 1948 by American.
Acquired by Irish-based Activis in 2015.
Activis renamed Allergan plc and
acquired by AbbVie in 2020.
Isreal – Founded by American-Israelis
May 1, 1935, in Jerusalem, Israel.

USA
Lake Bluff,
Illinois, USA

Biologics

USA
Thousand
Oaks, CA USA
USA
Irvine CA
Acquired by
AbbVie in 2020.
Isreal
Petah Tivka,
Israel
EU – Denmark
Bagsværd,
Copenhagen,

Biologics
Biosimilars

5

8

9

10 AbbVie

Brand
Pharma

11 Amgen

Biotech

12 Allergan

Brand
Pharma

13 Teva

Generic
Pharma

14 Novo
Nordisk

Brand
Pharma

Denmark – Founded in 1989 by merger
of Danish companies Nono Industri and
Nordisk Gentofte in Bagsværd,
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Biologics
and/or
Biosimilar
s
Biologics
Biosimilars
Biologics
Biosimilars
(Sandoz)

Biologics
Biologics

Biologics
Biosimilars

Biologics
Biosimilars

Biologics
Biosimilars
Biologics

Company

Traditional
Market

Origin – Place, Founder nationality,
Date

Current
Headquarters

15 Eli Lilly

Brand
Pharma

Copenhagen, Denmark.
USA – Founded in 1876 by an American
in Indianapolis, Indiana.

16 Bayer

Brand
Pharma

17 BristolMyers
Squibb

Brand
Pharma

18 Takeda
19 Boehringer
Ingelheim

Brand
Pharma
Brand
Pharma

20 Astellas
Pharma

Brand
Pharma

21 Mylan

Brand and
Generic
Pharma

22 Biogen

Biotech

Switzerland – Founded in 1978 by US
and German scientists.

23 Celgene

Biotech

24 Merck KGaA

Brand and
Generic
Pharma
Brand and
Generic
Pharma

USA – Founded in 1986, after
corporate spin-off from Celanese. Now
owned by Bristol Myers Squibb
Germany – Founded by Germans 1668,
Darmstadt, Germany.

Denmark.
USA
Indianapolis,
Indiana, USA
EU – Germany
Leverkusen,
Germany.
USA
430 East 29th
Street, New
York City, NY,
USA
Japan
Tokyo, Japan.
EU – Germany
Ingelheim,
Germany
Japan
Chuo City,
Tokyo, Japan
USA
Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania,
USA
USA
Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
USA
USA
Summitt, New
Jersey, USA
EU – Germany
Darmstadt,
Germany
Japan
Chuo City,
Tokyo, Japan

25 Daiichi
Sankyo

26 Baxter
Internationa
l Inc
27 Sandoz

Brand and
Generic
Pharma
Generic
Pharma

28 Shire Plc

Brand
Pharma

Germany – Founded in 1863 by
Austrians in Barmen, Wuppertal,
Germany.
USA – Founded in 1989 by merger of
Squibb and Bristol-Myers. Squibb
founded by American in Brooklyn, NY,
1858. Bristol-Myers founded by
American in Clinton, NY 1887.
Japan – Founded in 1781 by Japanese
citizens in Doshomachi, Osaka, Japan.
Germany – Founded in 1885 by Albert
Boehringer in Ingelheim am Rhein.
Japan – Founded in 2005 by merger
between Yamanouchi (1923) and
Fujisawa Pharmaceuticals (1894).
Netherlands – Founded in 1961 by
Danish founders.

Japan – Founded in 2005 by merger
between Sankyo Company and Daiichi
Pharmaceuticals, both pharmaceutical
companies founded in Japan in the late
19th to early 20th centuries.
USA – Founded in 1931 by Americans

Switzerland – Founded in 1886.
Novartis was created from the merger
of Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy
UK - Founded in 1986 by UK
entrepreneurs and acquired by Takeda
in 2019

24

Biologics
and/or
Biosimilar
s
Biologics
Biosimilars
Biologics

Biologics

Biologics
Biologics
Biosimilars
Biologics

Biosimilars

Biologics
Biosimilars

Biologics
Biosimilars
Biologics
Biosimilars

USA
Deerfield,
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The investment of both time and money necessary for the development of a biologic is
staggering.61 However, this issue – the calculation of innovation costs and input factors
– has been highly controversial. For a more nuanced perspective, we must look to the
body of research reporting widely different conclusions on this subject. In building on
their own work over the last three decades, Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski and
Ronald W. Hansen provided updated research and development cost estimates of
$2.8B.62 Shortly after the publication of DiMasi’s updated assessment, Vinay Prasad and
Sham Mailankody reported their research criticizing the transparency and
reproducibility of the DiMasi research and concluding that the mean cost to develop an
oncology drug is approximately $648M.63 The most recent statement on this issue was
published in March 2020 by Oliver J. Wouters, Martin McKee, and Jeroen Luyten seeking
to estimate the research and development costs required to bring a drug to market
using publicly available data. Wouters reported a higher median cost of $780M and
mean of $1.3B due to the way drug candidate failures were included in their
methodology. As with Prasad, Wouters criticized DiMasi’s use of confidential
information voluntarily provided by companies without independent verification which
is clearly problematic and a sounds basis to prefer Prasad and Wouters’ findings over
DiMasi’s research despite its long range over time.64
To sum up tritely, the development of a biologic takes between 10-15 years and may
cost upwards of USD $1 to 2 Billion.65 Further, even if a drug does get to clinical trials,
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the rate of eventual market approval is just over 10%.66 On its face, the upfront
investments necessary in R&D

make

clear

the motivations of

innovative

biopharmaceutical companies which is to protect as much of their hard earned and
commercialized work product as possible in order to be able to continue funding new
drug development. Interestingly, there is a high direct correlation between the average
spending on R&D over 10 years and the number of drugs approved.67
In terms of biosimilar development, the investments in generating a biosimilar is far
from insignificant at an average of between USD$100-200 million and it can take 5-10
years before it gets to market. These are greater hurdles than those faced by generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers.

68

However, the justifications underpinning the

biosimilars industry are the same as for generics; biosimilars rely on previously
developed technology to varying degrees to enter the marketplace and often tout the
competition and price reductions as important public benefits of their efforts. 69
But there is another side to this seemingly altruistic cycles of innovative biologic
development and biosimilar accessibility considerations. Biopharmaceutical companies
are going concerns that answer to shareholders and have tended to record profits that
are statistically higher in comparison to non-pharmaceutical healthcare companies and
non-healthcare companies on the S&P 500.70 This is demonstrated by the rise in average
after-tax profit margin of the top 25 drug companies (manufacturing biologics and
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biosimilars, sometimes both) from 2010 to 2015 of 15% to 20%.71 Further, Prasad found
that the in 90% of the drugs investigated had higher revenues in comparison to
development costs, the lowest of which was 17.5% up to a high of 6789.1% and 40% of
the drugs investigated had revenues that exceeded development costs by at least 10fold.72 Regardless of the actual research and development costs – be it $648M,73
$1.3B,74 or $2.8B75 - the risks associated with this investment will likely still not be
outweighed by the profit potential, especially if strategies are available to prolong
market exclusivity and, barring that, market dominance.
Much of the political scrutiny that the biopharmaceutical industry enjoys (or endures
depending on perspective and issue) is a result of their economic, social, technological
and legal influence on healthcare. Pharmaceutical companies routinely interacts with
and influence governments around the world on matters having direct and indirect
impacts on the regulation and protection of its products and their access to the
markets.76 To this end, the biopharmaceutical industry spends a ludicrous amount of
money annually on lobbying efforts77 in far disproportion to groups representing other
health care stakeholders.78
For the purposes of the present research, the specifics and accuracy of DiMasi, Wouters
and Prasad’s works are of tangential relevance given that pricing of biologics and
biosimilars are not substantially affected by legal and regulatory considerations.
However, the actions and strategies of industry players influencing and leveraging legal

71

Sharon Butt, Big Money Club: Revealing the Players and Their Campaign to Stop Pharmacare, 5 (March
2019).
72
Prasad & Mailankody, JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE, 1572 (2017).
73
Id. at.
74
Wouters, et al., JAMA, (2020).
75
Dimasi, et al., JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, (2016).
76
With corporate revenue streams greater than the GDP of some small nations, negotiations between
large pharmaceutical companies and states can look more like a discussion among peers rather than an
appeal to a governing authority.
77
Susan Scutti, Big Pharma spends record millions on lobbying amid pressure to lower drug prices at
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/23/health/phrma-lobbying-costs-bn/index.html. Butt, 21 (March 2019).
78
Robert Steinbrook, Lobbying Expenditures, Campaign Contributions, and Health Care-Follow the Money,
180 JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE (2020).

27

and regulatory frameworks globally are ultimately dictated by their motivations
including their risk-reward and bottom-line profit assessments.
2.3. The Technology – An Overview of Biologic/Biosimilar Biotechnology
Pharmaceuticals and biologics are like distant cousins with some similarities, but their
similarities are not nearly as important as their differences. Understanding these
inherent differences in the characteristics of biologics and biosimilars, as well as the
complexities of their development, is imperative to understanding the impact these
factors have on their regulation and patent strategies.
Pharmaceuticals are small molecule therapeutic agents with function determined
through various biological assays for activities. They are generally not structurally
complex, capable of being manufactured on an industrial scale, and are comparably
thermo- and chemically stable.79 Pharmaceutical investigation has generally taken the
“shot-gun” approach.80 That is, tens of thousands of possible therapeutic molecules are
made then screened in a battery of diverse tests to determine whether there are any
potentially therapeutic applications. Gradually, high potential candidates are selected
to advance to further levels of screening and development into a commercially viable
formulated product established to be safe and efficacious for a given indication.
Pharmaceuticals are then chemically synthesized in a well-defined and controlled
manufacturing process.81 These manufacturing processes are generally well establish
and accurately and predictably reproducible.82 Consistency of the final pharmaceutical
product is not often a challenge and is indeed the basis for the abbreviated pathway to
approval based on the demonstration of bioequivalency touched on in this chapter.
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Again, biologics and biosimilars are a different beast all together.83 Biological molecules
are, in comparison to small molecules, exponentially more massive in size and
structurally complex including primary (amino acid sequence), secondary (basic protein
folding), tertiary (complex protein folding) and quaternary (protein-protein interactions)
features critical to the functioning of the resulting therapeutic. These significant
complexities are the basis for the “biosimilarity” standard in respect of their regulation
rather than an equivalence determination since there is no such thing as an “identical”
or “generic” biologic.
Biologics and biosimilar can be loosely classified into three categories: monoclonal
antibodies, enzyme replacement/modulators and replacement/modulators or cellsurface receptors.84
The early 80s saw the creation of the first generation of biologics were derived from
human endogenous proteins (i.e., hormones and enzymes)85 made using recombinant
technology, namely combining genetic material from different organisms. 86 These
biologics have evolved into an important and valuable class of biologics where the
patents for the earliest of which have expired in the late 1990s, early 2000s.87 As
recombinant protein technology developed, the number of biologics under
development comparably increased.88 As a result of their designed specificity, one of the
most important distinctions between biologics and the majority of pharmaceuticals is
that their development has generally been targeted to specific biological molecules or
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pathways involved in particular disease states. 89 Indeed, the second generation of early
biologics developed in the late 1990s were more complex macromolecules such as
monoclonal antibodies. Initially, murine antibodies were not well tolerated, but the
humanization and eventual development of recombinant antibodies resulted in the
development of important biologics such as REMICADE (infliximab) and HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab).90 As discussed in this research, the patents related to these biologics
have had far-reaching effects on biosimilar development beyond just the scope of the
claims and terms of the patents, many of which are recently expired or close to expiry.
These technological realities and their implications bears some review and contextual
consideration: understanding the technological incongruity of biologics/biosimilars
versus brand/generic pharmaceuticals is essential to contextualizing the differences in
the regulation and patenting strategies. This is not an apples to oranges assessment; it is
more like apples to pygmy hippopotami.
The technology that goes into the research, identification, purification/manufacturing
and development of a biologic is significantly more complex in comparison to
pharmaceutical development and manufacture. Broadly speaking, biologics are derived
from biotechnology tools which are biologically sourced or use biological systems in
their manufacturing.
More particularly, biologics involve the use of cells/cell-lines, vectors, plasmids,
DNA/RNA PCR technology, and the use of biological or microbiological systems and
genetic engineering – such as plant and animal cells, viruses and yeasts – to
commercially produce therapeutic products. In comparison to pharmaceutical
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development, the complexities involved in the path to a biologic product are vast which
leads to more intricate patent and regulatory issues and strategies.91
Inherent variation arises from the fact that the biological systems used to produce the
biologic is less controllable than a chemical process. There is variability from batch-tobatch (biologic or biosimilar) even within a given process used to produce biologics
according to a specific protocol. This kind of cellular or organically-based synthesis is
simply not nearly as reproducible with the same accuracy or consistency as is the
chemical processes that yield pharmaceutical products.
Variations will also arise that are inherent in the biologic processes that produce the
biologics. For instance, in the production of proteins does not only involve the relatively
consistent reproduction of a specific polypeptide sequence from a designed nucleotide
sequence. Variations go beyond just the sequence of the protein and include the
posttranslational modifications that will dictate many of the important characteristics of
the end-biological products. These characteristics will be affected to varying degrees by
slight differences in the raw materials or the biological platform from which these
biologics are manufactured. For instance, posttranslational modification of polypeptides
can include the addition of sugars (i.e., glycosylation) lipids or other functional groups
including the addition of phosphate or acetate. The structural characteristics are as
equally important to the activity of the biologics product including the formation of the
secondary and tertiary structures that involve further chemical modifications (i.e.,
disulfide bridges or hydrogen bonding). Finally the interaction with other peptides in
order to form protein complexes are important quaternary structural characteristics
that affect the biological activity of the end product.92
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The important difference in the characteristics between pharmaceuticals and biologics,
and their impact at different stages from development to manufacture, is summarized
below in the following table:
TABLE 2 – COMPARISON OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BIOLOGICS AND PHARMACEUTICALS93
Stage
Physio-Chemical
Structure

Biologics

Pharmaceuticals

Large and biologically and chemically
complex

Product Characterization Difficult to fully characterize due to
complexity and the variability of the
resultant mixture of heterogeneous
products
Manufacturing
Complexity

Small and chemically less complex
Homogenous final product chemically
well characterized

Highly complex manufacturing in living Relatively simple manufacturing
systems
process primarily through chemical
synthesis

Isolation and Purification Lengthy, multi-stage purification
process; Low tolerance of variability;
detection of contaminant is difficult
and almost entirely unable to be
removed.

Generally easy to purify;
Contamination more easily avoided,
detected and removable.

Analysis

Potentially complex physiochemical
Analysis relatively simple laboratory
analytical methods or biological assays analysis

Environmental
Susceptibility

Highly susceptible to environmental
variations in temperature, humidity

Environmental changes have very
little impact.

Immunogenicity94

Likely has immunogenic effects
impacted by post-translational
modifications and process variations.

Generally low immunogenicity

What does all of this mean? First, it means that minor differences in manufacturing
processes can lead to variations in the biologic that can significantly modify the
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molecule stability, activity, specificity, or antigenic properties in comparison to the
reference biologic. Second, the regulatory assessment of a biosimilar is inherently and
profoundly different than the bioequivalency comparisons drawn between brand and
generic pharmaceuticals. Third, the inherent biologic variability may significantly affect
the treatment of a patient may lead to either an adverse immune reaction to the
biosimilar in comparison to the reference biologic, or a stronger or weaker than
expected effect on the intended target, or even interactions with unintended targets.
Fourth, the less consistent reproducibility, accuracy, and predictability inherent in
biologic manufacturing processes result in risks that dictate a higher standard for the
assessment of biosimilarity of the biosimilar in comparison to the reference biologic.
And ultimately, it means that the development of biosimilars takes more time, costs
more money and is more complex than the development of generic pharmaceuticals.
Consequently, biosimilars must be regulated differently, they must be approved
differently, and they must be incentivized differently.
2.4. The Patents
Technological differences described in this chapter have a significant bearing on the
patent strategies employed by biologic and biosimilar companies. However, it is the
intersection of these patent strategies with the regulatory frameworks that, as will be
described further in this chapter, is of particular interest to this research. A general
foundation of patent law principles, predominantly agnostic to the field of technology, is
first warranted.
In Canada, the US and EU, an invention is patentable where it is new, useful, not obvious
and of patentable subject matter.95 As described in more detail in Chapter 3, the
harmonization of many fundamental aspects of patent law applicable to biologics and
biosimilars arose from international treaty obligations and are now entrenched in
95
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Canada, the US and EU. In particular, patent protection must be provided for patentable
subject matter in all fields of technology including pharmaceutical products,96 the patent
term must run for 20 years from the date of filing,97 and the patent system must be
based on “first to file”, not “first to invent”, a change that had specific impact in the US
in 2010 discussed below.98
In terms of crafting the specific protections, patent claims define the fence around the
invention where the patentee is able to exclude others from treading upon. The way
that the claims of a patent defines this fence influence the ways in which a
pharmaceutical and biologic company can enforce these exclusionary rights. For
example, the technology involved in manufacturing a new drug or biologic can be
embodied in a number of different types of claims which commonly include, but are by
no means limited to, the following: medicinal ingredient,99 products,100 formulation,101
dosage form,102 product by process, 103 process,104 and use of the product. 105 These
protections are designed to be layered, their protection compounding; if a company
obtained only a process patent, but not a product patent, another company could
manufacture the product by a non-patented process, thereby not infringing the
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patentee’s process patent.106 However, given the relative newness of biotechnology,
there is a greater amount of potentially patentable technology that goes into a biologic,
the development of a biologic and potentially the development of biosimilars including
inventions that cover cell lines, animal models, vectors, genetic materials, gene
sequences, protein sequences, etc. This includes patent strategies to protect important
aspects of their technology inherent in the active/medicinal ingredient, formulation,
production process, and use of the biologic/biosimilar.107 As we will see throughout this
work, these perceived entitlements have the potential to lead to entanglements
resulting in a lack of biosimilar incentivization.
As previously discussed, the pharmaceutical industry has had a long history spanning
over a century and stemming from the chemical industry. Indeed, many of the current
major biologic industry players are these same pharmaceutical companies that can trace
their roots back to these chemical companies.108 Many of these companies are well
versed in the importance of intellectual property protection so it should come as no
surprise that biologics and even biosimilar companies seek to protect their innovation
by a variety of means including patents. Indeed, the protection of intellectual capital has
been the driving force behind many strategic plans of biologic companies, including
R&D, co-development agreements, assignment and licensing of technology, mergers &
acquisitions of other companies, etc. and other strategies to consolidate and capture
their intellectual property.109
Proponents of an aggressive patenting strategy argue that broad patent protection is
warranted to protect market exclusivity and resulting profits in order to fund the R&D
cycle which is extremely time consuming, inherently risky, and wildly expensive.
106
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However, the counter-perspective is that overly broad patent protection, namely a less
stringent assessment of the patentability of a given invention before the patent office,
will significantly deters innovation by anyone other than the brand first to the finish line.
Patent rights, like many other intellectual property rights, are exclusionary in nature, but
do not necessarily confer the exclusive ability to commercialize a product that may
(directly or indirectly) fall within the scope of a patent(s). Rather, a patent confers the
right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention. Accordingly, acquiring
patent rights for a maximum number of possible claim types is the first line of defense
that a biologics company has to protect its valuable intellectual capital from potential
biosimilar competition. This propensity contributes to the creation of clusters of patents
related not only to the biologic, but also technology overlapping with the biologic
creating “patent thickets” that are difficult to identify and navigate.110 In recent years,
even the EPO has identified the shift in patent strategy that is attributable to
macromolecular patent filings which has seen a significant increase. 111 It has been
proposed that the shift from a “first to invent” to a “first to file” system is the impetus
for patent filings that are so early in the development of the biologic that the claims will
tend to be speculative, overbroad and plentiful.112 However, the converse is also true;
patents can be filed at any time during the development of the biologic and well after
launch which may only be tangentially related to the biologic. The presumed underlying
intention is to create barriers to biosimilar competition. For instance, it was reported
that the majority of over a hundred patents related to HUMIRA (adalimumab) was filed
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in 2010 well after its market launch which, once challenged by biosimilar manufacturers
seeking approval, asserted infringement of 74 patents.113
Where patent thickets serve to build fences around the inventive elements of the
biologic, all fences must eventually come down as patents expire. Expiry of a patents
that may be asserted against a biosimilar is referred to as “patent cliffs” that represents
the end the primary scope of patent protection that usually claim products,
manufacturing processes, formulations, use, etc. A significant amount of effort and
analysis is undertaken to determine when the timing of these patent cliffs which greatly
informs a biosimilar manufacturer’s strategy in targeting specific biologics with which to
compete. The Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal published a broadly
encompassing review of estimated patent cliffs for monoclonal antibodies (nonhumanized and humanized) and non-antibody biologics taking into consideration both
patent expiry and data exclusivity assessments.114 Further, Hubb Schellekens’ work in
the area reports the expiry of the first wave of biologics developed in the 1980s, namely
hormones and enzymes, which have expired during the early 2000s. 115 For the second
wave of biologics developed in the 1990s, the patent cliff for many of these biologics
(e.g. RITUXAN (rituximab), REMICADE (infliximab), AVASTIN (bevacizumab), HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab), ENBREL (etanercept) has been occurring over the last few years to
date.116 However, there has been an obscuring of these patent cliffs by the patent
thickets due to a blurring of claims that may be asserted against a biosimilar applicant in
the course of its regulatory approval process by a reference biologic holder. These data
should be approached with some caution given that the patent thickets applicable to a
given biologic may be dense and no underlying patent information is provided in order
to verify the scope of the patent searches that underlie the reported results. Without
113

Wu & Cheng, CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP., (2019). Andrew Pollack, Makers of Humira and Enbrel Using New
Drug Patents to Delay Generic Versions The New York Times(July 15, 2016), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/makers-of-humira-and-enbrel-using-new-drug-patentsto-delay-generic-versions.html.
114
B. I. Journal Editor Ga, Patent expiry dates for biologicals: 2018 update, 8 GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS
INITIATIVE JOURNAL 24(2019).
115
Schellekens, TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, (2004).
116
Calo-Fernández & Martínez-Hurtado, PHARMACEUTICALS (BASEL, SWITZERLAND), (2012).

37

doubt, however, these assessments provide some insight into the approximate
protection periods, a necessary starting point in determining whether the de facto
period of protection has been inappropriately extended and why.
Thus, patent thickets are not only daunting and a significant barrier to biosimilar
competition,117 they also serve to obscure the patent cliffs, deter expensive patent
litigation and encourage private settlement of patent litigation and licensing agreements
that may artificially extend the biologic monopoly and establish a royalty stream once
biosimilar competition does come on the market. This is currently the state of affairs in
the case of HUMIRA (•), the single highest grossing drug in the world at $20B annually
and growing, where AbbVie will enjoy a market exclusivity period for a total of three
decades, well beyond the 2012 expiry of the product patent. These far-reaching
implications will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5’s analysis and discussion.
As previously alluded to, patent strategies take a more prominent position in the
biopharmaceutical industry. In countries where patent linkages are enshrined in
national legislation, the reference biologic holder’s patent(s) are linked to the regulatory
approval of competing biosimilars which is why these regimes are referred to as “patent
linkage” regimes. Introduced in the following section, the underpinnings for patent
linkages at the international treaty level is explored in Chapter 3, their comparative
national implementations examined in Chapter 4 and their implications discussed in
Chapter 5.
Importantly, there exists in Canada, the US and EU, exceptions that allow a biosimilar
applicant to practice the invention for experimental or regulatory purposes; activities
that would otherwise be infringing. These types of provisions can be referred to as
early-working or regulatory use exceptions/exemptions.
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In Canada, the s.55.2 early working exception enacted in the Canadian Patent Act118
applies to an otherwise infringing activity where the activity is done solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of regulatory information.119
These regulatory requirements can be pursuant to federal or provincial law, or the laws
of another country. While this provision is not specifically addressed to the
pharmaceutical industry, it has been used almost exclusively by generics and more
recently biosimilar manufacturers as an early-working exception for the purpose of
preparing submissions to Health Canada to obtain market authorization.
The Canadian PM(NOC) Regulations were enacted pursuant to s.55.2(4) of the Patent
Act with the intent of balancing the generic’s early working activities under s.55.2’s
Regulatory Use Exemption against the Brand’s intellectual property rights. 120 The
Canadian government’s intent to balance these competing interests was clearly
reflected in the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement of the Canadian PM(NOC)
Regulations as originally enacted in 1993 which states:
These Regulations are needed to ensure this new exception to patent infringement is
not abused by generic drug applicants seeking to sell their product in Canada during the
term of their competitor’s patent while nonetheless allowing generic competitors to
undertake the regulatory approval work necessary to ensure they are in a position to
market their products immediately after the expiry of any relevant patents.
…
These Regulations together with subsection 55.2(1) will allow patentee to enjoy full
patent protection while ensuring off-patented competitors will be able to enter the
marketplace immediately upon the expiry of all patents pertaining to a medicine.
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However, it is important to note the historical context that eventually lead to the
enactment of Canada’s s. 55.2 early working exception and the Canadian PM(NOC)
Regulations in 1993, namely the abolition of the compulsory licensing regime that
allowed Canada’s generic pharmaceutical industry to flourish.
Dating back to 1923, Canada’s patent laws provided for the issuance of compulsory
licenses for the manufacturing and importation of patented medicines.121 A compulsory
license was a statutory license, the patentee’s consent to which was not required,
allowing a generic manufacturer to make and sell a generic version of a brand
pharmaceutical that was still under patent protection where the pharmaceutical’s active
ingredient was manufactured in Canada. In exchange, the patentee received a fixed
royalty to be paid by the generic which were set at 4% of the retail drug price.122 In
1969, an amendment to the Canadian Patent Act allowed compulsory licenses to cover
instances where the active pharmaceutical ingredient was manufactured outside of
Canada, thereby allowing for the importation of the active pharmaceutical ingredient,
then subsequent compounding in Canada. This lead to an exceptionally strong generic
manufacturing industry which clearly caught the attention, and garnered the pressure,
of the brand pharmaceutical industries in the US and EU, eventually being identified as
incompatible with its international obligations. Unfortunately, the pendulum likely
swung too far; Canada was experiencing a negative effect of reduced innovation,
investment and loss of highly educated Canadians to other jurisdictions that eventually
spurred the federal Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in the mid-80s to strike
a commission to investigate a rebalancing of Canada’s compulsory licensing regime in
order to generate growth and strengthen Canada’s innovative industry. Thus, this
represented a tectonic shift in the Canadian legal landscape relating to pharmaceutical
patent law that, as we will see in this chapter and Chapter 4, ultimately lead to the
current pendulum swing in the other direction.
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In the US, the regulatory use exception arose from Congress’ response to a decision in
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. (“Bolar Exception”).123 In Eli Lilly and
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the US Supreme Court grant the patent term extension pursuant
to §156(f) to Eli Lilly, however, the Court also interpreted Congress’ actions in adopting
the Bolar Exception codified in §271(e)(1), applying to all human drugs, whether
chemical or biological, stating that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use,
or sell a patented invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs.”124
An early working exception has also be adopted in the EU, but not until after it
unsuccessfully challenged Canada’s early working exception. Discussed in detail in
Chapter 3, the TRIPs agreement allows, among other things, states to use the WTO’s
enforcement mechanism for disputes that may arise. The EU brought a complaint
against Canada taking issue with Canada’s early working exception that also provided
some stockpiling rights to generic manufacturers. Article 7 of TRIPs allows for significant
flexibility whereby WTO states are enabled to implement their TRIPs obligations as well
as give consideration to their other public policy objectives.125 This issue was put to the
WTO Panel by the EU arguing that the reference to measures consistent with TRIPs
Article 8(1) meant that any other considerations beyond the patent holders rights were
subordinate to the protection of the minimum intellectual property rights guaranteed
by TRIPs.126 That is, the early working exception, as well as the stockpiling provisions,
were contrary to Canada’s TRIPs obligations. Instead, the Panel accepted that Canada’s
adjustments to a patent holder's rights in the form of the early working exception were
contemplated according to the objectives and principles (and other relevant provisions)
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of TRIPs.127 The stockpiling provisions, however, were held to be problematic and were
eventually eliminated. Subsequently, the EU adopted that states that “[c]onducting the
necessary studies and trials with a view to the application of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4
and the consequential practical requirements shall not be regarded as contrary to
patent rights or to supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products.”128
The agencies responsible for the adjudication of patents warrant mention. The
intellectual property offices in Canada and the US are responsible for the examination of
patents, respectively the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Patent prosecution in the EU is a bit more
complicated; the European Patent Convention was created to provide a coordinated,
more efficient, less expensive pathway to patent grant in multiple countries. Beginning
with 16 signatories in the 70s, the EPC is administered by the European Patent
Organization which has grown to a total of 38 members including all 28 members of the
EU plus other countries like Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 129 Like the PCT, an
applicant can file a single patent application that, if granted, is a valid and enforceable
unitary patent in all of the member states that the applicant elects. Importantly, the
European Patent Office administering the European Patent Convention is not a body of
the European Union; patents are granted by the EPC for each country, but must be
enforced in each jurisdiction.
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2.5. The Regulations and Linkages – Biosimilar Regulatory Approvals and their
Intersection with Internationally Mandated, Nationally Implemented Patent
Linkages, Data Exclusivity and Additional IP Provisions
The importance of the early working exceptions crafted into the national patent laws in
Canada, as well as the US and EU, goes beyond a simple exception to patent
infringement and their associated legal consequences. These provisions provide
biosimilar manufacturers a “jump” on the regulatory process in order to secure
authorizations simultaneous with engaging in patent/IP clearance activities such as
patent litigation, if warranted. Further, this “jump” is not only with respect to
“infringement” time, namely the ability to practice protected invention(s) prior to the
patent expiry – but also in respect of “regulatory” time where the ability to file an
application for market authorization is also provided prior to the patent(s) expiry and/or
potentially where data is also protected from certain types of use pursuant to data
exclusivity protections as described below and detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.
In Canada, the US and EU, the standards for both the biologic and biosimilars are
identical, namely safety, efficacy and quality.130 A biologic applicant will be granted
market authorization if its submitted evidence in respect of the biologic supports these
criteria. The main distinction between the regulatory approaches for a biologic versus a
biosimilar is the pathway. The biologic pathway is based on the submission of complete
evidence and data establishing the safety, efficacy and quality of the biologic. However,
there is an abbreviated pathway available to biosimilars relying on evidence and data
already submitted by the previously approved biologic applicant. In Canada, and the US
and EU, an abbreviated pathway for the assessment of biosimilars has been created
such that their biosimilar application may compare or make reference to a previously
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approved biologic often called a “reference product”, “reference medicine”, or
“reference biologic product” (referred throughout as a reference biologic).
This section first addresses the technological realities of biologics and biosimilars that
have shaped the principles underpinning the regulatory regimes in Canada, the US and
EU, all of which are highly similar. With this context of how technology impacts
biosimilar regulation, we next explore the specifics of abbreviated approval pathways
for biosimilars using the EU as the starting point which accurately reflects reality; the EU
pioneered the abbreviated biosimilar assessment framework which heavily influenced
both Canada and the US’ efforts years later. Finally, we tie together the regulatory
framework by describing the intersection between biosimilar regulation and the
internationally mandated, nationally implemented patent linkages, data exclusivity and
additional IP provisions, the comparative analysis of which will be addressed in detail in
Chapter 4.
2.5.1. How Biosimilars Technology Shaped Their Regulation and Approval
The very nature of biologics and the technology behind their manufacture means that it
is impossible to create an identical copy, or even close facsimile, of the active ingredient
which is by and large possible in the brand/generic pharmaceutical paradigm. These
technological realities alone impacts the development of biologics and biosimilars as
well as their regulatory assessments.
Biologics and biosimilars are approved by a regulatory agency that, having received and
reviewed detailed data and evidence submitted, support the safety, efficacy and quality
of the biologic or biosimilar; these standards are equally applicable to biologics and
biosimilars in Canada, the US and EU as detailed below. The key to the abbreviated
biosimilars pathway is through establishing “biosimilarity” with a reference biologic.
Demonstrating that a biosimilar is “biosimilar” to a reference biologic is complex; the
reference biologic holder has extensive knowledge and information about the
44

development and manufacturing of the reference biologic including established controls
and specification tolerances.
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By contrast, the biosimilar manufacturer has

independently developed a different manufacturing process (e.g., different cell line, raw
materials, equipment, processes, controls, and specification tolerances) from the
reference biologic manufacturer. It is not an insignificant proposition to conduct the
necessary analysis to establish structural and functional similarity.132
Evidence for biosimilarity is founded upon structural and functional studies which, in the
past have been very difficult to establish due to the state of the relevant technology.
The good news is that advancements in analytical methodologies has increased the
ability to extensively characterize the structural and biological properties, as well as
increased the ability to identify and characterize the excipients and product- and
process-related impurities. However, while these advancements allow a manufacturer
to ascertain some differences, this has not translated to the capability to detect all
relevant structural and functional variations between a biologic and biosimilar.
Focusing on biosimilars, three significant ways that inject variability between a
biosimilar and a reference biologic are (1) the primary sequence of amino acids; (2)
post-translation modifications such as glycosylation (addition of sugar moieties) or other
side chains such as phosphorylation; and (3) tertiary (protein folding) and quaternary
(protein-protein interactions) structure. 133 The latter two factors are especially
susceptible to minor variations in formulation and environmental conditions, including
light, temperature, moisture, packaging materials, container closure systems, and
delivery device materials.134 Each of these factors (in addition to others) may lead to a
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lack of homogeneity in the resulting product when compared to the reference biologic,
even in the event of strict control. Indeed, even mild variations in the production
conditions of the reference biologic may lead to heterogeneity from batch to batch in
both the biologic and biosimilar manufacturers’ process.135 Further, these inherent
variabilities arising from the process and product purity may have unintended and
unpredicted immune responses.
Additionally, different manufacturing processes may alter a protein product in a way
that could affect the safety or effectiveness of the product. For example, differences in
biological systems used to manufacture a protein product may cause different
posttranslational modifications, which in turn may affect the safety and/or effectiveness
of the product. Thus, when the manufacturing process for a marketed protein product is
changed, the application holder must assess the effects of the change and
demonstrate—through appropriate analytical testing, functional assays, and/or in some
cases animal and/or clinical studies—that the change does not have an adverse effect
on the identity, strength, quality, purity, or potency of the product as they relate to the
safety or effectiveness of the product.
Finally, the biosimilar’s mechanism of action leading to a clinical effect may not be
entirely congruent with the reference biologic; further animal studies and human clinical
studies will likely continue to be required in order to demonstrate biosimilarity.
It should be noted that this abbreviated pathway does include significantly more
comprehensive data to establish biosimilarity than is required to establish
bioequivalence in the generic pharmaceutical context. Not only does the biologics and
biosimilars manufacturers have to overcome the vast amount of time, money and
resources required to develop a biologic/biosimilar, but it must also contend with a
comparably more difficult regulatory assessment and ongoing regulatory submission
requirements internationally in comparison to pharmaceuticals.

135

Radhakrishnan, et al., CURRENT OPINION IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, (2018).

46

2.5.2. Regulation of Biosimilars in Canada, the US and EU
Without question, the EU’s European Medicines Agency has been at the forefront of the
regulation of biologics and biosimilars. Both the Canadian and the US’ approaches were
influenced heavily from the EU’s prior experience. As a result, the EU’s approach will
serve to set the stage to be followed by a description of the highly similar strategies
employed in Canada and the US. 136
The practical implications arising from the inherent variability of biologics and their
manufacture (not present in the pharmaceutical context) means that the regulatory
approach to biologics and biosimilars has had to evolve. Recognizing these fundamental
realities, a high level approach was first adopted in the EU and then subsequently in the
US and Canada, namely the assessment of a biosimilar is based on whether it is similar
(“biosimilar”) to the reference biologic or at a higher standard, interchangeable with the
reference biologic.
The EMA is responsible for the assessment of applications made through a centralized
marketing authorization process in respect of new medicines, including biologics and
biosimilars, in the EU. While the EU’s pharmaceutical regulation also has a decentralized
and national procedure for obtaining marketing approval in EU member states, the
unified procedure through the EMA is compulsory for biologics and biosimilars, in
addition to other medicines.137
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Formal consideration of a biosimilars approval pathway began in the EU as early as
2001.138 In 2003, consideration of “similar biological medicinal products” were first
incorporated into the EU’s market authorization provisions,139 and the first biosimilar
review guidance document – the hallmark for the development of approaches around
the world – was adopted in 2005.140 Biologic and biosimilar applications are submitted
and assessed by the EMA’s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use
(“CHMP”). The CHMP provides initial assessments for marketing authorization of new
medicines that are ultimately approved centrally by the EMA.141
In its submission to the CHMP, a biosimilar applicant must establish that the biosimilar is
highly similar in functionality (biologic activity) and that there are no clinically
meaningful differences in terms of safety, quality and efficacy in comparison to the
reference biologic. In doing so, the biosimilar applicant is permitted to rely on the data
and evidence upon which the reference biologic’s approval was predicated, thereby
creating an abbreviated pathway to authorization that avoids the unnecessary, as well
as costly and unethical, repetition of clinical trials already establishing the safety and
efficacy of the reference biologic. As part of these obligations, biosimilar applicants
must provide

comprehensive non-clinical

product-by-product bioanalytic and

manufacturing assessments, as well as clinical evidence to establish similarity.
At the outset, the EU’s pioneering approach was acknowledged because it created a
comprehensive regulatory framework, but the implications of such an abbreviated
pathway in Canada and the US were wider reaching.
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Ultimately, the abbreviated framework that Canada adopted was similar to the EU’s
approach. Of equal importance to this research, Canada also linked the biosimilar
regulatory assessment to biologic patent consideration in the same way that the
regulatory assessment of a generic pharmaceutical is linked to the brand’s patents, data
exclusivity and now their sui generis rights. In Canada, the standard for assessing
biosimilars in reference to reference biologics is identical to the EU’s approach (as well
as the US’ described below). Drugs,142 including pharmaceuticals and biologics, are
regulated by Health Canada pursuant to the Canadian Food and Drugs Act143 and Food
and Drugs Regulations, 144 and are subject to the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations,145 and the Canadian Patent Act.146 The Biologics and Genetic
Therapies Directorate (“BGTD”), a directorate of the Canadian regulatory authority
Health Canada, is responsible for the review and assessment of all submissions related
to biologics and biosimilars.147 Health Canada uses the term biosimilar to describe “a
biologic product that is similar to and would enter the market subsequent to an
approved innovator biologic product.”148
No company may sell or advertise a drug in Canada without first obtaining a Notice of
Compliance (“NOC”) from Health Canada.149 To obtain a NOC, an applicant must file a
drug submission – new or supplemental new drug submission (NDS or SNDS),
abbreviated or supplemental abbreviated new drug submission (ANDS or SANDS) – with
Health Canada submitting comprehensive information as prescribed by legislation and
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policy. Biologics applications proceed by way of NDS (or SNDS) and, despite being an
abbreviated assessment pathway based on biosimilarity, so do biosimilars.150
In Canada’s abbreviated biosimilar pathway, the biosimilar applicant has the benefit of
relying on a reference biologic that has previously been authorized on the basis of a
complete quality, non-clinical, and clinical data package. As a result of this reliance, the
biosimilar applicant must establish in its NDS the comparative similarity in the quality,
safety and efficacy to the reference biologic.151 Interestingly, Canada allows a biosimilar
sponsor to rely on a Non-Canadian reference biologic.152
As is the case with the EMA/CHMP, Health Canada’s BGTD will evaluate whether the
biosimilar application demonstrates that, in comparison to the reference biologic, the
biosimilar is highly similar, and there are no clinically meaningful differences in efficacy
and safety between the biosimilar and the reference biologic. Health Canada’s BGTD
takes a step-wise approach to biosimilar application reviews, first requiring the
biosimilar applicant to establish similarity based on structure and function (such as
product stability, biological activities, physiochemical properties, immunochemical
properties, purity and impurity profiles),153 second moving on to non-clinical and clinical
studies that may speak to toxicity or immunogenicity. The purpose of clinical studies is
to establish that there are no clinically meaningful differences in efficacy and safety
expected between the biosimilar and reference biologic.
Further, the biosimilar applicant (as well as the reference biologic holder) must
demonstrate their ability to consistently manufacture the biosimilar as per its
represented specifications. This assessment may also include onsite evaluation visits
and laboratory testing conducted by Health Canada’s BGTD.
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The US’s approach to biosimilars culminated in the creation of an abbreviated
regulatory pathway. However, unlike Canada, the US did not follow its existing
brand/generic approach in crafting the link between the regulatory assessments of
biosimilars and the biologic holder’s patents. In terms of the regulatory framework, it is
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) which is the agency of the US
Government’s Department of Health and Human Services within the FDA responsible for
regulating biologics and biosimilars for human use154 under applicable federal laws,
including the Public Health Service Act155 and also, since most biological products also
meet the definition of “drugs”, under certain provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.156 In broad strokes, the assessment approach in the US is highly similar to
the EU’s criteria of safety, efficacy and quality.157 Like Canada, the US has a productspecific assessment approach where each biosimilar has its own approval requirements
assessed in a stepwise manner which will include comprehensive bioanalytical
comparisons, clinical studies and other study requirements as determined by the degree
of similarity as well as any discernable bioanalytical differences.
In the context of generic pharmaceuticals, the Hatch-Waxman Act158 enacted in 1984
established the legislative framework for generic manufacturers to obtain market
authorization granted by the FDA through a new abbreviated pathway for the approval
of new drugs, through the abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) process.159
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However, no such pathway equivalent existed for biosimilars until relatively recently in
2010.160
Up until 2010, the regulatory assessment pathway for biosimilars seeking market
approval was the new drug application (“NDA”) pathway identical to the previously
approved biologic.161 In essence, the FDA’s biosimilar approval process was a complete
repetition – requiring the identical data and evidence – to the approval process that
already resulted in the FDA granting approval to the biologic. In pharmaceutical
parlance, there was no abbreviated ANDA-like pathway created for biosimilars until,
after almost a decade of discussion,162 the enactment in 2010 of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act (US Biosimilars Act), 163 a subtitle of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (US Affordable Care Act).164
The US Biosimilars Act, amended, among other provisions, §351 of the Public Health
Services Act (“US Public Health Services Act”),165 creating an abbreviated pathway for
the FDA to assess biosimilars that are either biosimilar to or interchangeable with a
previously licensed biologic product166 through an abbreviated process pursuant to
§351(k) by way of the Biologic License Application (BLA) procedure. Importantly, the
abbreviated pathway created by the US Biosimilars Act is two pronged creating an
approval pathway for biosimilars that are demonstrated to be biosimilar as well as
interchangeable with a reference biologic.
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Through the BLA biosimilarity pathway the biosimilar applicant must establish a high
degree of similarity between the reference medicine and biosimilar which may include
some inherent minor differences in clinically insignificant modifications or tolerable
heterogeneity. In establishing biosimilarity, the biosimilar application must establish
that there is no clinically meaningful differences in the safety, purity and potency
(efficacy) in comparison to the reference biologic.167 In doing so, the biosimilar applicant
must conduct and submit non-clinical and clinical studies, such as bioanalytical studies
showing that the biosimilar is highly similar to the reference biologic, animal studies
assessing toxicity, as well as any clinical studies that may be required at the direction of
the FDA.
2.5.3. Regulatory Triggers for Patent Linkages, Data Exclusivity and Additional
IP Provisions
Understanding how biosimilars and biologics are regulated in Canada, as well as the US
and EU, is key to appreciating the way in which the regulatory processes in each
jurisdiction are designed to similarly intersect with the patent/IP clearance regimes,
namely patent linkages, data exclusivity and additional IP provisions, mandated by their
respective international obligations implemented in national legislation and regulatory
frameworks. As previously alluded to, patent strategies are heavily influenced by patent
linkage regimes. As will become apparent in this section and the coming chapters, a
given biologic manufacturer’s patent strategy has a material impact on the market
authorization of biosimilars containing the same active therapeutic ingredient given its
potential operative effect in the context of national patent linkage regimes, as well as
additional patent-based or sui generis rights arising from eligible patents.
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The patent strategies described in this chapter speak to the patent strategies that are
influenced by biologic/biosimilar technology. The complexity of biologics and biosimilars
have generally given rise to more patents claiming core inventions (product, formulation
and use of the product) and patentable underlying development and manufacturing
technology. Patent applications are usually filed at the outset of biologic development
and may encompass inventions beyond just the biologic, but also touch on aspects of it
development and manufacture. Given the lengthy regulatory process coupled with the
“first to file” requirement, an effective loss of patent term results where much of the
nominal 20-year patent term may be expired. In addition, a patent grants a right to
exclude others from practicing an invention claimed in the patent, which would
preclude a biosimilar not only from practically precluding others from competing on the
market with a biologic that falls within the scope of the invention. As aptly
demonstrated by the comprehensive, albeit narrow in scope, assessment of Jeffery Wu
and Claire Cheng, this patent strategy yields filing multiple, overlapping patents with
potentially overbroad claims that serve to obfuscate the patent landscape for a
particular biologic referred to as “patent thickets”, some of which may be eligible to be
asserted in the context of patent linkage regimes.168
A comparative analysis of patent linkages is detailed in Chapter 4. However, it is critical
to first understand how patent considerations are intertwined with the regulatory
assessments of biologics and biosimilars. Turning first to patent linkages, these regimes
are mandated by some treaty obligations requiring the linkage between the regulatory
authorization process with the status of the reference biologic holder’s patent(s) which
must be addressed prior to a regulatory agency’s grant of market authorization. In this
way, the biosimilar applicant has to establish that it will not fall afoul of the reference
biologic’s applicant patents before they are infringed through practicing the claimed
invention beyond the statutory early working exceptions. Alternatively, the biosimilar
applicant must successfully invalidate any relevant patents, again, prior to being granted
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market authorization. This linkage was thought to balance against the benefits
conferred by the early working exception afforded to biosimilar applicant allowing for
the development of biosimilars during the term of the reference biologic holder’s
patent(s). One main differentiating factor between patent linkage regimes is the
identification of the biologic holder’s patent(s) that will need to be addressed, one way
or another, by the biosimilar applicant prior to approval.
The underlying justification of the patent linkage regime is the restoration or
compensation for harm arising from (1) the reference biologic holder/patentee’s
inability to practice its invention during the time it takes to get regulatory approval for
the reference biologic and (2) the early working exception that benefits the biosimilar
company by providing an exception to what would otherwise be infringement of the
reference biologic holder’s patent(s).
Turning next to data exclusivity, these regimes generally operate in the same way in
Canada, the US and EU and are managed at the regulatory agency level. All biologics
that come to the market have to undergo regulatory approval in Canada, the US and EU,
respectively, based on evidence and data to establish the safety, effectiveness and
quality control of a new biologic. This evidence and data is mandatory and must be
submitted in order for the biologic applicant to obtain market authorization. This
mandatory evidence and data can be relied upon by biosimilar applicants to produce
alternative versions of the biologic to compete with the biologic on the market. Data
exclusivity provisions provide some protections over the use and disclosure of the
biologic applicant’s evidence and data from a biosimilar applicants’ reliance in two
practical ways.
The first is a prohibition from the filing of a biosimilar application. Calculated from the
first market authorization date, a reference biologic holder’s evidence and data cannot
be relied upon by a biosimilar applicant because the biosimilar’s application will not be
received by the relevant authority until the expiry of a prescribed period of time. In
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short, the biosimilar applicant is precluded from filing its submission with the regulatory
authority until the expiry of this period, namely the “filing prohibition” period.
The second exclusion is imposed on the regulatory agency’s ability to grant market
authorization, even if the biosimilar is approvable. Specifically, a biosimilar application
making reference to a reference biologic and relying on its evidence and data may be
assessed by the regulatory agency after the filing prohibition period, however, even if
the assessment has been concluded favourably, the regulatory agency is precluded from
granting market authorization/approval until the expiry of this second period, namely
the “authorization prohibition” period.
The justification of data exclusivity provisions is to compensate the reference biologic
holder from the harm arising from allowing a competing biosimilar with the ability to
rely on information, evidence and data of information taking considerable effort to
generate that the reference biologic holder was compelled to disclose for regulatory
purposes.169 It has been argued by various stakeholders that data exclusivity provisions
are also necessary to encourage continuous innovation given that patents are usually
filed at the outset of development and much of the nominal 20-year patent term is lost
during the lengthy regulatory process. However, as explored in Chapter 5, data
exclusivity has yet in play a role in the biologics/biosimilars realm.
It is important to note that data exclusivity is not related to patent considerations;
patents do not protect data. Data exclusivity may be relied on by a reference biologic
holder even where there is no patent protection on the biologic. Where a company has
a comprehensive patent portfolio, the data exclusivity benefits are not engaged unless
the period of protection extends beyond the patent term. Where data exclusivity
protection becomes truly beneficial is where there is difficulty relying on the ability to
assert a patent(s) in the event (1) of no patent protection, (2) a patent has been found
not to be infringed, (3) a patent has expired, and/or (4) a patent is found invalid.
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Additional IP provisions fall generally within two categories: provisions that purport to
affect the patent term such as patent term extension, restorations, and/or adjustments
and those that mandate the creation of sui generis rights not directly related to patent
rights but analogous to such rights in effect. As discussed in the context of Chapter 4’s
comparative analysis, these types of treaty obligations have domestically manifested
through the creation of supplementary protection certificates in the EU and certificates
of supplementary protection in Canada that are not themselves patent rights but are
impacted by patent status. Mitigating the alleged undue delay arising from the lengthy
regulatory assessment of a biologic is the purpose of these types of additional IP
provisions. The justification is to lessen the unreasonable curtailment of the effective
term of the patent due to the mandatory market authorization process.
The regulatory trigger for either patent term extensions or the assertion of sui generis
rights does not operate to affect the filing of a biosimilar application for market
authorization. However, these rights, if valid and subsisting, may operate to preclude
the approval of the biosimilar. In this way, the biosimilar application may be compliant
and approvable in all respects, but the issuance of the authorization or approval must
wait until the expiry of the patent or sui generis rights term(s) and are no longer a bar to
the biosimilar.
2.6. Summary of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 has laid the foundation for the justifications underlying the international and
national therapeutic innovation strategy in Canada, the US and EU; public and
commercial interest dictates that steps must be taken to promote the innovation of
these therapeutic agents through a variety of channels, one of which is ensuring an
appropriate balance between the protection of hard earned intellectual capital and
facilitating competition through the encouragement of biosimilars, thereby cultivating
an environment where innovation is continuously promoted.
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The promise of biologics and biosimilars, their public health considerations and
potential patient impact, is astounding; these macromolecules have opened a door to
therapies that were not only previously unattainable, but also unknown.
The regulation of a biologic, aspects of which are acutely concerned with purity and
impurities, is compounded by the reality that it is almost impossible to identically copy
and exclusively isolate the target biologic or biosimilar which has patent and regulatory
implications arising purely from the nature of their development and manufacturing
technology.
While the term of a patent in Canada, the US and EU is 20 years from the date of filing,
given that will likely take over a decade to get market authorization (not even a
guaranteed outcome), a biologic’s prospective exclusive commerciality is about half the
patent term. Accordingly, the imperative for a biologic company is to coordinate patent
and regulatory efforts through a life-cycle management strategy in order to maximize
market exclusivity and, after the entry of competitive biosimilar, preserve market share.
In terms of the patent and regulatory strategy for a biosimilar company, the patent and
regulatory strategy is to attempt to have as much clarity on the risk profile of developing
a competing biosimilar by assessing the patent landscape of the biologic and the
technology surrounding the biologic as well as ascertaining any applicable exclusionary
periods and/or rights extensions.
The product pipeline is of paramount importance making the intellectual capital that
goes into the development of the pipeline the lifeblood of the company. Further,
biologics and biosimilars are being developed in non-traditional ways by both traditional
players (pharmaceutical companies) and newcomers (biologic and/or biosimilar
companies) where the lines of “brand” vs. “generic” are blurred. It is the development
and protection of their products’ market authorization and penetration that is the
driving force behind almost all strategic plans, including R&D, co-development
agreements, assignment and licensing of technology, mergers & acquisitions, as well as

58

their lobbying efforts to effect legislative and policy change both at a national and
international level.
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CHAPTER 3. International Treaty Obligations Related to the Regulation
and Protection of Biologics and Biosimilars

3.1. Introduction
A global shift occurred in the 80s in the international trade arena, the effects of which
are still being felt all over the world decades later. That shift was the result of the
integration of intellectual property rights considerations with the international trade
agenda that was ultimately pressed upon the rest of the world by the more powerful,
namely the US, EU and their pharmaceutical industries. Due to the pharmaceutical
industry’s steadily increasing economic value and its impact on healthcare outcomes, as
well as ever-increasing spending, it was the gambit to strengthen pharmaceutical patent
rights that drove the inclusion of intellectual property into the international trade
agenda facilitated through international treaties and agreements.
International treaties embody agreements made between countries on important issues
that are crafted to influence national economic, health, security and/or legal strategies.
Such agreements relate to important geopolitical matters like land and water rights,
defense, human rights, healthcare and trade to name a few. On this same scale of
importance, intellectual property rights were thrust into the international trade agenda
through the World Trade Organization (WTO) created in the 90s and it’s Agreement of
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,170 the adoption of which was a
requirement for entry into the WTO.171 The choice of the WTO as the vehicle to drive
the intellectual property into the international area is of particular note. As discussed in
this chapter, the integration of intellectual property rights with the WTO as opposed to
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other international groups like the World Intellectual Property Office was crafted to tie
the enforcement of intellectual property compliance to the trade complex.
The creation of the WTO in the 1990s brought with it the global advancement of the
intellectual property agenda through TRIPs which sought to bring harmony to patent
laws among signatory countries. As well, TRIPs first mandated the adoption of
protective legislation undisclosed data in respect of pharmaceutical products where the
submission of data was made mandatory in order to receive market authorization.172
Prior to TRIPs, Canada had entered into the 1992 North American Free Trade
Agreement, 173 which first obliged Canada to adopt statutory data exclusivity and
harmonize its patent laws to standards set out therein. Recently renegotiated and
replacing North American FTA (1994), the Canada-US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement,174
imposes patent linkage requirements, increased data exclusivity thresholds and
introduces the concept of a sui generis rights regime, all of which was already mandated
by the 2014 Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement between Canadian and the
EU.175 Negotiations were concurrently underway on the Trans-Pacific Partnership176
which did not enter into force due to the US’ refusal to ratify the agreement. The
subsequently enacted Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership 177 that rose from the ashes of the TPP was the reason significant
amendment to Canada’s patent linkage regime was made. Provisions related to data
exclusivity and sui generis rights set out in TPP remain suspended but not off the table
entirely.
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The intellectual property/trade agenda integration, having significant economic and
legal impact, extends to biologics and biosimilars and have progressively expanded in
scope and stringency. The impacts of patent and regulatory international obligations
related to biologics and biosimilars are felt by biologic innovators, biosimilar developers,
and public and private healthcare industries, not to mention the patients these drugs
were developed to treat. Unless there was intervention at the international treaty level,
pharmaceutical patent rights were viewed by the US and the pharmaceutical industry as
an increasing economic liability unless strengthened and widely adopted beyond US
borders especially in light of the rise of the generic pharmaceutical industry in
Canada.178
As explored in Section 2.5.3, national patent and regulatory linkages (patent linkages),
data exclusivity and additional IP provisions (such as patent term extensions and sui
generis rights) are integrated into the Canadian legislative and regulatory landscape
applicable to biologics and biosimilars; the same holds true for the US and EU. However,
much of the impetus for these provisions are founded on Canada’s, as well as the US
and EU’s, international treaty obligations which, as discussed in this chapter, include
remarkable protections that have progressively increased in scope and stringency.
Accordingly, a detailed review of Canada’s international treaty obligations related to the
patenting and regulation of biologics and biosimilars is warranted and undertaken. This
examination is necessary to give appropriate context to the way in which Canada has
chosen to craft national legislation to fulfil its international obligation, in comparison to
the choices made in the US and the EU undertaken in Chapter 4.
Turing first to TRIPs and the WTO, Section 3.2 sets the stage for the rise of intellectual
property in the international trade agenda. Next, Section 3.3 explores the evolution of
Canada’s obligations rooted in the 1994 Canada-US FTA and culminating in the recently
ratified Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2018). Similarly, Section 3.4 explores Canada’s
obligations founded in the Canada-EU FTA (2017) which had significant impact on
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Canada’s patent linkage system converting the patent litigation process from an in
personam summary application proceeding to an in rem patent action with time limits.
Finally, we explore in Section 3.5 the CPTPP (2018) which to date represents some of the
most current positions of the US and its biopharmaceutical industry in terms of how
patent linkages, data exclusivity, and additional IP provisions should be crafted, despite
the fact that it is no longer a signatory to the agreement.
As we will see, the intellectual property provisions pushed by the international trade
agenda were developed over time and through heavy influence from the US, EU and
multi-national pharmaceutical industry, which begs the question of whether these
international obligations are detrimental to the approval and access of biosimilars in
Canada. What becomes subsequently apparent is a trend of increasing protections
imposed on signatories to these international treaties – a ratcheting up of the type,
complexity and duration of protections. As will be examined in Chapter 4 and 5, this
trend was mirrored in Canada and has detrimentally impacted the authorization and
adoption of biosimilars in Canada.
3.2. Overview and Context of International Treaties – Setting the TRIPs Stage
No other international treaty has had as significant an effect on the internationalization
of intellectual property obligations than the WTO’s TRIPs. TRIPs laid the foundation for
subsequent international agreements promulgating international treaty obligations in
respect of the regulation of biologics/biosimilars and related patent/IP considerations.
These treaties include the North American Free Trade Agreement, 179 recently
renegotiated and to be replace by the Canada-US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement,180 the
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Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement between Canadian and the EU,181 the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.182
Set out below at Table 3 are the signatories to each respective treaty (Contracting
Parties) and the date that these treaties were signed and came into force.
TABLE 3 – RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTRACTING PARTIES
Agreement
TRIPs

Contracting Parties

Date Signed

Canada, US, EU

April 15, 1994

In Force
January 1, 1995

Total of 164 Countries
CUSFTA

Canada and US

January 1, 1989

NAFTA

Canada, US, Mexico

January 1, 1994

CUSMA

Canada, US, Mexico

November 30, 2018

July 1, 2020

CETA

Canada and the EU183

October 30, 2016

September 21, 2017

CPTPP

Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam

December 30, 2018

(Not yet in force in Brunei
Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, Peru)

Given its significance as the foundation for the internationalization of intellectual
property, inquiry into the history and development of the WTO’s TRIPs agreement is
warranted in order to properly set the stage for the treaties that came after. The
emergence of the WTO in 1994 marked a new beginning in international trade and
economic relations, decades in the making and built upon efforts stemming back to the
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unrealized conceptualization of the International Trade Organization in 1948.184 One of
the main pillars of the WTO’s framework was the creation of TRIPs which represented
the transition of intellectual property rights as predominantly national considerations to
multilateral arenas at the behest of, among others, the US, EU and their pharmaceutical
industries.185 The development and implementation of TRIPs and what flowed in the
time that came after is a topic that is both broad and deep; it provides important
context as the starting point of international obligations related to the patenting and
regulation of biologics and biosimilars and their progression and proliferation through
subsequent international agreements. A comprehensive analysis of the history and
global progression of TRIPs provisions is outside of the scope of this research. However,
an overview of the history and political context of TRIPS, initial TRIPs obligations, the
progression and spread of enhanced or “TRIPs-plus” and the countries and industry
players that were motivated to entrench intellectual property rights into the trade
agenda will provide the necessary context for this research.
The motivations that resulted in the desire to tie IP to trade lay with the pharmaceutical
industry’s dissatisfaction with WIPO and the Paris Convention as the vehicles to
strengthen intellectual property protection in other countries. In the late 1970s, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, encouraged by the US pharmaceutical
industry, requested a conference to discuss the revision to the Paris Convention which
was rejected by WIPO. 186 The US’ efforts then turned to the international trade
apparatus; by coupling patent considerations with the trade agenda, mandatory
minimum standards could be tied to effective enforcement mechanisms.
Dr. Peter Drahos has helpfully characterized the historical development of international
intellectual property into three periods, the last of which, namely the global period,
provides insight into the inclusion of intellectual property into the international trade
184
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agenda.187 The hallmark of the global period is the US-driven, systematic intertwining of
intellectual property rights with international trade agreements in the 1980s.188 During
that time, the US made a series of amendments to its international trade legislation to
incorporate intellectual property into its trade agenda in response to pressure from the
US pharmaceutical industry. 189 These amendments empowered the trade apparatus of
the US government to include intellectual property into its program of “rehabilitation”
of countries identified as having trade practices that were detrimental or harmful to US
held intellectual property rights, including the patent rights of the pharmaceutical
industry.190 The remedial efforts included negotiation of bilateral agreements with the
offending countries where, in the case of recalcitrant countries, the threat of trade
sanctions loomed. This was in response to the movement in countries like Canada191
where a generic pharmaceutical industries were developing and posed an increasing
threat to brand pharmaceuticals’ global profits.192 Thus, during the 1986 Uruguay Round
of trade talks leading up to the Marrakesh Declaration, the US-led initiative to link
intellectual property with trade was spearheaded by key industry players, namely
lobbyists from the US film and pharmaceutical industries whose lifeblood rests in their
intellectual capital as expanded upon below.193
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Since its inception and in the decades following, the enactment and implications of
TRIPs is the source of a considerable amount of academic engagement and criticism.194
This is due to its controversial development which was regarded as the “most
contentious and anomalous component of the Uruguay Round” of trade negotiations.195
To say that TRIPs was, and remains, a polarizing instrument is an understatement.196
Peter Sutherland, GATT Director-General, characterized it as “the greatest trade
agreement in history”;197 however, opponents view it as a mere “TRAP” to both the
developed and developing countries.198 A perspective that was scarce in the voluminous
discourse, however, were first-hand accounts of those who were involved in the
negotiations. An attempt to remedy this deficiency on the record was made in recent
years and culminated in a book that, while published by the WTO, endeavors with
varying degrees of success to provide a more informed and objective understanding of
the TRIPs development from the perspectives of variously interested actors.199
The integration of the pharmaceutical industry in discussions to strengthen and
internationalize patent protection began before the negotiations of TRIPs. In the mid1970s when the US formed the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiation
with the purpose of advising the US President on trade issues, it is telling that this body
was chaired by the CEOs of Pfizer and IBM. Ultimately, one of the goals of TRIPs was to
extend established and stronger IP protections like those found in the US and EU to new
and emerging economies for their entrenchment into domestic law. This was a goal
assiduously sought by countries with strong pharmaceutical industries such as the US
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and Switzerland.200 Ostensibly, the rationale behind this questionable agenda is that
monopolistic regimes would provide the necessary incentive for technological
innovation in order to spur social and economic progress.201
It is a trite proposition that the biopharmaceutical industry considers patents as a key
aspect in the protection of its technology, a proposition that has been supported by
surveys going back before the negotiation of TRIPs and carrying forward in the US and
other countries. 202 Recall, this is also an industry engaged in comprehensive,
sophisticated and expensive lobbying efforts. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
the most active players – the key “demandeurs” – in the pharmaceutical lobby came
from the US, EU, Japan and Switzerland,203 namely, the countries reflected in Table 1
where all of the top pharmaceutical companies by revenue reside. A slightly altered
group called the “quad” spearheaded the Uruguay Round, namely the US, EU, Japan,
and also Canada. Canada’s compulsory licensing regime was at odds with the others
which, some TRIPs negotiators speculated, allowed it to play a moderating role against
the other three’s interests to protect its generic drug industry. 204 However, as is argued
herein, that has not borne out in reality in respect of biologics and biosimilars.
TRIPs describes the minimum rights that member states must provide to patentees;205 it
establishes the minimum requirements upon which each state’s national law can be
built, however these “minimums” largely meant that Contracting States would have to
strengthen their national IP laws. 206 Specifically, TRIPs requires member states to
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provide patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions for at least 20 years from the
date of filing necessitating a term increase in some states like Australia and New
Zealand.207 The requirement that patent protection must be available for both products
and processes in all fields of technology was the cause of some debate, especially with
Contracting States with compulsory licensing and/or generic pharmaceutical industry.208
Indeed, some states only provided for product patents after a transition period (Spain,
Portugal and Greece) and Canada did not provide product patents until 1993. 209
Member states do have the discretion to refuse patent protection on the basis of “ordre
public” or morality. 210 In Canada, such an exception on the basis of morality does not
statutorily exist. Arguably, the “morality” consideration which has roots in the US
common-law, has been rejected given its statutory omission.211
TRIPs provides that WTO States may also exclude from patent protection inventions
directed to diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, plants and animals (other than
microorganisms), and biological processes for the production of plants or animals (other
than microbiological processes).212
This purported harmonization of intellectual property laws was criticized as a “one-sizefits-all legal standards that ignored local needs, national interests, technological
capabilities, institutional capacities and public health conditions.”213
As a WTO agreement, TRIPs ties intellectual property considerations to other trade
issues also integrate their enforcement mechanisms which tend to have stronger
“teeth”. For many countries, TRIPs established an international intellectual property
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framework that Contracting States were forced to accept along with those strong
enforcement teeth.214 If a state like Canada wanted to play in the sandbox with the rest
of the world, it had to accept all of the rules imposed by the trade agenda to have
access to all the new toys, including TRIPs’ intellectual property obligations which, by
stepping foot into the sandbox, are now enforceable through the international trade
apparatus of the WTO.215
TRIPs represented an expansion of patent protection that states were obliged to
adopt,216 the negotiations of which were the most complex and contentious issues on
the table.217 It is clear that the minimum requirements that TRIPs has created is not a
“minimum” at all. Further, this fictional minimum has been rapidly and progressively
increasing with each bilateral and multilateral agreement that imposes upon signatory
states enhanced or “TRIPs-plus” provisions.
The American political environment and international trade/intellectual property
agenda has systematically applied pressure on its trading partners – and they have not
exactly been quiet about these goals. The US Trade Act of 2002 states:
[t]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are … to further promote adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights, including through… ensuring that the provisions of any
multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property rights that is
entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found
in United States law…218

Post-TRIPs, pressures and additional bilateral and multilateral agreements pushed by
the US has encouraged not only accelerated the adoption of TRIPs minimum patent
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standards, but also TRIPs-plus standards. Essentially, the incorporation of patent
protection standards and the US industry influence in the WTO served to benefit private
business interests to the detriment of promoting access to innovation.219
An example of a TRIPs-plus accelerated adoption strategy pertinent to the present
investigation is TRIPs is the obligation for Contracting States to protect undisclosed data.
The original wording of the protection of undisclosed data in Article 39.3 of TRIPs does
not represent what we have come to know as data exclusivity provisions. The obligation
imposed by Article 39.3 of TRIPs provides that states are obliged to ensure protection
against unfair commercial use and disclosure of test or other data as follows:
Article 39.3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities,
the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a
considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition,
Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect
the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair
commercial use.

Thus, two specific obligations are imposed related to use and disclosure. First, for data
that is required to be submitted as a condition of the market authorization of a new
chemical pharmaceutical product, said data requiring considerable effort to generate,
WTO Contracting Parties “…shall protect such data against unfair commercial use.”220
Second, Article 39.3 provides WTO States “…shall protect such data against disclosure…”
except where disclosure is necessary to protect the public, “…or unless steps are taken
to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.”221 However, none
of the language in this article implies that there should be any prohibition on the filing
of submission or delays in the grant of market authorization. Simply put, this language
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refers to the protection of data from “unfair commercial use”, the lack of definition of
which caused the US some consternation during the negotiations,222 and required
“steps” to be taken to protect disclosure in the event it is necessary to “protect the
public” – all of which is profoundly ambiguous or, given that this was by design,
characterized as “constructive ambiguity”.223 There is no exclusivity granted by this
provision to the data.224 Further, there is no fixed period of time specified in Article 39.3,
however (and peculiarly) a draft version did specify a time period of “generally no less
than five years…”225 It is unclear what a state was supposed to be doing in that “no less
than five years” period of time. However, the TRIPs-plus provision that spawned from
Article 39.3 of TRIPs made the inclusion of a timeframe make sense. Well before the
recent Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020), new, more detailed data exclusivity provisions
dictating filing prohibition periods and authorization prohibition periods spread through
bilateral agreements between the US and other countries where the bargaining power is
usually high disproportionate.226
In this way, states got foisted into the sandbox through side-dealing resulting in bilateral
and multilateral agreements designed to accelerate the adoption of TRIPs minimum
patent standards which have been succinctly described by Peter Yu as TRIPs-plus
provisions, TRIPs-extra provisions, and TRIPs-restrictive provisions.227 As aptly described
by Drahos, the US and EU trade apparatus uses bilateral agreements to ratchet up the
harmonization of intellectual property rights to ensure they are linked to the trade
agenda and embody at a minimum the TRIPs standards regardless of any existing
222
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transition periods in order to advance the patent agenda extending the TRIPs standard
and accelerating the otherwise prescribed transition period.228
We now turn to how TRIPs has influenced the following international treaties. Prior to
receiving market authorization, the following international treaty obligations mandate
that Canada provide for national legislation and policies to mitigate against the delays in
the regulatory market authorization process and the costs associated with developing
these complex therapeutic agents, namely patent linkages, data exclusivity and
additional IP provisions which include patent term extensions and sui generis rights.
With this context, the remainder of the analysis of the treaty obligations arising from
the following international treaties is now appropriately situated in light of the TRIPs
evolution set out above.
3.3. Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1989), North American Free Trade
Agreement (1994), and Canada-US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (2020)
Canada and the US began negotiating a free trade agreement in the mid-80s resulting in
the Canada-US FTA (1989) that came into force on January 1, 1989. This agreement was
superseded by the North America FTA (1992) which included Mexico and came into
force on January 1, 1994.
It is important to keep in mind the political backdrop during this time. As noted above,
the Uruguay Round negotiations was underway in the mid-80s. It would have been
reasonable for the US and Canada to have left the contention issue of intellectual
property on the table in Canada-US FTA (1989) in 1989 given the context set out in the
treaty notes:
During the course of the negotiations, the two governments worked on an overall
framework covering the protection of intellectual property rights (trademarks,
copyright, patents, industrial design and trade secrets). In the end, a substantive chapter
was dropped. Nevertheless, in Article 2004, the two governments agree to continue to
228
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cooperate and work toward better international intellectual property rules, particularly
in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations where a working group on
trade-related intellectual property issues has been established.

A wider conversation about international trade and intellectual property rights was
already occurring at the GATT/WTO level; indeed the North American FTA (1994) could
be considered as one of the testing ground for the US strategies linking intellectual
property rights to its international trade agenda given that effectively identical
provisions related to patents ultimately ended up in TRIPs.
As was the case in TRIPs, both the North American FTA (1994) and Canada-US-Mexico
FTA (2020) create minimum standards.229 Similar to TRIPs, the North American FTA
(1994) sought to harmonize many fundamental aspects of patent law applicable to
biologics and biosimilars. This reiteration of the harmonization of patent law includes
the principle that patentable subject matter encompasses all fields of technology,
provided the invention is new, useful and non-obvious,230 while continuing to provide
for exceptions from patentability of methods of medical treatment, plants and animals
(other than microorganisms) and essentially biological processes for their production, as
well as “order public” and “morality” exceptions.231 Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020) also
requires that Contracting Parties confirm that patents are available for inventions
claiming, products, new use for known products, new methods for using a known
product, or new processes of using a known product,232 and provides for a one year
grace period for public disclosure emanating from the patentee.233
Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020) reiterates many of the harmonizing legal principles using
TRIPs and the North American FTA (1994) as the foundation, and expands upon them.234
229
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Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020) represents a significant advancement of treaty
obligations on Contracting Parties in respect of biologics and biosimilars by increasing
the threshold of data exclusivity, mandating the implementation of a patent linkage
systems (even if already existing in Contracting Parties), and providing for additional IP
Obligations such as patent term restorations or a sui generis mechanism to achieve the
same goal (this obligation is mirrored in Canada-EU FTA (2017)as discussed below).
3.3.1. Patent Linkage Requirements in the Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020)
TRIPs did not impose any treaty obligations related to the linkage of regulatory
assessments of biosimilars with the clearance of the reference biologic holder’s patent
rights. Recall that patent linkages are mandated by some treaty obligations requiring
linkage between the regulatory authorization process with patent considerations which
must be addressed before a biosimilar is granted market authorization. In this way, the
biosimilar applicant has to establish that it will not fall afoul of the reference biologic’s
applicant patents before they are technically infringed. Alternatively, the biosimilar
applicant must successfully invalidate any relevant patents, again, prior to being granted
market authorization. This linkage was thought to balance against the benefits
conferred by the early working exception afforded to biosimilar applicant allowing for
the development of biosimilars during the term of the reference biologic holder’s
patent(s).
While it did not impose any international treaty obligations related to patent linkages on
Canada and Mexico in the North American FTA (1994), the US negotiated a number of
multilateral and bilateral treaties in the mid-90s imposing patent linkage treaty
obligations going beyond TRIPs on all but one country (Israel) out of 20. 235
Unsurprisingly, Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020)’s patent linkage provision represents an
235
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evolution of these types of provisions and establishes a comprehensive linkage between
the regulation of biologics and biosimilars with the reference biologic’s patent status.
Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2018) Article 20.50 entitled “Measures Relating to the
Marketing of Certain Pharmaceutical Products” links the regulatory approval of a
biosimilar with the patent status of a biologic approved in any Contracting Parties, or
other territory.236 Contracting Parties are required to provide a system that will require
notice to be given to the reference biologic’s holder that the biosimilar applicant is
seeking marketing authorization, and to provide for sufficient time and access to judicial
or administrative proceedings to seek remedies for potential and allegedly infringing
acts that may arise from a grant of market authorization of the biosimilar.237
3.3.2. Data Exclusivity Requirements in the Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020)
The North American FTA (1994)’s data exclusivity provisions are set out at Article 1711
and are operatively identical to Article 39.3 of TRIPs. However, while no period of time
was specified in TRIPs, the North American FTA (1994) specifies a “reasonable period
shall normally mean not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted
approval to the person that produced the data for approval to market its product.”238
This reflects draft language of the North American FTA (1992) that was ultimately not
included in the final North American FTA (1992) agreement. And, as discussed above, do
not represent what has come to be known commonly as data exclusivity provisions until
the TRIPs-plus agenda pushed them into the national legislation through bilateral and
multilateral dealings.
Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020) initially mandated a data exclusivity period of 10 years
for biologics in respect of biosimilars entry.239 However, and well after Contracting
236

Canada-US-Mexico (2020) at Article 20.50.
Canada-US-Mexico (2020) at Article 20.50 (1)(a) and (b).
238
North American FTA (1994) at Article 1711.
239
Draft Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020), Article 20.49. 10 year data exclusivity period for biologics
removed by the US.
237

76

Parties had signed the treaty, the provision was pulled from the agreement unilaterally
by the US. This move was widely reported to be supported by House Democrats and
industry organizations affiliated with generic and biosimilar manufacturers. Conversely,
it was decried as an affront to the protection of American IP by brand/innovator
industry organizations and seen as an erosion of the strong stance the US has taken
against “pirates”.240
What remains in the Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020) is the limitation on the use and
disclosure of protected data for a period of 5 years from the date of the marketing
approval of the first biologic241 in the Member State.242 As well, where the first biologic
data that is relied upon by the biosimilar applicant has been submitted in another
Member State, then the data exclusivity period of 5 years runs from the date of the
market authorization of the first biologic where the data relied upon was submitted.243
Further, the Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020) provides a belt and suspenders provision
making the coexistence of data exclusivity and patent rights explicit; where data
exclusivity applies to a biologic, and that biologic is also covered by patent protection,
the expiry of a patent term(s) does not alter the period of data exclusivity protection.244
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3.3.3. Other Obligations Relevant to the Canada-US-Mexico (2020)
In addition to robust patent linkage and data exclusivity obligations, Canada-US-Mexico
FTA (2020) also provides for patent term adjustments not necessarily tied to a biologic’s
patent status, but may in fact be so tied.
In respect of biologics that are subject to a patent, Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020)
obligates states to make a patent term adjustment available.245 These adjustments
created pursuant to this provision may be limited to a single adjustment for a biologic
regardless of the number of patents, based only on the first marketing approval of the
biologic in the state, and may be limited to a maximum of 5 years. 246
Alternatively, a state may provide a sui generis period of protection that must attribute
the rights conferred by the patent, but which in and of itself is an extension of the
patent term and/or rights.247 For such sui generis rights, states may limit this period of
protection to 2 years. 248
3.4. Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (2017) – the Canada-EU FTA
(2017)
Canada and the member states of the EU signed the Canada-EU FTA (2017) on October
30, 2016 which came provisionally into force on September 21, 2017.249 This agreement
was the result of almost a decade of discussions between Canada and the EU.250
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Given the overlap in the negotiations of both the Canada-EU FTA (2017) and the
Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020), it is interesting to see how the respective differences in
the approaches to patent linkages, data exclusivity and additional IP provisions arose
from the US’ priorities versus those of the EU. The EU relies heavily on data exclusivity
and sui generis protections, these types of provisions are robustly addressed and
bolstered in the Canada-EU FTA (2017) as opposed to the Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020)
which does not contain similarly strong provisions. patent linkages, on the other hand,
are only briefly addressed in Canada-EU FTA (2017); Canada does have existing domestic
patent linkages, but the EU has none at all. However, given that the US and Canada have
implemented comprehensive domestic patent linkage regimes, the Canada-US-Mexico
FTA (2018) robustly addressed the inclusion of patent linkages.251
In terms of the Canada-EU FTA (2017), the contentious linkage issue, however, was the
lack of appeal avenue in Canada, a new imposed obligation that will have lasting
legislative, procedural, regulatory and jurisprudential impacts in Canada for some time.
3.4.1. Canada-EU FTA (2017) Patent Linkage Requirements
The patent linkage provisions in the Canada-EU FTA (2017) is short, but includes a
requirement that has had a significant impact solely on Canada given that there is no
patent linkage regime in the EU.
Article 20.28 of the Canada-EU FTA (2017) states
Patent linkage mechanisms relating to pharmaceutical products
If a Party relies on “patent linkage” mechanisms whereby the granting of marketing
authorisations (or notices of compliance or similar concepts) for generic pharmaceutical
products is linked to the existence of patent protection, it shall ensure that all litigants
are afforded equivalent and effective rights of appeal. (emphasis added)

This provision steps beyond the Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020)’s patent linkage
requirements by requiring states to allow for equivalent and effective rights of appeal.
251
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The practical implication of this obligation has been an overhaul of Canada’s patent
linkage regime that is detailed in Chapter 4. In short, amended Canadian PM(NOC)
Regulations came into force in 2017 which shifted the previous in personam summary
applications (without effective means of appeal) to full in rem actions resulting in final
determinations on infringement and validity with rights of appeal.
3.4.2. Canada-EU FTA (2017) Data Exclusivity Requirements
The Canada-EU FTA (2017)’s data exclusivity provisions builds upon the international
treaty obligations that all parties are bound to pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPs but
provides timing specifications.
In addition to the restriction on use and disclosure,252 Canada and EU states are
precluded from allowing a biosimilar applicant to rely on the biologic applicant’s data for
a period of 6 years following the date of the biologic’s market authorization without the
biologic applicant’s consent.253 This provision precludes the “use” of the data in that the
review of a biosimilar application that relies on a biologic applicant’s data is prohibited
for a period of 6 years from the date that the biologic was granted market authorization.
Further, Canada and EU states are precluded from granting market authorization for a
biosimilar relying on the biologic applicant’s data for a period of eight years from the
date that the biologic was granted market authorization without the biologic applicant’s
consent.254
Taken together, a biosimilar application relying on a biologic’s data is reviewable 6 years
after the biologic’s approval, but the biosimilar itself is not approvable until after eight
years of the biologic’s approval. Therefore, there is a two year period during which time
a biosimilar application may be reviewed, but not approved.
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3.4.3. Other Obligations Relevant to Canada-EU FTA (2017)
Canada-EU FTA (2017) has mandated the creation of a sui generis right that is analogous
to patent rights as applied to biologic products, use or product by process patents.255
Similar to the principles underpinning the sui generis protection obligated by CanadaUS-Mexico FTA (2020), this type of provision is aimed at addressing the regulatory
review delay causing loss of effective patent terms.
Contracting Parties are required to create this sui generis right to be applied to a firsttime market authorized biologic in the Member State that has not yet been subject to a
previously granted sui generis period of protection.256 The biologic applicant must make
an application for the sui generis protection within 60 days of either the first grant of
market authorization for the biologic or the grant of an applicable patent.257 The sui
generis period of protection will begin upon the expiry of the applicable patent, if only
one patent exists or, where more than one patent is applicable to this provision, upon
the expiry of only one of said applicable patents.258 The sui generis period of protection
is calculated as the difference between the date of grant of the first marketing
authorization less the filing date of the applicable patent less 5 years, but in no case
(and notwithstanding any population testing incentives) shall the period exceed 2 to 5
years.259
The sui generis protection is constrained by the status of the applicable patent and may
be revoked for a variety of reasons including, a finding of invalidity, lapse prior to its
lawful expiry and narrowing of the claims to exclude eligible claims vis-à-vis the biologic.
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3.5. Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership – the CPTPP (2018)
Negotiations resulting in the now defunct TPP were concluded on October 5, 2015 and
the agreement was eventually signed on February 4, 2016 by all signatories. On January
30, 2017 the US advised the remaining signatories of its intention not to ratify the TPP
which, due to an agreed upon GDP threshold, meant that the agreement could not
enter into force.
Signatories to the TPP, less the US, then entered into further negotiations eventually
leading to the CPTPP (2018) which concluded on January 23, 2018 and entered into
force in Canada on December 30, 2018.260 The CPTPP (2018) incorporates by reference
many provisions of the TPP with the exception of some drastic, and ultimately
suspended, intellectual property provisions in Chapter 18; these presently
unenforceable international treaty obligations will remain suspended until all the parties
decide otherwise.261
These contentious but suspended TPP provisions are not completely off the table;
importantly, they may serve as indicators of the current thinking of some parties and
their stakeholders, many of whom have stated their position publicly. While the parties
may have delayed the discussion, these suspended provisions give us an indication of
where the agenda is likely to develop in the future.
Accordingly, set out herein are the provisions related to patent linkages, data exclusivity
and other treaty obligations related to biologics that were ratified in the CPTPP (2018),
as well as the provisions that were left suspended as TPP relics; relics that could be
revived anytime on consent of the parties.

260

As of this date the CPTPP entered into force for Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealans,
Singapore, and for Vietnam the agreement entered into force on January 14, 2019.
261
CPTPP Article 2

82

3.5.1. Patent Linkage Requirements in the CPTPP (2018)
CPTPP (2018) ratifies a modified TPP provision related to patent linkages in Article
18.53.
Unsurprisingly, CPTPP (2018)’s patent linkage treaty obligations are identical to CanadaUS-Mexico FTA (2020)’s Article 20.50 given that they were evolving at the same time
through the same international trade negotiation channels. Like the Canada-US-Mexico
FTA (2020), CPTPP (2018) establishes a comprehensive linkage between the regulation
of biosimilars with the clearance of reference biologic holder’s patent rights.
CPTPP (2018) states are required to provide a system where notice shall be given to the
biologic’s patent holder or licensee that the biosimilar applicant is seeking marketing
authorization, and to provide for sufficient time and access to judicial or administrative
proceedings to seek remedies for potential and allegedly infringing acts that may arise
from a grant of market authorization of the biosimilar.262 Notably, neither the CanadaUS-Mexico FTA (2020) nor the TPP/CPTPP (2018) mandate and appeal avenue like the
analogous requirement in the Canada-EU FTA (2017).
3.5.2. Data Exclusivity Requirements in the CPTPP (2018)
CPTPP (2018) does not impose any treaty obligations in respect of Data Exclusion on its
signatory states.
The suspended TPP data exclusivity provision in Article 18.50 is structurally similar to the
Canada-EU FTA (2017)’s data exclusivity provision, but the timeframes are more relaxed.
In addition to the restriction on use and disclosure, 263 states are precluded from
allowing a biosimilar applicant to rely on the biologic applicant’s data for a period of 3
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years (instead of Canada-EU FTA (2017)’s 5 years) following the date of the biologic’s
market authorization without the biologic applicant’s consent.264
Further, states are precluded from granting market authorization for a biosimilar relying
on the biologic applicant’s data for a period of 5 years (instead of Canada-EU FTA
(2017)’s 8 years) from the date that the biologic was granted market authorization
without the biologic applicant’s consent.265
The entirety of suspended TPP Article 18.51 specifically relates to data exclusivity
applicable to biologics. This provision provides for a protection period of 8 years from
the first market authorization grant of a biologic, increased from the 5 year period
applicable to a pharmaceutical product pursuant to suspended TPP Article 18.50.1. As
was the case during the negotiations of Canada-US-Mexico FTA (2020), a main point of
contention was the data exclusivity provisions that called for a 10 year period of
protection. Interestingly, the period of data exclusivity protection for a biologic called
for in the TPP was 8 years, was subsequently suspended in the CPTPP (2018).
3.5.3. Other Relevant Obligations in the CPTPP (2018)
Other relevant provisions that harken back to the effort to harmonize patent laws
through the international trade agenda culminating in TRIPs were restated in the TPP,
but eventually suspended in CPTPP (2018).266 The operative provisions impose on states
begin with making patents available in any field of technology, on the basis of novelty,
non-obviousness, utility and patentable subject-matter, generally maintaining the TRIPslevel of exceptions to and exclusions from patentability.267
Suspended TPP Articles 18.46 and 18.48 sets out the latest iteration of the constructs
pushed by interested pharma-protective parties: patent term extension/restoration
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provisions addressing, respectively, unreasonable delay due to patent prosecution or to
compensate for regulatory delay. In fact and effect, the provision for unreasonable
delay is similar to Canada’s pre-existing treaty obligations, but are likely to be
completely foreign for other states.
3.6. Summary of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 provides the historical and political context is necessary in order to
understand the development of the ever-more harmonized international patent laws as
time presses forward. For many countries, meeting TRIPs “minimum” standards caused
widespread legislative changes which, by and large, were designed to bring national
frameworks in line with the US and EU at the behest of industry groups heavily
leveraged in intellectual capital, such as the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, it was the
pharmaceutical industries in the US, EU, Switzerland and Japan (incidentally the resident
countries of the largest biopharmaceutical players) that sought increased patent
protection. The intangible and inherently transient nature of information and
technology, coupled with the requirement to regularly disclose this information to
regulatory authorities, poses a significant challenge to this goal; however the US, EU and
the intellectual capital dependent industries took up the challenge.
While an interesting story and a little bit of history is all well and good, the importance
of this history lies in the implications of how the TRIPs “minimum standards” were
implemented (willingly or otherwise) through the international trade agenda, namely
the homogenization of strong patent protection potentially dampening innovation and
development biologics and biosimilars.
Chapter 3’s analysis of how the international treaty obligations related to biologics and
biosimilars have changed since the widespread adoption of TRIPs in the mid-90s to the
present with the implementation of two of the most significant trade agreements in
recent time (Canada-EU FTA (2017) and CPTPP (2018)) is critical to understanding
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Canada’s national responses to these ratcheting obligations that will be address in
Chapter 4. As is demonstrated in Table 4 below, a trend of increased complexity,
restrictions and periods of protection is beginning to form. While the Suspended TPP
provisions are not in force in Contracting Parties, these provisions do provide some
guidance on what the US’ expectations might look like moving forward.
TABLE 4 – SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO PATENT LINKAGE,
DATA EXCLUSIVITY AND ADDITIONAL IP PROVISIONS
Agreement

TRIPs

Patent Linkage

No

Data Exclusivity

Article 39.3 – Precursor Provision
Period Not Specified

Additional IP
Provisions
Harmonization of
Patent Laws

CUSFTA

No

No

No

NAFTA

No

Article 1711

TRIPs Harmonization
of Patent Laws

5 years from market authorization
CUSMA

Yes
Comprehensive

5 year period of protection from
the date of market authorization
in the Member State or another
Member State where the data
resides
10 year limit applicable to
biologics withdrawn unilaterally
by the US

CETA

TPP

No obligation, but
where patent
linkages exist, the
Member State is
required to provide
an appeal
mechanism

6 years from the date of the first
market authorization before a
biosimilar is able to rely on the
data in its submission

Yes

3 years from the date of the first
market authorization before a
biosimilar is able to rely on the
data in its submission

Comprehensive

Patent Term
Adjustment limited to
a maximum of 5 years
or
Sui generis period of
protection limited to 2
years
Sui generis period of
protection a minimum
of 2 years

8 years from the date of the first
market authorization before a
biosimilar may be granted market
authorization
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Patent Term
Adjustment – Undue
delay arising from
patent prosecution

CPTPP

Yes
Comprehensive

5 years from the date of the first
market authorization before a
biosimilar may be granted market
authorization

Patent Term
Adjustment - Undue
delay arising from
regulatory review

No – TPP Provision Suspended

No – TPP Provisions
Suspended

Thus, the international foundation is appropriately laid which is critical to fully
appreciate the implications of Canada’s legislative choices that, as you will see in
Chapter 4, has contributed to the dampening of biosimilar authorization in comparison
to the EU.
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CHAPTER 4. Comparative Legal Analysis of the Regulation of Biologics and
Biosimilars and their linkages to Patent and IP Clearance in Canada, the
US and EU

4.1. Introduction
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the patenting and regulation of biologics
and biosimilars addressed in international agreements are materially tied to the
approval of biosimilars in Canada. However, these obligations examined in detail in
Sections 4.2-4.4 do not specifically dictate the way in which signatories like Canada are
required to domestically implement these obligations. This inherent discretion has led
to a different approach in Canada, in comparison to the US and EU; differences that we
will see in the following pages may serve to impede the number and timely entry of
biosimilars on to the Canadian market.
The state-level integration of patent linkages, data exclusivity and other additional IP
protections (patent term extensions, sui generis rights) has had consequences on the
regulation of biologics and biosimilars because they have been largely developed in the
context of pharmaceuticals and are still, by and large, in the process of maturing; it
remains to be seen if these consequences were unintended, but some are without
doubt unforeseen.
Accordingly, this chapter is a detailed investigation of Canada’s patent linkages, data
exclusivity provisions and other additional IP provisions directly or indirectly impacting
the approval of biosimilars. This analysis will provide the necessary foundation for the
further examination of how Canada, in comparison to the US and EU, has chosen to
craft its domestic laws and regulations in an attempt to achieve balance between the
incentivization of biologic innovation with the promotion of biosimilar development.
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We first examine the integration of the biologic’s patent considerations with the
regulatory assessments of biosimilars, namely patent linkages. Patent linkages have
influenced biologic and biosimilar manufacturers’ patent and regulatory strategies.
Canada’s experience with patent linkage regimes, namely the Canadian Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations268 is an example of how governments can
forge the formal linkages between the patent status and regulatory approval of
pharmaceuticals and biologics. Since 1984, the American system prescribed by the US’s
Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman Act)269 established the abbreviated pathway to
approval for pharmaceuticals which was then loosely analogized to biosimilars through
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (US Biosimilars Act).270 However, a
recent ruling at the US Supreme Court271 may release some of the pressure baked into
the US Biosimilars Act’s patent linkage regime until subjected to legislative reform. As
well, biosimilar applicants are making significant use of post-grant patent challenge
mechanisms before the USPTO and EPO. These are addressed in the context of the
patent linkages due to their nexus to patent enforcement strategies.
Despite the harmonization and strengthening of patent laws in the EU, patent linkages
are effectively non-existent; however, EU’s data exclusivity protections have developed
in scope and duration. The same could be said for data exclusivity in Canada (applying
equally to pharmaceuticals as well as biologics), but is especially applicable to the US
experience where data exclusivity terms for biologics stands at a astounding 12 years
versus 5 years for pharmaceuticals.
In contrast to the contentious post-grant patent challenges, the less contentious
additional IP provisions, such as the US’ patent term extension and the sui generis rights
(not identical, but analogous to patent rights) provided by Canada and the EU are next
268
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examined. There is, however, some nuance in the consideration of what is contentious
vs. not contentious; the US’ patent term extension regime is predominantly assessed
and administered by the USPTO with input from the FDA, the decisions of which have
not been challenged. In Section 4.4, we will examine the consequences of the
implementation of different sui generis regimes mandated by Canada and the EU’s
international additional IP provisions. Specifically, a comparable situation plays out in
the EU where the supplementary certificate of protection regime is administered by the
regulatory body and rarely challenged. However, in Canada the Certificates of
Supplementary Protection are tied to and litigated alongside the biologic’s patents that
are statutorily citable against the biosimilar’s application.
Finally, the last section compares the number of biosimilars approved and launched on
the market, if launched at all, in Canada versus the US and EU. As previously established,
the EU has been at the forefront of biosimilar regulation and approval, the first
biosimilar having been authorized in 2006. It was a decade later before the first biologic
was approved in the US. While Canada adopted an assessment framework prior to the
US, it has slightly lagged in its approval numbers, but interestingly its market launches
are faring better than their American counterparts, the reasons for which necessitates
further scrutiny in Chapter 5. Ultimately, we will see that the existence of patent
linkages tying the biologic’s patent status to the biosimilar’s approval has had a
dampening effect on the number of biosimilars approval as well as their launch into the
Canadian market.
4.2. Patent Linkages to Regulatory Market Approvals in Canada, the US and EU
Patent linkages have progressively been mandated by treaty obligations as set out in
Chapter 3. Where present, these obligations require that the national regulatory
authorization process be linked with the status of the reference biologic holder’s
patent(s). These patents must be addressed prior to any grant of authorization by the
national regulatory agency. In this way, the biosimilar applicant has to establish that it
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will not infringe the reference biologic holder’s patents. Alternatively, the biosimilar
applicant must successfully invalidate any relevant patents, again, prior to being granted
market authorization.
The following sections set out sequentially each of Canada, the US and EU’s unique
approach to patent linkages from one end of the spectrum where the process is fairly
well characterized (Canada) to the other end of where linkages at the level of the EU
does not exist. Interestingly, there is wide divergence on one critical issue that, as we
will see in Chapter 5, has a profoundly detrimental effect on the clearance of the
reference biologic holder’s patents, namely their identification in advance of litigation.
4.2.1. Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and
the Canadian Patent List – To be (eligible), or not to be (eligible)
First enacted in 1993 since amended numerous times, Canada’s Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations (“Canadian PM(NOC) Regulations”) were crafted to
link the Canadian drug regulatory approval process with an assessment of related patent
rights,272 but do not have an effect on the regulation or determination of public health
and safety.273
These regulations were enacted to work in conjunction with Canada’s version of the
Bolar Exception, namely the early-working exception to patent infringement established
by s.55.2 of the Patent Act.274 Between its patent linkage regime and its early working
exception, Canada sought a balance between a brand’s patent rights and a generic’s
early-working exemption activities by linking Health Canada's ability to approve a
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generic drug to the patent status of the brand’s reference drug product.275 Specifically,
Canadian PM(NOC) Regulations provide brands with an avenue to prevent generics from
obtaining market authorization if their actions would otherwise result in patent
infringement.276
While Canada’s PM(NOC) proceedings predominately concern pharmaceutical litigation,
they are applicable to biologics and biosimilars which, over time, will take greater
prominence in the Canadian patent litigation landscape.
Recently, treaty obligations flowing from Canada-EU FTA (2017) obligated Canada to
implement a right of appeal in the context of the Canadian PM(NOC) Regulations
triggering a massive overhaul of Canada’s patent linkage regime that came into force in
2017. These changes have a significant impact on pharmaceutical and biologics litigation
in Canada, shifting away from the bicameral nature of pre-September 2017
pharmaceutical patent litigation. Previously, patent linkage proceedings were in
personam summary applications without effective means of appeal (“PM(NOC)
Applications”). Through the PM(NOC) Application, brands sought an order prohibiting
Canadian authorities from issuing a Notice of Compliance in respect of a generic’s
submission and, once commenced, an automatic 24 month stay was granted pending
the judgement on the application. This has been compared to an interlocutory
injunction award without having to establish a prima facie case.277
An important distinction in these pre- September 2017 PM(NOC) Applications is that any
appeal from these judgement, strictly applying solely to the parties before the Court,
were considered moot in the event that the marketing approval was granted issued to
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the generic/biosimilar.278 The reference brand/biologic holder remaining option was to
commence a subsequent traditional patent action for infringement pursuant to which
the validity of its patents could be challenged in a forum where the finding would be
applicable in rem because res judicata did not apply to the underlying PM(NOC)
Application.279
That will no longer be the case. Post-September/2017, reference brand/biologic holders
now advance full in rem actions resulting in final determinations on infringement and
validity and having rights of appeal (“PM(NOC) Actions”).280 PM(NOC) Actions will apply
to any notices of allegation, described below, served on a Brand after September 21,
2017. This represents a fundamental change to the process shifting the primarily paperbased application to a full patent trial with documentary production, oral examinations
and viva voce evidence at trial. Judges will now be required to adjudicate final
determinations on questions of patent validity and infringement, subject to a right of
appeal, not simply whether the generic/biosimilar’s allegations are justified.281 In this
way, the reference brand/biologic holder must defend the validity of its patent in a way
that now will be binding beyond the present litigation while other potential biosimilar
applications may be standing by in anticipation of the outcome. In the event that the
validity of the reference brand/biologic holder’s patents are held to be valid, res judicata
will preclude additional challenges. However, invalidity findings, which were not a
complete bar to subsequent PM(NOC) Applications with different generic/biosimilar
parties, will now stand as final determinations, subject to appeal.
Importantly, there is an obligation for the reference biologic holder to identify patents
claiming relevant inventive elements of the reference biologic upon its approval by
providing a list of patents for inclusion on the Canadian Patent Register, this is an
important regulatory trigger for the biologic which cannot be rectified if done
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improperly. 282 The biosimilar applicant must address the listed patent(s) on the
Canadian Patent Register, but only those listed as of the date of filing of the biosimilar’s
application; the patent list is effectively frozen as of the date of filing of the biosimilar’s
application.283 When the generic/biosimilar applicant, the prescribed “second person”,
files an application making reference to a previously approved reference biologic, it
must address all of the eligible patents on reference brand/biologic holder’s patent list.
If the generic/biosimilar applicant seeks to obtain a Notice of Compliance prior to the
expiry of any of the reference biologic eligible patents, it must serve the reference
brand/biologic holder with a Notice of Allegation (“NOA”)284 indicating either that it will
wait until the expiry of the reference brand/biologic holder’s listed patents or make one
or more of the following allegations challenging the patent(s): (i) its biosimilar would not
infringe any claim to the biologic or use of the biologics in the patent(s); (ii) the listed
patent(s) are invalid or have expired; or (iii) the reference biologic who filed a patent list
in respect of the drug is not the patentee nor has consent from the patentee to list the
patents.285 The 24-month prohibition from issuing a Notice of Compliance in respect of a
second person’s submission is maintained which significantly fast-tracks the Canadian
patent litigation.286
If, after receiving the biosimilar applicant’s Notice of Allegation, the reference biologic
holder decides to challenge the biosimilar applicant’s allegations, it must do so in
accordance with the process set out in s. 6 of Canada’s PM(NOC) Regulations within 45
days of service of the biosimilar applicant’s Notice of Allegation, commencing a
PM(NOC) Action in the Federal Court for a declaration that the making, constructing,
using or selling of the second person’s drug would infringe any patent or CSP that is the
subject of the biosimilar applicant’s allegation. Commencement of the PM(NOC) Action
automatically triggers a 24 month stay prohibiting the Minister of Health from issuing a
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NOC in respect of the biosimilar. Importantly, if the reference biologic holder misses the
45-day deadline, the avenue to contest the biosimilar “second person” is forever closed.
The Canadian Patent Register contains a list of the reference brand/biologic’s patents
that the generic/biosimilar applicant is required to address in its Notice of Allegation
and the subsequent PM(NOC) Action if brought by the reference biologic holder. This is
a critical aspect in Canadian patent litigation because the universe of patents that may
be asserted by the reference brand/biologic holder through the Canadian patent linkage
regime is known. Only patents having a Canadian filing date prior to the filing date of
the reference biologic’s new, or supplemental, drug submission (NDS/SNDS) may be
listed on the Patent Register287 and a list of eligible patents must be filed at the time of
filing the NDS/SNDS; patent lists submitted separately will be refused.288 If an eligible
patent is not yet granted, it must be listed within 30 days of issuance.289 In order to be
eligible for listing on the Patent Register, a patent must contain a claim to the medicinal
ingredient, a claim for the formulation containing the medicinal ingredient, a claim for
the dosage form or a claim for the use of the ingredient.290 The Canadian PM(NOC)
Regulations do not permit listing of process patents on the Patent Register; it remains
open for reference biologic holders to enforce these patents outside of the patent
linkage framework.
If the reference biologic holder decides to challenge the biosimilar applicant’s
allegations, it has 45 days from the service of the Notice of Allegation to bring a
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PM(NOC) Action.291 Commencement of the PM(NOC) Action automatically triggers a 24
month stay prohibiting the Minister of Health from issuing a NOC in respect of the
biosimilar.
Generic/biosimilar manufacturers have argued that there is no deterrent to a reference
brand/biologic holder to commence an action without regard to the strength of their
challenge in order to fully capitalize on the 24-month stay. However, the reference
biologic holder that commences a PM(NOC) Action is open to significant liability under s.
8 of Canada’s PM(NOC) Regulations for any loss suffered by the biosimilar for the period
of time during which the issuance of the generic’s NOC was on patent hold where the
prohibition proceeding is dismissed or withdrawn or discontinued by the reference
biologic holder. If the reference biologic holder decides not to challenge the NOA and
takes no action within the 45-day period, Health Canada will be free to approve the
biosimilar’s NSD/SNDS if otherwise compliant.
The implications of this shift from PM(NOC) Application to PM(NOC) Action has not yet
been made clear. The first judgement of the Federal Court of Canada arising from a
PM(NOC) Action was rendered only on April 16, 2020 in Amgen Inc. v. Pfizer Canada ULC
in respect of Pfizer’s biosimilar NIVESTYM (filgrastim) making reference to Amgen’s
NEUPOGEN (filgrastim). 292 Further, the academic literature is sparse. The legal
commentary from the private practice community reiterates the Canadian
government’s rationale to strike a balance by mirroring traditional patent litigation to
achieve the objectives of providing a route of appeal, eliminating dual litigation,
enabling parties to advance a full record based on discovery and viva voce evidence. In
relying on experience, the advantages of the shift from an application regime to an
action regime is significant, but not for reasons related to the stated objectives. As
parsed in Chapter 5, framing Canada’s patent linkage regime as in rem actions allows for
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and makes more attractive private settlement agreements between parties that can
serve to delay the market launch of biosimilars.
4.2.2. US Biosimilars Act’s Patent Linkages – Hatch-Waxman Without The
Orange Book
As well as creating an abbreviated pathway for biosimilars, the US’ adoption of the US
Biosimilars Act shaped a “patent dance” to which all biologic and biosimilar
manufacturers are bound to step, linking a biologic’s patent right entitlements to the
regulatory market authorization of a biosimilar (the “patent dance”). 293 However,
consideration was not fully given to the various contentious fora – dance floors, to keep
the analogy alive – available to these parties. In addition to the traditional court-based
litigation contemplated in the patent linkage regime created by §351(l) of the US
Biosimilars Act, biologic and biosimilar manufactures may also do battle before the
USTPO via patent reissuance reviews and inter partes review mechanisms. These
proceedings are not directly linked to the regulation of biosimilars, but may be used
indirectly to narrow the field of patents that may be asserted by the reference biologic
holder when patent litigation comes due. All avenues of patent challenges, linked or
otherwise, are addressed in this section.
To put the US Biosimilars Act’s patent dance into appropriate context, some
consideration must be given to what came before: the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
“Orange Book Proceedings”.294 Arising from the pharmaceutical experience, the regime
created in 1984 by the Hatch-Waxman Act linked the approval of generic
pharmaceuticals to the patent status of the already approved brand pharmaceutical’s
product, similar to Canada’s PM(NOC) proceedings created in the early 90s.295 The US
Federal Circuit recognized that the Hatch-Waxman Act reflects a balance struck by
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Congress “between two competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research
and development of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic
copies of those drugs to market.”296
Like Canada’s PM(NOC) Regulations., the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generics to submit
abbreviated drug submissions comparing its generic drug to the previously approved
brand drug and, unlike the biologic/biosimilar paradigm, not have to produce any preclinical or clinical data, instead relying on the brand’s data. In “exchange” for access to
the abbreviated process and reliance on the brand’s data, the generic must address all
of the brand’s patents.
Like the PM(NOC) Regulations And the Canadian Patent Register, the Hatch-Waxman
Act required the publication of the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange Book”, lists among other
important information, the brand pharmaceutical’s patents. During the regulatory
assessment process, the brand manufacturers may make an election to include a patent
or list of patents to be listed in the Orange Book against the brand pharmaceutical
ensuring that if a generic were to reference that particular brand, the generic
manufacturer would have to address each listed patent – usually alleging either noninfringement or invalidity – or wait until the expiry of each and every patent before the
generic’s launch if approved by the US FDA. Listed patents may only include patents
related to the active ingredient, product and approved uses of the product.
The US Biosimilars Act does not mandate a list of biologic products similar to the Orange
Book; however, the US FDA has taken the initiative to create an analogous reference
guide formally known as the Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference
Products Exclusivity and Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, commonly
known as the Purple Book. While not applicable to biologics and biosimilars, the HatchWaxman Act and Orange Book share some broad stroke foundational principles and
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similarities with the patent linkage regime created by the US Biosimilars Act. Like the
Orange Book, the Purple Book is a list of all biologics and biosimilars granted market
authorization pursuant to §351(a) (biologics) and §351(k) (biosimilars) of the US Public
Health Services Act,297 respectively. A marked and significantly deficient departure from
the Orange Book (and the Canadian Patent List) is the lack of patent listed in the Purple
Book.
Some interesting characteristics of the patent dance created by §351(l) codified in the
US Public Health Services Act become apparent upon closer examination and as a
consequence of this key distinction.298 But prior to this analysis, the full patent dance
process is set out in the following table:
TABLE 5 – STEPS IN THE US BIOSIMILARS ACT PATENT DANCE299
Elapsed Time
Step
Step 1 – Information Exchange
+20 days
Within 20 days of FDA’s notification that the biosimilar license application has been
accepted, biosimilar applicant sends a notice of filing (BLA Filing Notification) and
copy of the biosimilar license application to the reference biologic holder as well as
manufacturing information pertinent to the BIOSIMILAR LICENSE APPLICATION, and
may provide additional information as requested by reference biologic holder. This
information may be provided under statutory and/or contractual confidentiality
terms.
+80 days
Within 60 days of the BLA Filing Notification, reference biologic holder provides the
biosimilar applicant with a list of patents* for which it could bring a claim of patent
infringement and a list of patents it is willing to license to the applicant
+140 days
Within 60 days of receiving the Biologics Patent List, the biosimilar applicant provides:
(1) a list of patents that it believes the reference biologic holder could bring a claim of
infringement in respect of and (2) detailed statements why, claim-by-claim, each
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed by the biosimilar applicant; (3) may
include a statement when the biosimilar applicant intends to launch its biosimilar,
potentially after the expiry of one or more patent and (4) whether it would consider a
license to one or more patents listed in the Biologics Patent List
+200 days
reference biologic holder provides: (1) a claim-by-claim of why it believe each
Biologics Patent List patent is valid, enforceable and infringed by the biosimilar
applicant.
After Above:
For 15 days of good-faith negotiations, the biosimilar applicant and reference biologic
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+15 days

holder attempt to agree on a list of patent to litigation prior to product launch as an
“artificial” act of infringement given that there will be no actual infringement until the
product is marketed, but the litigation is predicated on the biosimilar’s assertion that
it intends to market its biosimilar, if approved, prior to the expiry of one or more of
reference biologic holder’s patents.
If negotiations fail, the biosimilar applicant and reference biologic holder compile
their own lists as follows:
biosimilar applicant provides a list of patents to be litigated
+20 days
Within 5 days of receipt of biosimilar applicant’s Litigation Patent List,
reference biologic holder provide a list of patent that may not exceed the
number of patents on the biosimilar’s Litigation Patent List. Where the
biosimilar Asserted Patents List contains no patents, reference biologic
holder may include one patent in the Litigation Patent List.
+50 days
Within 30 days, reference biologic holder must commence an action against the
biosimilar applicant (“timely infringement suit”). RPB holder is limited to only royalty
recovery (not damages or injunctive relief) where:
(1) reference biologic holder fails to bring a timely infringement suit or
(2) the action is dismissed without prejudice or not prosecuted to judgment
in good faith.
Step 2 – Market Launch Notification
- 180 days
biosimilar must provide 180 day advance notice prior to commercial launch, thereby
allowing for the following actions to be taken in respect of the patent lists (as
modified by newly issued or licensed patent):
reference biologic holder or biosimilar applicant can seek a declaratory
judgement; and
reference biologic holder can seek a preliminary injunction before the
intended date of first market launch.

*Newly issued or licensed patents must be added to the patent lists within 30 days of
issuance or licensing.
The implications of the patent dance are not necessarily evidence on the face of the
process as set out above; however, the practical implications, in light of recent case law,
has significant influence on the conduct of biosimilar applicants and reference biologic
holders as they attempt to navigate the strange pre-litigation steps that, in some
respects, require engagement of the parties prior to the commencement of litigation.
Specifically, there are five consequences arising from the patent dance and its recent
judicial consideration that warrant some commentary.
First, the lack of patent list on the Purple List means that a prospective biosimilar
manufacturer is precluded from the benefit of having a relatively known universe of
patents disclosed well in advance; the ability to make commercial and R&D decisions in
light of the patent landscape for a particular target is significantly curtailed and only
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mitigated by expensive, lengthy and qualified freedom to operate opinions. This
deficiency in transparency has been widely and justifiably criticized by Jeffery Wu and
others.300 This situation is exacerbated by the increasing prevalence of the patent
thickets introduced in Chapter 2 related to a given biologic that may be asserted against
the biosimilar, but there is no certainty of what patents may be put into play either way
until the biosimilar is developed and advances through the market approval process –
i.e., after the significant investment of money and years later. Contradictorily, patent
counsel with the biologics industry group BIO has recently taken the position that even
if patent information was forced to be disclosed for the sake of transparency,
transparency will not be achieved because “[w]e’re going to end up with very large lists
of patents that people will not understand.… I don’t think this is going to create a lot of
transparency,” while at the same time asserting that patent thickets are not an issue
even though he states that “a lot of patents, frankly, that aren’t specific to the biosimilar
products but that relate more generally to recent modern methods of biologics
manufacturing.”301
Second, the US Biosimilars Act created two phases in the patent linkage litigation
scheme, the first setting out default obligations for the exchange of information that
have since been held to be voluntary. The biosimilar applicant is required to voluntarily
disclose its biosimilar license application and process of manufacture information, as
well as identify the patents it thinks are applicable to the reference biologic holder’s
patents(s) that may be asserted against the proposed biosimilar applicant’s application.
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As established below, biosimilar applicants are not willing to do so, and reference
biologic holders are limited to the remedies in the US Biosimilars Act which does not
include injunctive relief.
Third, the US Biosimilars Act dictates ramification where parties do not engage in
voluntary exchanges including limited litigation rights; injunctive relief has been held to
be outside of the scope of the US Biosimilars Act’s patent linkage regime by the US
Supreme Court.302
Fourth, (absent the application of the US Supreme Court’s ratio in Amgen v. Sandoz
discussed below), the cumulative effect of multiple tightly sequenced steps that the
parties are obliged to take, hence the common moniker “patent dance”, results in an
overall lengthy period before any patent infringement action could be brought.
Critically, this could potentially be after the FDA accepts the biosimilar application for
filing and begins its assessment.
Five, following the initial exchange of patent lists, the multiple short time-framed steps
are in fact substantive patent litigation steps required to be taken between 180 days
prior to the biosimilar’s commercial launch and post launch. These steps involve
complicated patent assessment, analysis and responses on very tight deadlines with the
potential for significant consequences.
In 2017, the US Supreme Court issued its first and, thus far, only decision relating to
biosimilars and the US Biosimilars Act’s patent dance.303 In the 9-0 ruling, the Court held
that biosimilar applicants are not required to share their biosimilar license application
information with the reference biologic holder. Further, the biosimilar applicant’s 180
day intention to launch the biosimilar on the market, namely Step 2, could be served
prior to receiving the FDA’s approval of the biosimilar. Given its implications, and as a
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potential basis for further legislative reform, this decision warrants further
consideration. Ultimately, it was hailed as a victory for the biosimilars industry.304
Sandoz, the biosimilar applicant, submitted an abbreviated biosimilar license application
for ZARXIO® (filgraztim-sndz), making reference to the reference biologic NEUPOGEN®
(filgrastim) produced by Amgen, the reference biologic holder.
As set out in detail in Table 5, Step 1 of the patent dance is to facilitate the exchange of
information related to the biosimilar’s abbreviated license application, its manufacturing
process and the reference biologic holder’s patents, all of which is confidential and/or
commercially sensitive information. The provision of biosimilar applicant’s information
is to allow for the reference biologic holder to assess potential patent infringement
claims. Step 2 is the market launch notification; the biosimilar applicant shall provide
notice of its intention to enter the market no later than 180 days before launching the
biosimilar on the market.
In the case before the US Supreme Court, Sandoz (biosimilar) did not comply with Step 1
purporting to protect its complex manufacturing processes and intellectual property.
Amgen (reference biologic) unsuccessfully sought an injunction in the Federal Circuit to
force the disclosure of Sandoz’ (biosimilar) information.
In respect of Step 2, Sandoz (biosimilar) served its Market Launch Notice to Amgen
(reference biologic) before receiving FDA approval of its biosimilar. Amgen (reference
biologic) took the position that the Market Launch Notification could only be granted
after FDA approval, not in advance.
The US Supreme Court sided with Sandoz (biosimilar) on both counts. In respect of
Sandoz’ non-compliance with Step 1, the trial court and Federal Circuit held that
injunctive relief was not statutorily available as a remedy for Sandoz’ (biosimilar) lack of
disclosure. However, the Federal Circuit did agree with Amgen’s (reference biologic)
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position that the Market Launch Notice should only come from Sandoz (biosimilar) after
it received FDA approval for its biosimilar.
In relying on strict statutory interpretation, the US Supreme Court reversed the Federal
Circuit’s decision in respect of Step 2 finding that the language mandating the Market
Launch Notice, without further condition or requirement, was intentional. Other time
limits in the US Biosimilars Act were made conditional or contingent, but no such
restriction was imposed on the Market Launch Notification by Congress.
More significantly, however, the US Supreme Court held that no injunctive relief was
available to Amgen (reference biologic) to redress Sandoz’ (biosimilar) failure to comply
with the information disclosure obligations in Step 1. The US Biosimilars Act, as written,
was held to already provide a remedy, namely the ability to litigate the question of
patent infringement before the biosimilar’s launch; it would be inappropriate to read
into the legislation an additional injunctive remedy that was non-existent.
Amgen’s (reference biologic) injunctive relief argument may not be entirely dead since
this argument was also pursued under California’s unfair competition statue, an
argument that the US Supreme Court remanded back to the Federal Circuit for
determination. On remand, the Federal Circuit held that the US Biosimilars Act
supersedes Amgen’s (reference biologic) state-law based claims.
The practical effect of the US Supreme Court’s ruling is that it gives biosimilar applicants
more control over the strategic timing of the Market Launch Notification which is in
essence the trigger for litigation associated with the biosimilar and reduces the
reference biologic holder’s market exclusivity without having to engage in patent
litigation to as little as 6 months, depending on the FDA’s approval processing times
among other factors.
In addition to the direct impact that patents have in terms of the US Biosimilars Act
patent linkages, there is also an avenue to effect indirect changes to a reference biologic
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holder’s patent portfolio in advance of becoming a bar to a biosimilar through the
patent linkage regime. This indirect process, namely inter partes review (IPR),305 was
created by the America Invents Act in 2011 where questions of patent validity,
(specifically anticipation 306 and obviousness 307 ) may be raised shortly after patent
issuance, but where no declaratory action has been filed.308
Inter partes review proceedings is fertile ground for much examination and debate, but
the primary relevance of inter partes reviews to the research at hand is the way in which
the inter partes review process provides an option, albeit potentially difficult,309 that
may affect the number of patents that ultimately may be asserted against the biosimilar
applicant through the patent dance, or those that may be asserted through traditional
patent litigation outside of the US Biosimilars Act patent linkages.310
Prior to the creation of inter partes review proceedings, questions of validity were
primarily dealt with before the federal district courts which are long, involved and
expensive proceedings.311 The impetus for their creation was to provide a quicker and
less expensive way to an answer on the validity of a patent. However, inter partes
review proceedings are a double edge sword. On one hand the benefits of inter partes
review proceedings to biosimilar challengers are: (1) the presumption of validity does
not apply (2) the legal burden is to establish grounds of invalidity on the preponderance
of the evidence and (3) adjudication is by a technically trained administrative patent
judge within the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the US Patent and Trademarks
Office (USPTO) and (4) set proceedings timeframe of 24 months. However, where inter
partes reviews are brought and the validity of the patent is upheld, estopple precludes
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the biosimilar challenger from subsequently challenging the validity of the patent on any
ground that were or reasonably could have been brought in the inter partes review
proceeding thereby limiting the defense possibility in the instance the biosimilar is sued
for infringement either within the context of the US Biosimilars Act patent linkage
proceeding or separately through traditional patent litigation.312
The constitutionality of the inter partes review procedure was discussed and debated in
the literature313 and in the Courts prior to the US Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States
v. Green Energy Group.314 The question before the Court was whether the inter partes
review procedure was an unconstitutional “taking” of property rights by the
government without a jury trial. As a “public franchise” rather than a private “property
right”, the Court held that a government agency can make determinations on the
validity regarding government granted patent rights without a jury trial. The result is
that biosimilars manufacturers can seek to clear the patent thicket at any time and
outside of the patent dance. This position makes sense; the PTAB can address questions
of anticipation and obviousness in a more timely and cost-effective forum to adjudicate
whether or not there was even the existence or entitlement to a right which is not a
determination of whether the right was taken away.
4.2.3. No EU Community Patent Linkages
Community ties bind the EU and EEA member states together both economically and
legally, but there remains a great deal of national juridical independence in respect of
intellectual property laws, among other areas. As a result, the EU’s approach to patent
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linkages is entirely dissimilar to the US and Canadian approach – they are effectively
non-existent. The EU has taken the position that patent linkage is contrary to the EU’s
early working exception afforded to generic pharmaceuticals, and now biosimilars.
Specifically, patent linkages are considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004
and Directive (EC) No 2001/83.315 In direct contrast with the US and Canada, the status
of a patent is not a ground for the refusal or delay of approval for a biosimilar in the EU.
Attempts to introduce patent linkages has been made by brand industry lobbying,316
and indeed patent linkages or national laws that deter the approval and adoption of
generics still exist today in the EU. However, the EU Commission has previously taken
action indicating that patent linkages are not supported and are expressly opposed at
the member state level.317
While there is a high degree of integration in the prosecution of patents before the EPO,
the assertion and enforcement of granted patents must be brought before domestic
courts where inherent jurisdictional challenges abound.318 Domestic patent litigation
strategy between biologic and biosimilar manufacturers has become a tactical game
that relies and plays-off against the various predilections of each member state.319
However, these patent challenges are, at least in the more significant states in the EU
economic community,320 uncoupled from the EMA’s assessment of a given biosimilar
referencing a biologic.
Accordingly, most patent-based challenges in the EU are founded in the opposition
mechanism available to third-parties before the EPO. The EPO has 38 contracting states
and provides unified patent prosecution and opposition mechanisms with the option to
obtain national patents at the election of the patent applicant after prosecution.
315
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Oppositions may be filed by any public member(s) within 9 months of patent grant,
public notice provided.
This approach enables a biosimilar manufacturer to challenge a reference biologic
holder’s key patents in a single forum rather than multiple state patent courts. For
example, oppositions were filed for epoetin (Amgen’s reference biologic EPOGEN
(epoetin)), filgrastim (Amgen’s reference biologic NEUPOGEN (filgrastim)), infliximab
(Janssen’s reference biologic REMICADE (infliximab)), insulin glargine (Sanofi’s reference
biologic LANTUS (insulin glargine)), and somatropin (Pfizer’s reference biologic
GENOTROPIN (somatropin)).321
There are, however, disadvantages in proceeding by way of opposition before the EPO;
the few limited grounds to revoke a patent available during opposition proceedings
focus on whether there was a defect in the assessment leading to the grant of the
patent. These grounds include (1) the subject matter is not patentable; (2) the invention
was not disclosed clearly or completely enough for one skilled in the art to perform the
invention; or (3) the subject matter extends beyond the content of the application
filed.322 Thus, the mainstream issue of patent infringement usually at play in traditional
patent litigation plays no role before the EPO.
There are three main outcomes of opposition proceedings: (1) the opposition is rejected
and the patent is maintained as granted; (2) the patent is maintained in amended form
with a new published specification; or (3) the patent is revoked. Initial opposition
decisions may be appealed within two months; countries may have conflicting rules
whether they stay any national patent infringement actions while an opposition and any
associated appeal is pending.323 The median time for an appeal is close to three years,
which
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The commencement of opposition proceedings (by the biosimilar applicant) does not
preclude the commencement of domestic patent litigation by either party; the
reference biologic manufacture may seek redress for patent infringement while the
biosimilar applicant can seek declarations of patent invalidity. Unfortunately, pursuing
patent litigation strategies in different jurisdictions will require expertise of local
practice and specialized patent counsel – a vastly expensive and resource intensive
proposition.
Regardless of the perpetrating party, biologic/biosimilar patent litigation in the EU is
messy; multijurisdictional litigation strategy appears chaotic, but does make for
profoundly fertile ground for further research and industry insight as the area evolves.
The crux of the matter, however, is that there is no linkage between EMA/CHMP’s
regulatory assessment and any patent consideration, save for the tangential connection
resulting in coterminous exclusivity and patent expiry. However, this begs the question
of “why didn’t the EU adopt a patent linkage regime?”
4.3. Data Exclusivity Provisions in Canada, the US and EU
Data exclusivity was first introduced in the US in 1984 with the Hatch-Waxman Act and
has since permeated throughout the world, as detailed in Chapter 3, through
international trade agendas and their accompanying treaty obligations prompted by the
US, EU and their pharmaceutical industries. During the negotiation of this legislation,
brand pharmaceutical companies advocated for additional protection against generics in
order to preserve the incentive for continued innovation with greater certainty of their
return on investments commensurate with the risk. 324
Biosimilar manufacturers are not precluded from generating their own clinical efficacy
data to circumvent data exclusivity, but this is a costly approach and potentially creates
some serious ethical issues. That is, some clinical trial participants would not receive
324
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treatment (the biologic) that has already been shown to be safe and effective in order
for data on the biosimilar to be garnered. Further, clinical trial participants would also
be taking the risk of taking a drug where the knowledge and information about the drug
already exists. The reality is that while biosimilar manufacturers may be required to
carry out non-clinical and clinical trials, these trials are not identical to the clinical trial
upon which basis the biologic was granted approval and, more importantly, the data to
which the biosimilar applications rely upon through the abbreviated pathway created by
the US Biosimilars Act.325
Generally, data exclusivity provisions protect the data of a biologics manufacturer who
submits the first application for a biologic from allowing a biosimilar applicant to rely on
the biologic’s data for comparison purposes during the biosimilar regulatory
assessment. Legislation in many countries, including Canada, the US and EU, allow a
biosimilar applicant to make reference and rely upon comparisons to the data and
evidence of a previously approved reference biologic.
This ability for the biosimilar to rely upon the reference biologic data represents a
significant savings in costs and resources that would otherwise have to be expended on
expensive testing and clinical trials establishing the safety and efficacy of the biosimilar.
Instead, the biosimilar applicant benefits from the reference biologic holder’s efforts by
having to establish the safety, effectiveness and potency in relation to the reference
biologic. While in comparison to the costs and resources expended by the reference
biologic manufacturer, the biosimilar manufacturer’s comparative submission is less
expensive and onerous to produce, it is by no means without considerable cost and
effort.
It is therefore a policy objective of data exclusivity provisions to provide reference
biologic manufacturers with time to recover the substantial investment and costs
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incurred in the R&D and commercialization of the biologic, through market exclusivity,
before the competitive biosimilar entry into the marketplace.
As detailed below, data exclusivity as solely a bar to market entry has evolved; it
protects the disclosure and the use of the reference biologic holder’s data which, in
practice, has created two types of prohibitions. First, the prohibition for a period of time
that precludes the biosimilar from entry into the market after approved (“Market Entry
Prohibition Period”). Second, is the prohibition for a period of time that preclude a
biosimilar application, relying on an reference biologic, from being either assessed or
even accepted for filing with the regulator (“filing prohibition period”).
The rationale for the filing prohibition period is that the biosimilar should not enjoy the
springboard benefit of relying on the reference biologic, namely using the Market Entry
Prohibition term for the biosimilar to be assessed and granted market authorization
such that it is ready for launch immediately after the expiry of the Market Entry
Prohibition. The filing prohibition period is thought to equalize the prejudice caused by
the lengthy regulatory approval process.
It should be noted that data exclusivity provisions are independent of the patent
protection realities that will continue to be the focus of biologic companies’ strategy to
protect market exclusivity. Separate and apart from the status of patents relating to the
biologic, a biosimilar applicant will be precluded from relying on the reference biologic
holder’s data for the purposes of obtaining regulatory authorization until after the
various periods of data exclusivity have expired. However, the potential and future
power of these regimes cannot be discounted; data exclusivity creates strong
monopolies that are automatically granted and enforced without significant contest by
regulatory agencies, without limited exceptions or conditions.
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4.3.1. Data Exclusivity in Canada
Amendments to the Canadian FDA Regs. enacted on October 5, 2006, implemented
Canada’s data exclusivity obligations required by TRIPs as a member of the World Trade
Organization as well as the North American FTA (1994).326 Specifically, Canada has an
obligation to provide protection to data that is required to be submitted for the purpose
of obtaining regulatory approval of pharmaceutical products from disclosure or unfair
commercial use.
Canada’s data exclusivity provisions are intended to provide the manufacturer of an
innovative drug with an internationally competitive, guaranteed minimum period of
market exclusivity; thus providing an adequate incentive for innovators to invest in
research, and to develop and market their products in Canada.327 As confirmed by
caselaw and the purpose statement in section C.08.004.1(2) of the FDA Regs., data
exclusivity eligibility has two requirements: (1) it applies only to a new chemical entity,
and (2) the production of the supporting data under consideration required
considerable effort.328 Examples of new and significant data requiring considerable
effort to generate include clinical trials providing data and evidence to determine the
safety, efficacy, properties, and conditions of use of a reference biologic. However, data
and evidence submitted from secondary sources such as literature references and/or
post-market domestic or foreign experience would not be considered data eligible for
protection. 329 Data exclusivity has a tumultuous history in Canada despite its
longstanding presence in our legislation. Prior to 2006, the prior version of C.08.004.1 of
the FDA Regs., purported to provide 5 years of data exclusivity, was narrowly
interpreted by the Federal Court of Appeal rendering the provision rarely triggered.330
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The pre-October 2006 data exclusivity states that if the Minister of Health, in support of
a manufacturer’s drug submission: (1) “examines any information”; and (2) “relies on
data” contained in the information or material filed by the brand pharmaceutical and for
which a Notice of Compliance has already issued, a Notice of Compliance shall not be
issued to the subsequent-entry manufacturer earlier than 5 years after the date of
issuance of the brand’s Notice of Compliance.331 In Bayer, the Federal Court of Appeal
decision interpreted this provision narrowly to require that the Minister actually
examine and rely on the brand’s data in considering an abbreviated drug submission
and the bioequivalence of the generic drug. An actual examination of the brand’s data
and information was rarely done or relied upon, therefore there was no effective data
exclusivity protection in Canada prior to October 2006.
As a result from mounting pressure from the US and its pharmaceutical lobby, the state
of affairs in Canada changed in 2006. The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (“RIAS”)
accompanying the October 2006 amendments acknowledged that the Minister did not
in the ordinary course actually examine the innovative drug submission despite the
reliance on that submission in assessing the bioequivalence of a subsequent-entry drug.
Accordingly, the RIAS explains that the amendments serve to re-characterizes the
triggering of the post-October 2006 data protection provisions “to clarify that the
aforementioned reliance will give rise to an exclusionary period.”332 However, this
amendment went beyond providing clarity. Unsurprisingly, given the political climate
and the spread of TRIPs-plus provisions due to the advancement of bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements, brand companies took the position that Canada should
be adopting a data protection period consistent with the EU. Further, the brand industry
advocated for an expansion of the applicability of data exclusivity on a variety of
grounds, but most notably an expansion beyond the definition of “innovative drug” to
include all products containing the medicinal ingredient like combination products and
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different formulations and polymorphs.333 Proponents of the generic industry asserted,
among other things, that the pre-2006 data exclusivity approach endorsed by Bayer was
in keeping with Canada’s obligations and should not be disturbed. Any implementation
of a filing prohibition or authorization prohibition as published for comment went
beyond the scope of Canada’s international obligations. This is a position with which I
am inclined to agree. Canada unilaterally, even if under pressure, amended its data
exclusivity obligations to mirror the regime in the US and EU.
Section C.08.004.1(1) defines “innovative drug” as “a drug that contains a medicinal
ingredient not previously approved in a drug by the Minister and that is not a variation
of a previously approved medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester, enantiomer, solvate
or polymorph.”334 In the context of interpreting the term “innovative drug”, the Federal
Court of Canada recently rendered a decision in respect of Canada’s data exclusivity
provisions and acknowledging the necessity of considering the context of Canada’s
international obligations. The Courts have previously acknowledged that there is a
difference between Canada’s international obligations and the way in which these
obligations are nationally implemented. The obligations arising from the North America
FTA (1994) and TRIPs are to protect data from disclosure or unfair commercial use. How
Canada chose to meet this obligation is by conferring data exclusivity pursuant to
C.08.004.1(3) making the “innovative drug” the “vehicle” through which its data may be
protected in the event of a comparison to the “innovative drug”. 335 The Court
considered the context of Canada’s international obligations relevant to, though not
determinative of, the interpretation of its current data exclusivity provisions.336
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Thus, the decision of how Canada implemented its perceived obligations pursuant to the
North America FTA (1994) and TRIPs was Canada’s own doing, but the subsequent
interpretation of its national provision will be undertaken in light of the intent of its
international obligations which have been found to be consistent with existing case law
taking the rational approach of limiting the applicability of data exclusivity to
“innovative drugs” as “new chemical entities”.337 Under the current data exclusivity
provision, Canada provides for an 8 year approval prohibition period from the date the
first NOC was issued to the biologic “innovative drug” reference product comprising the
identical medicinal ingredient precluding the approval of a biosimilar. Where there are
paediatric studies have been submitted within the first 5 years of the issuance of the
innovative drug’s NOC, the 8 year period will be extended by 6 months. Approval for a
biosimilar in Canada proceeds by way of a new drug submission, but nonetheless seeks
to reduce the clinical and non-clinical study requirements by demonstrating similarity to
a previously approved reference biologic drug. Accordingly, a biosimilar will not be
considered to be an “innovative drug”. As well, the current provision establishes a 6
year filing prohibition period of an biosimilar application from the date of issuance of
the first NOC for the biologic “innovative drug”.
While C.08.004.1(5) excludes a biologic from data exclusivity where the reference
biologic is not marketed in Canada, the application of this exclusion might be
ambiguous. This exclusion to data exclusivity applies where the drug identification
number (DIN) for the reference biologic was cancelled or the reference biologic was
otherwise withdrawn from the market. However, the enforceability of data exclusivity
might be called into question where the reference biologic has been issued an NOC, but
has not been marketed in Canada after authorization has been granted.
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4.3.2. US Data Exclusivity
The US Biosimilars Act prohibits the filing of a biosimilar application pursuant to §351(k)
until at least 4 years after the date the FDA first approves the reference biologic, i.e., a
4-year filing prohibition period.338 However, it is the prohibition for the licensing of a
biosimilar for the very significant period from the date of the first license grant of the
reference biologic that astonishes, namely a 12 year approval prohibition period.339 This
12 year approval prohibition is over double the period that is mandated by the HatchWaxman Act for pharmaceuticals, a 5-year approval prohibition period. It is important
to also note that a 3-year authorization prohibition for previously approved
pharmaceutical where the new or supplemental drug application is based on a new
clinical investigation, e.g., a new indication for an existing pharmaceutical.340 No such
exclusivity expanded scope of protection for biologics exist.
As well, the US Biosimilars Act extends the data exclusivity periods an additional 6
months where the reference biologic license applicant includes or is requested by the
FDA to include paediatric studies such that it will be 12-½ years before the biosimilar can
gain market access and 4-½ years before the FDA will accept the filing of an application
for a biosimilar.341
Much commentary has been devoted to the implications of the US’ biologics data
exclusivity regime. Erika Lietzan, previously a brand pharmaceutical litigator, argues that
data exclusivity is a myth that has been created to reframe the concept of ownership
over data generated for the purpose of regulatory assessment and approval. In essence,
she argues that a reference brand/biologic holder’s data may be indefinitely protected
and ownership continuously maintained, but for being compelled to disclose same in
the course of seeking market authorization. In this way, market exclusivity is a fiction
338

US Public Health Services Act at §351(k)(7)(b)
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since the government cannot give to the brand something that the brand already owns.
Thus, the 12-year market exclusivity is an unreasonable and unjustified truncation of
perpetual data exclusivity.342 However, a helpful review of the justifications for the 12
year exclusivity period, including their underlying assumptions, provided by Julie
Polovina cast this extended duration into doubt.343
During the negotiation of the US Biosimilars Act, various stakeholders proposed a range
of exclusivity terms and put forth studies analyzing the length of time it took a reference
biologic holder make back the initial research and development investment. Renowned
academic Henry Grabowski submitted report indicating that it took 12.9 to 16.2 years
after a reference biologic holder received FDA approval to recover these costs.344 The
biologics industry group BIO advocated for a 14-year exclusivity period as an “insurance
policy” for situations where a biosimilar applicant was able to “work around” the
reference biologic holder’s patents.345 Notably, there was no mention of the lawful
entitlement to do so or even scenarios considering the invalidity of said patents. In 2009
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported that a 12 to 14 year exclusivity period was
unnecessary to encourage innovation.346 Based on updated research from Prasad and
Wouters,347 we now know that the profitability underlying such an extended 12 year
exclusivity period is unjustified.
The US Biosimilars Act also awards limited data exclusivity to the first market authorized
biosimilar thereby precluding the market authorization of further biosimilars. The data
exclusivity period attributable to the first biosimilar ranges between 12 to 42 months,
depending on a variety of factors. Pursuant to §351(k)(6)(a) of the US Patient Health
342
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Services Act, the first biosimilar is granted an exclusivity period of one year after the
date of market entry after which time any other biosimilar may be granted market
authorization by the FDA.348Data exclusivity grants to the first biosimilar are significantly
impacted where the reference biologic holder and biosimilar applicant engage in patent
litigation. A grant of market authorization for a further biosimilar may be delayed by 18months in the event of a final court decision or dismissal (with or without prejudice) on
all patents-in-suit against the first biosimilar.349 Practically speaking, the reference
biologic manufacturer maintains its market exclusivity pending the related patent
linkage litigation. Given that the first biosimilar applicant was required to engage in
litigation, regardless of the outcome, it is awarded an 18-month period of exclusivity to
the exclusion of other biosimilars. If the patent linkage litigation is prolonged for at least
42 months, any other biosimilars must wait 42 months after approval of the first
biosimilar.350
In the event that the reference biologic manufacturer does not engage the first
biosimilar applicant in litigation, any further biosimilar applicants must still wait 18
months after approval of the first biosimilar. 351 Practically, the biologic and first
biosimilar manufacturer may enter into a settlement agreement and apportion the
statutory exclusivity periods privately between them to the exclusion of further
biosimilars. Use of settlement agreements can occur because, unlike the Hatch-Waxman
regime for pharmaceuticals, patent litigation is not required under the US Biosimilars
Act — instead, negotiation is encouraged. As a result, the innovator manufacturer can
avoid litigation and negotiate a settlement with the first biosimilar manufacturer,
thereby obtaining an additional 18-month period of marketing exclusivity and
potentially benefits from royalty payments once the first biosimilar launches.
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4.3.3. EU’s Enhanced Data Exclusivity Regime
Adoption of a data exclusivity system in the EU was the result of intense lobbying by the
pharmaceutical industry, citing the need to protect future investments leading to
further innovation.352 Enacted in 1965, the requirement for the provision of data in
support of a new medicine application stems from Article 4.8 of the EU Directive
65/65/EEC.353 The first iteration of EU’s data exclusivity regime protecting the data
mandated in 1965 was first implemented in 1987 in Directive 87/21/EEC; this Directive’s
main purpose was to establish bioequivalence as an evidentiary basis for the approval of
generic pharmaceuticals.354
As patent law harmonization swept the globe through the adoption of GATT, WTO and
TRIPs, as well as further European community expansion, patent regimes strengthen
and pharmaceutical patent strategies rose in prominence. While it might be expected
that with the rise of more powerful patent regimes, the need for increasingly broad data
exclusivity would decrease; that was not the case.
The initial 1987 data exclusivity provisions provided for 6 years of data exclusivity for
most medicines from the first marketing approval and 10 years for biotech products. If
considered “in the interest of public health”, member states were empowered to
extend data exclusivity to 10 years; this crafted flexibility led to domestic variability
across the EU. Importantly, EU states were also empowered to make the data exclusivity
period and the date of expiry of a product patent (if allowed in the member state)
coterminous.
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Broadened in 2004, the EU’s data exclusivity regime is the most generous exclusivity
regime globally,355 embodied in two aspects: (1) the approval prohibition period in the
EU is 10 years from the date of approval of the reference biologic, and (2) the filing
prohibition period of 8 years during which time the EMA is precluded from accepting or
reviewing any biosimilar applications for market authorization. Additionally, another 1year period of protection is available where the reference biologic is approved for a new
indication providing significant benefit during the filing prohibition period.356
4.4. Non-Patent Contentious Additional Protection Provisions Relevant to Biologics
and Biosimilars
As discussed in the context of international treaty obligations in Chapter 3, the
additional IP provisions are focused on compensation biologics manufactures for the
loss of patent term due to the mandatory regulatory authorization assessment
encroaching on their 20 year patent monopoly. Without yet having access to the market
due to regulatory processes, the biologic applicant is precluded from commercially
practicing its invention to the exclusion of others, thus precluded from leveraging its
considerable innovation investment. As well, the compulsory data and evidence forming
the basis of its obligation is generally conducted prior to the regulatory assessment
process, also cutting into the patent term.
Two mechanisms have been crafted into the IP treaty obligations of Canada-US-Mexico
FTA (2018) and Canada-EU FTA (2017) for Contracting Parties to alternatively adopt,
namely provisions that either extend patent terms or sui generis rights that are
analogous to, even depend upon, patent rights but do not directly affect the patents.

355
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Canada and the EU have implemented the latter – sui generis protection analogous to,
depend upon, but not rights conferred by patents through Canadian Certificates of
Supplementary Protection (“CSP”) or EU’s Supplementary Protection Certificates
(“SPC”). The US, on the other hand, early on adopted the patent term extension (“PTE”)
approach initially with the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act applicable to
pharmaceuticals. After some perceived ambiguity, the FDA has clarified that the US’s
Patent Term Restoration Program also applies to biologics.357
The purpose of PTE and CPS/SPC rights is to compensate biologic manufactures for the
loss of patent term due to the mandatory regulatory approval process that demands the
submission of expansive and expensive non-clinical and clinical trial evidence of the
safety and efficacy of the biologic before it can be marketed.
The regulatory process in Canada, the US and EU takes years and often begins well after
the filing date of relevant patents claiming the product, process or use related to the
biologic under assessment. Thus, once granted, the 20-year patent term would be
effectively curtailed because the compulsory regulatory process would be ongoing
during the term of the patent; the biologic patent holder was precluded from
commercially leveraging their patent (making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing) until the biologic was approved for sale often years after the patent grant.
PTE and CSP/SPC regimes were a proposed solution to recoup some of the regulatory
downtime by extending either the patent term (PTE) or providing protection analogous
to patent rights beyond the expiry of the relevant patent (CSP/SPC) thereby
compensating for the delay out of the control of the biologic applicant.
In addition to compensating biologics manufacturers for perceived current losses,
PTE/CSP/SPC provisions would, in principle, further incentivize innovation and the
development of new biologics.
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4.4.1. Canada’s Certificates of Supplementary Protection System
Given a compensatory sui generis rights system was a treaty obligation arising from
Canada-EU FTA (2017), it should come as no surprise that Canada’s Certificate of
Supplementary Protection (“CSP”) is similar to the EU’s SPC regime. Upon issuance, a
CSP provides an additional period of protection of up to 2 years for new biologics
protected by an eligible patent.358
The rights conferred by CSPs are codified in s. 115 of the Canadian Patent Act which
provides that the scope of the CSP is the same as that of the patent, but only with
respect to the making, constructing, using or selling of any drug [biosimilar] that
contains the medicinal ingredient or combination of medicinal ingredients [biologic] set
out in the CPS, by itself or in addition to any other medicinal ingredient. 359
Like eligible patents listed in the context of Canada’s PM(NOC) Linkage regime, CSPs are
eligible to be listed in association with a biologic on the Patent Register pursuant to ss.
4(3.1) of the Canadian PM(NOC) Regulations which dictate two requirements. First, the
patent noted in the CSP must be listed on the Patent Register in respect of the biologic.
Second, the submission or supplement is in relation to a biologic with respect to which
the CSP grants rights, privileges and liberties referred to in s. 115 of the Canadian Patent
Act.
However, pursuant to s. 3(7) of the Canadian PM(NOC) Regs, no patent or CSP shall be
added to the Patent Register until the drug (biologic) submission in respect of which the
patent list was submitted receives an NOC. Once issued and listed on the Patent
Register, the CPS protection lies dormant until the expiry of the patent set out in the
CPS.
358
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4.4.2. Patent Term Extension in the US
On the basis of statutory and jurisprudential interpretation, in addition to the position
explicitly taken by the FDA, the patent term extension or restoration (“PTE”) provisions
enacted by §156 Title 35 of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 apply to biologics.
Specifically, under §156(f) of Title 35, PTE may be granted in respect of a human drug
product defined as “…the active ingredient of a…human biologic product (as those
terms are used in the…Public Health Services Act)…”.360
A patent will only be eligible for PTE if it includes at least one claim encompassing the
approved biologic (product claim), its process of manufacturing (process claim), or an
approved use of the biologic (use claim). Further, the patent must satisfy the following
criteria: (1) the cited patent has not expired; (2) the patent has not benefited from a
previous PTE; (3) within 60 days of receiving the first marketing approval for the biologic
from the FDA, the patent holder or its agent must submit a PTE application to the
USTPO; (4) the biologic was subject to regulatory review period prior to its commercial
marketing or use; and (5) the FDA’s authorization is the first market approval of the
biologic, or where the patented biologic manufacturing process primarily uses
recombinant DNA technology, and the FDA’s authorization is the first approval of a
biologic that is manufactured under said patented process.361
In practice, both the USPTO and FDA participate in calculating and determining PTEs, but
it is the PTO that makes the final determination on patent eligibility. For the purposes of
this research, this process is non-contentious since the determination of PTE eligibility is
based solely on the biologic manufacturer’s representations set out in its PTE
application; third-party communications will not be considered by the PTO outside an
extraordinary situation.
360
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PTE have a maximum term of 5 years. The combination of eligible PTE term and the
unexpired patent term cannot exceed more than 14 years or put another way, the
biologic manufacturer cannot enjoy more than 14 years of market exclusivity.
The PTE term depends on the date of first marketing approval of the biologic. It is
calculated by the difference between the first marketing approval date and the filing
date of the patent in question, less 5 years. No PTE is available if less than 5 years have
elapsed between patent filing and the first market authorization date.
The PTE term is less than 5 years if the difference between first approval date and the
patent filing date is over 5 years but under 9 years, but beyond that difference, the PTE
term is capped at 5 years. Accordingly, no patent term extension is available in respect
of a biologic where there is 14 years or more left on the relevant patent term. Such a
patent would be ineligible for PTE.
4.4.3. European Union’s Supplementary Protection Certificates
In 1992, the EU introduced a sui generis right through the creation of Supplementary
Protection Certificates (“SPC”) providing up to 5-years of additional protection for
pharmaceuticals protected by patent.362 The purpose of this supplemental period of
protection was to promote research and innovation leading to the development of new
drugs, now including biologics, and to deter the migration of industry R&D efforts out of
the EU to countries that might offer greater protection.363
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Under this regime, SPCs extends protection over eligible biologics required to go
through the EU’s regulatory authorization process364 that are protected by product,
process and/or use patents, but are not themselves patent rights. SPCs seek to mitigate
the potential harm arising from the effective reduction of patent protection terms due
to the long and mandatory regulatory process. This justification for EU’s SPC system
remains consistent with the Canadian justification for its relative new Certificate of
Supplementary Protection regime, as well as US’ patent term restoration provision now
just over three decades old.
Interestingly, an amendment specifically targeting biosimilars was adopted recently
which created two manufacturing-based exceptions to SPC protection in the 6 months
prior to its expiry. 365 The exception of particular pertinence allows a biosimilar
manufacturer the ability to manufacture biosimilar, otherwise precluded by the SPC, for
the purpose of storage so that the biosimilar will be ready for market launch
immediately after the expiry of the SPC.
This exception was to even the playing field between EU-based manufacturers vs.
foreign manufactures who would be ready to launch immediately upon the SPC expiry
having had the ability to develop manufacturing capacity by being unburden by the
SPC.366
A biosimilar applicant must meet certain criteria to rely on the storage use exception:
(1) at least three months prior to commencing the otherwise offending acts, the
biosimilar applicant must notify the SPC holder of prescribed information related to the
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biosimilar to be manufactured under this exception as well as provide the same
information to the Member State’s intellectual property office; (2) the patent cited on
the SPC application has not yet expired as of the date of the SPC application; (3) the SPC
is filed in respect of the first market authorization grant for the relevant biologic in the
Member State; (4) the patent cited in the SPC application is not subject to a previously
granted SPC in the Member State.
The protection conferred by the SPC is not an extension of the patent term or any other
patent rights; SPCs extend the effect of the right namely, the right to exclude others
from practicing the invention. Thus, an SPC extends the market exclusivity of a biologic,
preluding a biosimilar being granted market authorization until the expiry of the SPC.
Importantly, the SPC only comes into force upon the expiry of the cited patent for, in
the normal course, a period of 5 years. Given the formula for calculating the SPC term,
the total combined term of market exclusivity granted by virtue of both patent and SPC
protection cannot normally exceed 15 years. 367
The SPC term depends on the date of first marketing authorization and is calculated as
the difference between that date and the filing date of the relevant patent less 5 years.
Normally, this means that no SPC term is available if less than 5 years have elapsed
between the patent filing date and the first market authorization date. Presumably, the
biologic manufacturer has not suffered undue delay in the marketing authorization
process that the SPC was created to protect against in this scenario.
Undue delay apparently kicks in if the first marketing authorization date is over 5 years
but under 10 years after the patent filing date; the SPC term then corresponds to the
period elapsed between the five-year point and the first marketing authorization date
representing the undue delay the SPC seeks to address. Ultimately, the SPC term is
367
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126

capped; SPC protection for biologics where the first marketing authorizations are
granted more than 10 years after the patent filing date is 5 years.
SPC protection is mandated in all EU and EEC Member States, but these regimes are not
unified or even mutually recognized; SPC applications must be filed and approved on a
state by state basis tracking to the different dates of first market authorizations, even if
based on the same underlying patent.
4.5. Summary of Chapter 4
Chapter 4’s examination of the ways in which each of Canada, the US and EU have
implemented their respective treaty obligations. Canada’s implementation of its treaty
obligations, in particular its patent linkage regulations, is an exercise of discretion that
has led to a different approach in Canada that, as will be explored in Chapter 5, serves
to impede the number and timely entry of biosimilars on to the Canadian market.
On the face of the quantitative analysis, a marked difference in the number of
biosimilars approved and marketed in Canada (and the US) in comparison to the EU is
observed. While Canada adopted an assessment framework prior to the US, it has
slightly lagged in its approval numbers, but interestingly its market launches are faring
better than their American counterparts. Consideration of the reasons for these
quantitative results will be of particular interest in Chapter 5’s analysis and discussion.
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CHAPTER 5. Analysis and Discussion

5.1. Introduction
The central question explored in this work centers on the impact of how Canada has
chosen to craft its legislation and regulations domestically in furtherance of its
international treaty obligations on the regulation of biosimilars, linked to patent/IP
considerations, in comparison to the US and the EU.
Without question, the EU has enjoyed significant success in the implementation and
execution of its biosimilars strategy which may be in part because of the head-start that
it has had in the regulation of biosimilars in comparison to the US and Canada, but as
will be explored in this Chapter, that is far from the entire picture.
There are some very interesting comparisons to be drawn upon reflection of the
number of approved biosimilars in relation to (1) the coverage of reference biologics,
namely how many “follow-on” biosimilars per reference biologic and (2) how many have
been launched on the market. The target reference biologics seem to be based on
patent expiry dates and the size of the market, which, I surmise, address two important
factors: risk and reward.
As explored herein, it is the second factor, namely the prominence of patent
considerations, that form the main basis for the discrepancies between the EU versus
the US and Canada. In essence, the way that Canada (and the US) implemented its
international obligations, in particular patent linkages, has contributed to the delayed
adoption of biosimilars and their launch on the Canadian market.
The interplay of patent litigation in the US and Canada through their respective patent
linkage regimes is complicated by biologic patent strategies that create clusters of
patents or “thickets” that provide intertwining coverage creating overlapping and
potentially overreaching entitlements that may eventually prove to also be overbroad.
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These patent thickets provide dense coverage of the “core” claims attracting patent
linkage protection, as well as peripheral patents focused on non-eligible claims.
US litigation is further hampered by (1) a lack of patents listed in the Purple Book and (2)
the inherent uncertainty of the patent dance, both of which may be factors in the
increasing incidence in settlements delaying the launch of the biosimilar years after the
grant of approval.368
In Canada, the recently overhauled Canadian patent litigation framework shifting from
in personam applications to in rem actions has had the likely unintended consequence
of further integrating the Canadian biosimilar outcomes with US outcomes in terms of
settlement agreements that are not yet subject to additional governmental scrutiny.
Further, Certificates of Supplementary Protection are in effect proxies or carry on rights
that are challenged in the same way patents are challenged in Canada. In particular,
CSPs are integrated into the Canadian patent linkage Regime in a way that has not
happened in the EU.
In terms of data exclusivity, the provisions that created a tight assessment window for
biosimilar applications may serve to unjustifiably delay the approval of biosimilars
beyond the expiry of the data exclusivity period in the future. However, as concluded
from an examination of the relevant reference biologics, data exclusivity has yet to be
triggered in the assessment of a biosimilar in any of the US, EU, and Canada to date.
As will be established in this Chapter, the factors noted above and addressed in more
detail below are not mutually exclusive; they are intertwined and dynamic systems
layering obstructions with the cumulative effect of precluding the entry of biosimilars
into the Canadian market to the detriment of Canadian patients and the public and
private payers’ bottom line.
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Undoubtedly, it is in the best interest of the Canadian public, and humanity writ large, to
promote the creation of innovative biologics, an enormously resource heavy and
expensive endeavour primarily funded by private industry players. Similarly, it is equally
important to incentivize further innovation as well as encouraging healthy competition
by promoting the development and adoption of biosimilars. A better balance can and
needs to be struck.
5.2. The Numbers – Quantitative Analysis and Assessment of Market Authorized
Biologics and Biosimilars
To gain insight into the effect that Canada’s national implementation of its international
obligations has had on biosimilars, a quantitative analysis of the biosimilars approved
and launched to date is undertaken. We look at the success of biosimilar approvals and
their availability on the Canadian market as a measure of how Canada is faring in this
important step to bring biosimilars to Canadians and what aspects of its national
implementation arising from progressive patent and regulatory obligations may be
hindering biosimilar approval and launch.
Data in respect of the biosimilar approvals and launches in Canada, the US and EU are
presented in Appendices 1-3 which form the basis for the following findings. Data
reported in Appendix 4 represents an amalgamation of some of the data reported in
Appendices 1-3 that contextualizes this information to gain further insight into the
effects that Canada’s implementation of its international treaty obligations has had on
biosimilar approval and marketing. All data was obtained from searches of either the
national databases maintained by each jurisdictions’ respective agencies or public
sources such as press releases and news reports.
Turning first to the Canadian numbers: the Canadian Drug Product Database provides
comprehensive information about biologics and biosimilars that have been granted
market authorization. Broken down by status, the Drug Product Database lists biologics
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and biosimilars that are marketed,369 approved,370 cancelled post-market,371 cancelled
pre-market,372 cancelled pre-market for a variety of safety issues,373 or cancelled for
administrative reasons374 or dormant.375
The details of the Canadian experience is set out in Appendix 3. To date, there are 24
approved biosimilars making reference to 11 reference biologics,376 two of which have
yet to launch, in Canada. As it now stands, there are no IP holds or stays pending
litigation that is impeding the market launch of the following biologics. Currently, there
are no biologics or biosimilars that have been cancelled pre-market on the basis of a
safety issue, nor have there been any cancellations on the basis of an unfiled Annual
Notification. On the face of these numbers, biosimilars approvals are overall faring
better that those in the US, but not as well as the in the European regime.
Like the comprehensive information made publicly available by Health Canada, the US
Food and Drug Administration’s Purple Book lists all of the biosimilars that have been
approved by way of the abbreviated pathway for biosimilars pursuant to §351(k) of the
369
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373
Such as failure to provide evidence regarding the safety and effectiveness of a drug, under Section
C.01.013 of the Regulations pursuant to Section C.01.014.6 (2)(b) of the Canadian FDA Regs, the
suspension of and Notice of Compliance under section C.08.006 pursuant to Section C.01.014.6 (2)(b) of
the Regulations, failure to comply with the order issued under section 21.31 of the Act to conduct an
assessment and provide the results pursuant to Section C.01.014. 6 (3)(a) of the Regulations, and
following the examination of the results of an assessment provided in response to an order issued under
section 21.31 of the Act pursuant to Section C.01.014.6 (1)(a) of the FDARegs.
374
Canadian Food and Drugs Act s. C.01.014.6(2)(a). for failure to file an Annual Notification pursuant to
C.01.014.5.
375
Dormant refers to an active DIN that was previously marketed in Canada but for which there have
been no sales for period of at least 12 months. See DPD Database reference terms.
376
AVASTIN (bevacizumab), ENBREL (etanercept), GENOTROPIN (somatropin), HERCEPTIN (trastuzumab),
HUMALOG (insulin lispro), HUMIRA (adalimumab), LANTUS (insulin glargine), NEOPOGEN (filgrastim),
NEULASTA (pegfilgrastim), REMICADE (infliximab), RITUXAN (rituximab). Each of these reference biologics
have been granted market authorization in Canada. While Canadian biosimilar applicants are statutorily
permitted to rely on data and information submitted before aanother non-Canadian regulatory agency,
no biosimilar applicant has yet availed themselves of this option to date. We are still in early days and that
day might yet still come to pass.
370
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US Public Health Services Act. As set out in Appendix 1,377 28 biosimilars have been
approved making reference to 9 reference biologics.378 However, 10 of these biosimilars
have not launched. Eight biosimilars (6 biosimilars of HUMIRA (adalimumab) and 2
biosimilars of ENBREL (etanercept)) were first delayed by litigation and now presumably
as a result of settlement agreements reached between AbbVie and all of the biosimilar
applicants seeking market authorization. These private arrangement have concerning
implications as discussed below.
Similar to its place as the pioneering jurisdiction in the regulation of biosimilars, the
European biosimilar approval and marketing numbers surpass Canada and the US.
Sourced from the European Medicines Agency’s medicines database,379 the assessment
detailed in Appendix 2 shows that 65 biosimilars have been approved making reference
to 15 reference biologics.380 A number of these biosimilars have been withdrawn for a
variety of reasons. However, none of the reasons are attributable to litigation delays or
even delays due to data exclusivity periods of supplementary protection certificates.
Further, there are currently a total of 16 biosimilars under review in the EU, two of
which are the first biosimilar in relation to new reference biologics that previously had
no biosimilar.
This analysis of biosimilars approved and launched provides a measure of the impact of
Canada’s implementation of international obligations to determine whether and how
the differences in the way Canada has implemented patent linkages, data exclusivity
and additional IP provisions have impacted the market entry, or lack thereof, of
biosimilars in comparison to the US and EU. But what do these numbers actually mean?
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Current to July 31, 2020
AVASTIN (bevacizumab), ENBREL (etanercept), HERCEPTIN (trastuzumab), HUMIRA (adalimumab),
NEUPOGEN (filgrastim), NEULASTA (pegfilgrastim), PROCRIT (epoetin alfa), REMICADE (infliximab),
RITUXAN (rituximab)
379
Current to July 31, 2020
380
AVASTIN (bevacizumab), ENBREL (etanercept), EPREX/ERYPO (epoetin alfa), FORSTEO (teriparatide),
GENOTROPIN (somatropin), GONAL-F (follitropin alfa), HERCEPTIN (trastuzumab), HUMALOG (insulin
lispro), HUMIRA (adalimumab), LANTUS (insulin glargine), LOVENOX (enoxaparin sodium), MABTHERA
(rituximab), NEOPOGEN (filgrastim), NEULASTA (pegfilgrastim), REMICADE (infliximab)
378
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What bearing do they have on the questions of progressive international treaty
obligations and the variability of their national implementation?
There are some very interesting comparisons to be drawn upon reflection of the
number of approved and launched biosimilars in relation to (1) the clustering of
reference biologics, namely how many “follow-on” biosimilars per reference biologic, (2)
the number those biosimilars that have been launched and not launched on the market,
and (3) the reason, actual or speculative, that the unlaunched biosimilars have been
precluded from market launch. This analysis will assist in understanding the
consequences of Canada’s choices in its implementation of treaty obligations in light of
the goals of promoting access to cost-effective cutting-edge therapeutics for the good of
Canadians while at the same time promoting the innovation of new biologics.
In the context of this work, biosimilar “clustering” refers to the number of biosimilars
that make reference to the same biologic. The EU as the outlier reports the approval of
65 biosimilars, of which the vast majority have been or are currently available on the
market. Very interestingly, the cluster of biologics has been relatively broader for a
longer period of time, coming in at a total of 15 reference biologics.
In contrast, the Canadian ratio of biosimilars that are approved, marketed and clustered
to reference biologics is 24:22:11. The picture in the US looks quite similar: 28 approved
biosimilars making reference to 9 biologics, but the biggest difference is in the launch
numbers. Thus, the comparable ratio yields 28:18:9. In both Canada and the US, there is
significant overlap or clustering of reference biologics; the biosimilars make reference to
9 and 11 reference biologics are almost identical, but for 2 that are available in Canada.
However, the distinction evident in the American context is the number of biosimilars
that, while approved, have yet to launch. The majority of these biosimilars were first
delayed due to patent litigation, but are now presumably precluded from the market –
both Canadian and US markets – by private settlement agreements. Of the 10
biosimilars that have yet to launch in the US, 8 are delayed for years due to patent
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litigation settlements and licensing agreements reached between the biologic and
biosimilar manufacturers in respect of HUMIRA (adalimumab) and ENBREL (etanercept).
Turning to Appendix 4, further insight can be gained when comparing the success of the
approval and launch in the EU to the deficiencies in the US and Canada. First, Canada (as
well as the US) lags behind the EU in the number of biosimilars approved which cannot
be solely attributable to the length of time that the EU has been approving biosimilars
(since early 2000s) versus the evolution of Canada’s regulatory scheme creating an
abbreviated pathway for biosimilars a decade later.
Second, not only are more biosimilars approved and launched in the EU, but both
approvals and launches tend to happen sooner in the EU rather than both Canada and
the US.
Third, there is a clustering of target reference biologics – i.e., the propensity for multiple
biosimilar applicants to target the same reference biologic – in Canada and the US, but
there appears to be a longer standing trend in differentiation in the EU.
Finally, in the EU there tends to have more biosimilars approved and launched per
reference biologic. This further competitive pressure on the biologic, as well as the
other competing biosimilars will ultimately result in decreased prices to the benefit of
patients and payers alike.381
With these conclusions regarding the numbers of biosimilars approved and launched in
Canada, as compared to the US and EU, the remaining discussion will turn to the
reasons underpinning these

moderately concerning trends in

Canada

and

recommendations to mitigate the harm inherent in the current and interrelated patent
linkage, data exclusivity and additional IP regimes.

381

Daniel Acquah, Extending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data Outside the EU –
Is There a Need to Rebalance?, 45 IIC - INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW
256(2014).
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5.3. The “Ratchet” Effect – Canada’s Detrimental Implementation of its
International Treaty Obligations Regarding Biosimilars
Adoption of the early working/Bolar exceptions in the US and EU, set the stage to
normalize the exceptional status of pharmaceutical inventions providing justification for
governments to treat them differently than every other technology. The early working
exception was the first step in the successive escalation of and deviation from
traditional patent and other IP laws and policies in relation to pharmaceuticals, then
biologics.
Canada’s implementation of its treaty obligations have consistently lead to the increase
in complexity and stringency of its national standards rather than being primarily
dictated by the national considerations of patient care, best treatment practices, and
cost efficiencies. This is especially telling given Canada’s history with the compulsory
licensing regime giving rise to a strong generic industry. The pendulum swung, but did
Canada swing it too far? Maybe, given that many of the changes dictated by the
international trade agenda, echoed by Canadian industry brand stakeholders owing
allegiance to their US or European parent companies, have resulted in the
implementation of increasingly strict national constructs than was necessarily required
by its international obligations as examined in this work and further in this section.
In an effort to promote generic pharmaceuticals,382 bringing with it the promise of more
affordable drugs, Canada, the US and EU implemented early working/Bolar exceptions
thereby allowing generics authorization to do that which would otherwise be
prohibited.383 So during the term of the brand’s patent, a generic was able to practice
the invention and develop a generic version of a patented brand drug that was also
subject to data exclusivity protections.
382

Promote, but not enable generic manufactures as much as Canada’s abolished compulsory licensing
regime had done in the preceding decades.
383
Claims to pharmaceutical products or processes were not prohibited from protection in these
jurisdictions in Canada, the US and EU at least as late as post-1993.
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In an effort to strike a balance for giving generics this “head start”, protections arising
from patent linkages and data exclusivity were extended to brands. But it did not stop
there. Over time, in the name of striking the appropriate balance, Canada has
experienced a “ratcheting” up phenomenon as tweaks were made to Canadian patent
laws and regulations at the behest of international trade agendas.
In Canada, the attempts to strike a balance between the brand and generic
pharmaceutical companies, now in respect of biologics and biosimilars, have simply
served to increase the competing protections such as patent eligibility which has
experience a tightening of the types of eligible patents, increased data exclusivity
stringency and created a whole new set of rights analogous to patent rights again in the
name of balance. Specifically, this progression is demonstrated in the evolution of data
exclusivity, as well as the significant changes that the Canadian PM(NOC) Regulations
has undergone since their inception and integration with the early working exception
through s. 55.2 of the Canadian Patent Act.
A similar situation has also played out in the US in terms of its patent linkages as well as
an incrementally increased scope of data exclusivity to 12 years for biologics well
beyond the protection given to pharmaceuticals. However, it should be noted that
efforts are afoot in the US to push back against the “ratcheting” incremental increase of
US data exclusivity. Calls to include a 10 year data exclusivity minimum in Canada-USMexico FTA (2020) led to the unilateral withdrawal of this provision by the US prior to
ratification.384
Canada, however, accepted the increase to the data exclusivity period to 10 years
dictated by the Canada-US-Mexico FTA seemingly without objection before it was
unilaterally removed by the US. Canada regularly follows the steadily increasing
international obligations which are then matched by national legislation that often goes
beyond what is stipulated in international agreements. There does not seems to be a
384

Admittedly, this is different from the current 12 year approval prohibition period in the US, but dialing
back an international obligation is not the same as amending domestic legislation.
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specific reason why Canada regularly goes beyond its obligations, but one possibility is
Canada’s propensity to want to please its trading partners as a result of the differential
power imbalance, as well as being susceptible political and industry pressures.
As addressed more fully in the section below, however, the most notable detrimental
aspect of American biologics patent litigation is the lack of patents listed the Purple
Book.
5.4. Patent Thickets and Linkages – Death by a Thousand (Patent) Cuts
The existence of patent linkage regimes is a strong indicator of delayed biosimilar
approvals and, going a step further, acts as a deterrent on biosimilars development; a
deterrent that is compounded with the uncertainty in the number and scope of patents
that may be at issue. In the EU, there is no direct link between the regulatory approval
of biosimilars and reference biologic patent clearance; however, an indirect connection
through Supplemental Protection Certificates tied to patent rights exist, but are
addressed at the agency level, not through litigation.
The situation in the US and Canada is similar; there is a comparably lower number of
biosimilars approved for a similar reference biologic cluster in comparison to the EU.
However, these lower numbers may not be attributable solely to the EU’s decade or so
head-start given that the relevant patents related to the approved biosimilars had
comparable patent expiry dates which, even absent a patent linkage regime, would have
served to curtail commercially risky behaviour.
Recall, in both Canada and the US (where patent linkages are material considerations)
there are mechanisms for the identification of patents that are potentially asserted
against a biosimilar which must be addressed prior to market approval of the biosimilar.
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In order to be eligible for listing on the Canadian Patent Register, a patent must contain
a claim to the medicinal ingredient, a claim for the formulation containing the medicinal
ingredient, a claim for the dosage form or a claim for the use of the ingredient.385
Similarly in the US, but only in the pharmaceutical context, patents are listed in the
Orange Book that relate to (1) the compound patent (covering the pharmaceutical
active ingredient), (2) product patents (formulation and composition) and (3) methodof-use patents (indications). 386 However, the most notable deviation from the
pharmaceutical patent linkage regime is the differences in the Purple Book, the
analogous but certainly not identical register of biologics and biosimilars.
The Purple Book is silent as to the patents applicable to a given biologic. Why were
patents overlooked when the Purple Book was created? Well, they were not overlooked
at all; their inclusion was specifically rejected. The bargaining position of stakeholders,
namely the brand pharmaceutical industry, at the time the Orange Book was crafted in
the early-80s was far different than in 2010. It is likely that attempts to make changes to
this state of affairs will ultimately prove successful, but every day of exclusivity on the
market for a multi-billion dollar drug is a good day for its manufacturer until that time
comes.
The Purple Book’s deficiencies are coupled with the ineffectual patent dance during
which time the parties are to come to some accommodation in respect of the patents at
issue between the parties. The most recent judicial statement from the US Supreme
Court is that parties cannot be sanctioned outside of the measures already statutorily
provided so the recourse is the patent litigation that the parties were heading towards
in any event.
The lack of clarity on the identity of the patents that may ultimately be asserted by the
reference biologic holder against the biosimilar applicant is compounded by the
385

PM(NOC) Regulations at s. 4. Section 4.5.1 of Canada, Guidance Document Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations. May 11, 2018.
386
FDA Regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1)
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deliberate cultivation of patent thickets creating another layer of exclusion. Biologics are
designed to be highly targeted, efficacious against diseases historically difficult and
expensive to treat like cancer, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and other inflammatory
conditions.387 Given that the technology to develop these treatments are themselves
fairly recent developments, they themselves give rise to patentable technology.
Pharmaceutical patents are not properly characterized as “thickets” since the patent
mass is much smaller by comparison owing to the less complex nature of these agents,
and developers have been aided by the FDA’s Orange Book, which includes exclusivity
information along with product formulation data. Patents covering biologics, however,
are statistically higher in number than comparable in the pharmaceutical context.388
Couple this trend with the increased number of patents that are related to other
innovative aspects of the biologic, such as new cell lines, innovation in cultivation or
purification, and the terms “patent thicket” or “patent maze” become more apt.
Patent Thickets refer to a mass of patents where the inventions are likely overlapping,
have readily apparent validity challenges based on lack of novelty or overbreadth, and
contribute to an uncertain patent landscape where boundaries are difficult to ascertain
– a thicket which is difficult to assess and navigate a path through.389 For instance,
patents related to the core inventions in respect of two top biologic products in the top
10 list of highest revenue products, are each covered by 93 (HUMIRA) and 43 (RITUXAN)
core

patents

respectively.

390

The

core

patents

covering

similarly

situated

pharmaceuticals are 7 and 3. 391 Thus, there is a vast amount of uncertainty in
ascertaining the patent and regulatory landscape of a reference biologic that is itself a
bar to the identification and development of biosimilars.
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The implications of this shift from PM(NOC) Application to PM(NOC) Action has not yet
been made clear. The first judgement of the Federal Court of Canada arising from a
PM(NOC) Action was rendered only on April 16, 2020 in Amgen Inc. v. Pfizer Canada ULC
in respect of Pfizer’s biosimilar NIVESTYM (filgrastim) making reference to Amgen’s
NEUPOGEN (filgrastim). 392 Further, the academic literature is sparse. The legal
commentary from the private practice community reiterates the Canadian
government’s rationale to strike a balance by mirroring traditional patent litigation to
achieve the objectives of providing a route of appeal, eliminating dual litigation,
enabling parties to advance a full record based on discovery and viva voce evidence. In
relying on experience, the advantages of the shift from an application regime to an
action regime is significant, but not for reasons related to the stated objectives. Framing
Canada’s patent linkage regime as in rem actions allows for and makes more attractive
private settlement agreements between parties that can serve to delay the market
launch of biosimilars. In the PM(NOC) Application regime, the in personam and dual
nature (i.e., application, then potential subsequent action) of these proceedings did not
lend well to making multiple deals with competing biosimilar applicants. As well, the
reference biologic applicant could assert the validity of patents in multiple proceedings
given that any findings were non-binding as between applications. However, with the
potential of a finding of invalidity looming, it would stand to reason that a reference
biologic holder would seek to protect its patent in Canada, as well as in other
jurisdictions, and be inclined to settle proceedings against competing biosimilars in
order to preserve its market share for as long as possible. Biosimilar applicants would
also view this approach favourably by avoiding costly litigating and potentially securing
market entry to the advantage of other biosimilar applicants.
By way of illustration, litigation involving oncology targeted HERCEPTIN (trastuzumab)
and RITUXAN (rituximab) deals with 52 Genentech patents, most of which are not core
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patents, but are peripheral that relate to manufacturing, such as making cells, cell
culture media, and protein purification.393
As previously noted, there are over a hundred patents covering HUMIRA (adalimumab),
many of which were granted well after the biologic’s launch, but many of these
peripheral patents are for methods of manufacture or use, as well as additional
unauthorized indications that should not pose a bar to market authorization. 394
A number of biosimilars have targeted seeking even just a piece of the almost $20B
market. The product patents on adalimumab expired in the US in December 2016 and in
Europe in June 2017.395 However, in the US AbbVie has taken the staunch position that
while their product patent has expired, other patents covering inventions related to
HUMIRA (adalimumab) do not expire until no earlier than 2022. Instead of protracted
litigation on multiple fronts, AbbVie executed a successful licensing and settlement
strategy that preserves it exclusivity and likely provides a licensing revenue stream
without risk to having its patents’ validity challenged. Accordingly, of 10 biosimilars that
have been approved but not launched in the US, 6 are biosimilars of HUMIRA
(adalimumab) 396 where all of the biosimilar applicants have negotiated private
settlement agreements, 397 likely including license payments, to enter the market
sequentially beginning in 2023.398
Two ENBREL (entanercept) biosimilars399 remain subject to litigation which apparently
involve 5 or fewer patents, “depending on whom you ask…”.400 This litigation will likely

393

Hagen. March 14, 2020.
Wu & Cheng, CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP., (2019).
395
Derbyshire M. Patent expiry dates for biologicals: 2018 update. Generics and Biosimilars Initiative
Journal (GaBI Journal). 2019;8(1):24-31. doi:10.5639/gabij.2019.0801.003
396
AJEVITA (adalimumab-atto); CYLTEZO (adalimumab-adbm); HYRIMOZ (adalimumab-adaz); HADLIMA
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keep entanercept biosimilars off the market until 2029 in light of the recent US Disctrict
Court of New Jersey’s ruling in favour of Amgen’s ENBREL (etenercept-szzs) against
Sandoz’ biosimilar ERELZI (entanercept).

401

Sandoz acknowledged that “[valid]

intellectual property should be respected, however, we continue to consider the
patents, in this case, to be invalid…”402 The two patents that were upheld were
exclusively licenced to Amgen by Roche, however the original product patent expired as
long ago as 2012. Roche’s patents are a good example of the effect of the patent thicket
effect extending Amgen’s market exclusivity until 2029.403 Amgen is similarly excluding
Samsung Bioepis’ previously approved ETICOVO (entancercept-ykro) from the market
through patent litigation.404
Of the remaining 2 approved but unlaunched biosimilars: 1 is not coming to market
because of business reasons,405 and the last was approved only in June 2020.406
From the Canadian perspective, the American patent linkages and patent thickets
undoubtedly affects the Canadian litigation experience since pharmaceutical and
biologic patent litigation is highly coordinated and invariably dictated from the US.
Further, there is a propensity to cede less valuable jurisdictions in an effort to protect
more valuable markets. The circumstances leading to the discontinuance of PM(NOC)
Actions may not be disclosed unless done so by the parties, the same is true for any
terms such as settlement agreements or licensing agreements. Thus, it is possible for
401
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litigation to proceed in the US while terms are reached in Canada allowing the biosimilar
to proceed to market, likely under some kind of royalty arrangement, or simply have the
Canadian litigation bundled up with the US settlement. For instance, the biosimilar
HADLIMA (adalimumab)’s launch is delayed by agreement in the US which is likely to
also cover the Canadian litigation discontinued on April 10, 2018, but not made public.
Similarly, for the unlaunched RIXIMYO (rituximab), a discontinuance was filed on
November 21, 2018 and the biosimilar remains unlaunched, for how long is only known
to the parties to the settlement agreement.
Finally, the faster approval and market launch in the EU bears some consideration. In
the EU, it is quite common for products to be launch fairly quickly after approval has
been granted, likely due to the fact that IP clearance occurs at the regulatory level and is
primarily a result of an assessment of data exclusivity and Supplementary Protection
Certificates. data exclusivity regimes are not normally subject to litigation, but may be
subject to challenge at the regulatory level. Supplementary Protection Certificates are
tied to underlying patents and may be revoked where a patent has been found to be
invalid, but again, there is no direct linkage to the EMA’s regulatory assessment with the
clearance of patent rights through a patent linkage regime.
There are multiple calls to reform the Purple Book to address the information disclosure
imbalance between the biologics and biosimilar companies. Indeed, there are more
formal actions at play seeking to statutorily compel the disclosure of patent and
exclusivity information, namely the Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019.407 Similarly, the
draft Biologic Patent Transparency Act tabled by senators US Susan Collins and Tim
Kaine, represents a strong statement about seeking to “put an end to the harmful
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patent strategies that block new drugs from coming to market”.408 The rhetoric is strong
on both sides. While it is not likely that either of these bills will pass in their current
form, the undercurrent speaks to a need for change.
Prioritizing assessments based on markets where you can get authorized quickly with
minimal litigation exposure are business strategies for private sector players; for those
entities beholden to shareholders, it is not a question of where the biologic can most
impact patients’ outcomes and public and private healthcare costs. And that’s
understandable. What is not understandable is for governments to be complicit in the
continued obfuscation of the patent landscape precluding biosimilars from the same
transparency afforded to the brand/generic pharmaceuticals players versus the same
players in the biologic/biosimilars context. While one might argue that this unfairness
falls solely within American borders – Canada has a functioning patent list after all – this
would represent a severe misunderstanding of the level of interconnectedness of patent
litigation, or rather US “directedness”.
At a high-level, there are good reasons to promote settlement between litigants.
Uncertainty in the patent landscape falls away, significant resources and money can be
better employed elsewhere, and a way forward for all parties becomes known.
However, where the terms of settlement between private companies have such
significant impacts on the public health and public money, perhaps some additional
scrutiny of these agreements that negotiates prolonged market exclusivity
arrangements is warranted.
What does all of this mean? It means that Canada has implemented its international
obligations through the adoption of a patent linkage regime that allows for confidential
settlements delaying market entry of biosimilars on conditions that have nothing to do
with their regulation. It means that private enterprise, not necessarily even Canadian, is
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dictating by secret agreements the public’s access of biosimilars, the launch of which
will have a profound impact on the price and patient access of critically important and
wildly expensive drugs. And, from a Canadian perspective, many of these considerations
apply to Canada as an afterthought given that many strategic decisions are with the US
market in mind and settlements delaying market entry of a biosimilar generally apply to
multiple jurisdictions, if not worldwide.
5.5. Canada’s Data Exclusivity Regime – Its Current Irrelevance and Potential
Imbalance
Canada has had to implement changes to its data exclusivity regime in response to its
international obligations which have progressively increased in complexity and
stringency, both of which have not been balanced against increased efficiency in the
regulatory approval process.
However, the practical operation of these provisions have yet to be tested because to
date, Canada’s data exclusivity regime has yet to be engaged in the course of the
regulation of any of the 24 approved biosimilars. Indeed, the situation is identical for the
US and the EU. Recall, the data exclusivity periods canvassed in Chapter 4 stipulate the
ultimate expiry of the data exclusivity periods 12, 10 and 8 years after the date of first
authorization in Canada, the US and EU, respectively.
The national effect on biosimilar applications was ascertained by determining first if the
date of any of the biosimilar approvals making reference to the noted reference biologic
was within 5 years409 of the expiry of the each respective Market Prohibition Period. If
so, the second more detailed consideration was whether the filing date of the biosimilar
applications were before the expiry of the Market Prohibition Period or even precluded
by the filing prohibition. As reported, there is not currently one reference biologic in any
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of Canada, the US and EU where the relevant national data exclusivity provisions were
operative in respect of the regulation of the referencing biosimilars.
TABLE 6 – FIRST AUTHORIZATION DATES IN CANADA, THE US AND EU OF REFERENCE BIOLOGICS OF
APPROVED BIOSIMILARS IN INDICATED JURISDICTIONS
Reference
Biologic

First US
FDA
Approval

First EU
EMA
Approval

2/26/2004

US Data
Exclusivity
Effect on
Biosimilars
None

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)
ENBREL
(etanercept)
EPREX/ERYPO /
PROCRIT
(epoetin alfa)
FORSTEO
(teriparatide)
GENOTROPIN
(somatropin)
GONAL-F
(follitropin alfa)
HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)
HUMALOG
(insulin lispro)
HUMIRA
(adalimumab)
LANTUS (insulin
glargine)
LOVENOX
(enoxaparin
sodium)
MABTHERA/
RITUXIMAB
(rituximab)
NEUPOGEN
(filgrastim)
NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)
REMICADE
(infliximab)

1/12/2005

EU Data
Exclusivity
Effect on
Biosimilars
None

First
Canadian
HC
Approval
9/9/2005

Can Data
Exclusivity
Effect on
Biosimilars
None

11/2/1998

None

2/2/2000

None

12/1/2000

None

6/1/1989

None

1/6/1989

None

6/10/2003

None

8/3/1988

None

1/19/1998

None

10/20/1995

None

9/25/1998

None

8/28/2000

None

8/13/1999

None

6/14/1996

None

4/30/1996

None

10/8/1996

None

9/8/2003

None

9/24/2004

None

6/9/2000

None

4/3/2002

None

Pre-2000

None

11/26/1997

None

2/06/1998

None

3/17/2000

None

2/20/1991

None

3/1991

None

1/1/1992

None

1/31/2002

None

22/08/2002

None

3/12/2004

None

8/24/1998

None

13/08/1999

None

6/6/2001

None

In theory, not yet practice, the imbalance in the data exclusivity regime does not arise
from the mere existence of the prohibition preventing the approval of a biosimilar until
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the expiry of the Market Prohibition Period. The challenge is in the disproportionally
long filing prohibition period which may result in the practical and unwarranted
extension of exclusivity beyond expiry of the ultimate data exclusivity period.
In the US, the Biosimilars Act dictates a 4 year filing prohibition period,410 and a nighinconceivable 12 year approval prohibition period unjustified by recent investment
recovery models.411 Importantly, there is an 8 year window during which biosimilar
applications may be submitted to and assessed by the FDA. This 8 year window provides
ample opportunity for a biosimilar application to be ready to launch upon the expiry of
the data exclusivity period.
The EU’s data exclusivity regime, the most generous globally, prescribes a 10 year
approval prohibition period and filing prohibition period of 8 years during which time
the EMA is precluded from accepting or reviewing any biosimilar applications for market
authorization. Additionally, another 1 year period of protection is available where the
reference biologic is approved for a new indication providing significant benefit during
the filing prohibition period – this is intended to incentivize continued studies of the
already approved biologic.412
The assessment window in the EU is much shorter between the filing prohibition and
Approval Prohibition (2 years), but the efficiency of the EMA/CHMP’s assessment of a
biosimilar may not inject as much unintended prejudice into the process. The
EMA/CHMP’s assessment times of biosimilar applications are more likely to be less than
2 years. In effect, the biosimilar applicant has the first 8 years of the data exclusivity
Period in which to rely on the biologics’ information and data in the development of the
biosimilar, empowered to file the submission which more likely than not will be
approved before or soon after the expiry of the approval prohibition period.
410

US Public Health Services Act at §351(k)(7)(b).
US Public Health Services Act at §351(k)(7)(a). See supra Section 2.2 and the research of Prasad,
Wouters and DiMasi.
412
This additional year is also available where a drug is transferred from being prescribed to over-thecounter which is highly unlikely for a biologic.
411
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The Canadian filing prohibition and Approval Prohibition periods are, respectively, 6
years and 8 years.413 Like the EU, the window for Health Canada to assess the biosimilar
application approximately 2 years, but unlike the EU, Health Canada’s assessments are
much more custom and reviewed on a case-by-case basis which leads to variability in
assessment times. For instance, some of the regulatory reviews took less than a year
while others lasted for more than 2.5 years. Where a biosimilar application is not
immediately ready to submit upon the expiry of the filing prohibition period, it is more
likely than not that normal regulatory assessment times will result in the undue delay of
the biosimilar’s market authorization beyond the data exclusivity period.
While this assessment is currently speculative, it is not inconceivable that this now
identified issue may come into play sooner rather than later given that the more
recently developed biologics will become biosimilar targets within the data exclusivity
window.
5.6. Summary of Chapter 5
Chapter 5 is the culmination of this work that gives greater understanding of the impact
of how the national implementation of Canada’s international obligations are affecting
the efficient approval of biosimilars and their accessibility to the Canadian public.
As initially explored, the steadily increasing international obligations have been matched
by a mirrored legislative ratcheting up in Canada that in most cases go beyond what is
stipulated in the international agreements. There does not seems to be a specific reason
why Canada regularly goes beyond its obligations, but two possibilities are political and
industry pressures.
The most significant impact on the regulation and legal treatment of biosimilars,
however, relate to Canada’s patent linkages, the US’ patent linkages that are intimately
413

These provision date back to 2006, but it was clarified in 2017 that data exclusivity extended to
biologics and applies to biosimilar applications directed to proceed before Health Canada as New Drug
Submissions rather than as Abbreviated New Drug Submissions.
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tied in practice to patent litigation in Canada, and the prevalence of patent thickets
covering all aspects of a given reference biologic.
One of the most significant obstacles faced by biosimilar developers is the lack of clarity
about relevant patents and exclusivity timelines in the US’ Purple Book which has a
indirect, but significant impact in Canada as a result of the strong coordination of
Canadian patent litigation from the US. Absent that information, ascertaining risk is an
exercise rife with uncertainty where the patent field is unnecessarily obfuscated.
Compelling biologic license holders to disclose the patents they identify as eligible for
protection pursuant to the US Biosimilars Act would give some clarity, albeit likely not
certainty, about the universe of patents that need to be endured or waited upon before
a biosimilar is permitted market access.
Couple this lack of transparency with a higher degree of patent “protection” via patent
thickets (which operates more like patent deterrence) and the litigation path becomes
mired, the risks of which will not necessarily be outweighed by the potential rewards.
At this point in the biologics/biosimilar world, data exclusivity protections have yet to
play a role or even be triggered, but that is not to say that these provisions will never
have effect in the context of biosimilar regulation. Casting forward, however, it is
conceivable that the short 2 year window where the biosimilar application may be filed
prior to the expiry of data exclusivity period precluding market access may represent an
unwarranted extension of the biologic’s exclusivity.
Ultimately, the interconnectivity of the regulatory assessment of biosimilars, biologic
“patent thicket” strategies, data exclusivity idiosyncrasies, litigation realities and patent
scope uncertainties all work together to varying effect to delay the market entry of
biosimilars in Canada, as well as the US. Importantly, Canada is additionally susceptible
to the whims of commercial strategy dictated by what is happening in the US and EU by
biologic and biosimilar companies that negotiate the price and availability of critically
important drugs through litigation settlement arrangements.
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the biologics/biosimilars industry is one of the most important and
valuable global industries that holds the promise of more effective medical treatments,
but these cutting edge treatments are profoundly and prohibitively expensive. However,
biologics hold the potential to expand the frontiers of medical treatments for the
betterment of Canadian patients and are of particular importance in the development of
treatments for chronic and often disabling conditions such as diabetes, autoimmune
diseases and cancer, going beyond the capabilities of existing pharmaceutical drugs.
Thus, developing and facilitating the development and approval of biosimilars to spur
competition will drive prices down414 for the benefit of patients and payers alike.415
Canada’s history from the 1920s to 1980s provides an interesting backdrop to the
current research; Canada was the home of a burgeoning generic pharmaceuticals
industry relying on a “compulsory licensing” model that forced brand pharmaceutical
companies to license its patented inventions to generic manufacturers for low and set
licensing royalties. This regime was replaced by the first patent linkage regulations in the
early 90s which was undoubtedly implemented under the influence of the US, EU and
their brand pharmaceutical industries concentrated predominately in the US and EU, as
well as Japan and Switzerland, through the international trade agenda. Over time and
continued influences, expanded patent and regulatory provisions were mandated by
various international treaties, namely data exclusivity and other patent/IP
considerations including patent term extensions and sui generis rights. It is Canada’s
domestic implementation of its international treaty obligations that has served to
dampen the approval of biosimilars and their launch onto the Canadian market.

414

Blackstone & Fuhr, TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (2012).
FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE REVOLUTION IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE XXIII-XXIV, 23135, 237-50 (2010). Francis S. Collins, The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalized
Medicine (2010), XXIII-XXIV, 231-35, 237-50.
415
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The foundation for this research was set in Chapter 2 where economic, technological
and the regulatory context of biologics and biosimilars was explored. This chapter is an
overview of the technology related to biologics and biosimilars which, as is subsequently
addressed, directly influences the way in which these therapeutic agents are both
regulated and patented.
The scope of Canada’s international obligations, and their changes over time, was
reviewed in detail in Chapter 3. This thorough analysis of the evolution of international
treaty obligations related to biologics and biosimilars and the way in which patent
linkages, data exclusivity and additional IP protection provisions are approached in
Canada. In each of Canada, the US and EU, patent laws are statutory constructs where
the patentability assessment is governed by jurisdiction. However, the increase of
globalization and trade harmonization efforts has shaped the evolution of IP legislation
in many countries over the last few decades through the ever evolving and increasingly
widespread adoption of international treaty obligations which have been promulgated
through the international trade agenda. This inextricable link between intellectual
property and international trade was made in the 1980s; any countries with aspirations
of attaining or maintaining membership to the WTO would not be able to avoid the
requirements of TRIPs. Thus, Chapter 3 was not only a review of current international
agreements, but also a canvass how these obligations have shifted, and stiffened,
overtime.
Turning to how these obligations have been implemented, Chapter 4 was an analysis of
the national legislation, regulations and policies related to the regulation and patenting
of biologics and biosimilars. These treaty obligations mandated, either directly or
indirectly, the national adoption of patent linkages, data exclusivity and additional IP
provisions, but as established in Chapter 4, the exact implementation of this mandate is
at Canada’s discretion. A quantitative assessment of biosimilars that have been
approved and launched in each respective market concluded this chapter and the data
was used as a measure of success in achieving the goal of facilitating the approval of
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safe and efficacious biosimilars while also incentivizing further innovation in the analysis
and discussion set out in Chapter 5.
The analysis and discussion in Chapter 5 was undertaken with a view to gleaning insight
into the factors that influence the authorization of biologics and biosimilars based on
each states’ different approach to the implementation of their international treaty
obligations. In short, Chapter 5 is the culmination of this research that gives greater
understanding of the impact of how the national implementation of Canada’s
international obligations are affecting the efficient approval of biosimilars and their
accessibility to the Canadian public.
The steadily increasing international obligations adopted nationally resulted in a
legislative ratcheting in Canada that in most cases went beyond what was stipulated in
the international agreements. There is no express reasoning why Canada regularly goes
beyond its obligations, but one can draw strong inferences from Canada’s pattern of
being susceptible to political pressure from its first and second largest trading partners
and the local representatives of the multinational biopharmaceutical.
However, the most significant impact on the regulation and legal treatment of
biosimilars was found to be Canada’s patent linkages, the US’ patent linkages that are
intimately tied in practice to patent litigation in Canada, and the prevalence of patent
thickets covering all aspects of a given reference biologic.
The list of obstacles faced by biosimilar applicants is topped with the lack of clarity
about relevant patents and exclusivity timelines in the US’ Purple Book which has had an
indirect, but significant impact in Canada as a result of the strong coordination of
Canadian patent litigation from the US. Absent that information, ascertaining risk is an
unnecessary, lengthy and expensive endeavour where the patent field is needlessly
obfuscated. Compelling biologic license holders to disclose the patents they identify as
eligible for protection pursuant to the US Biosimilars Act.
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Absent this clarity, further complicated by patent thickets, litigation becomes expensive
an expensive endeavour which will not necessarily be justified when weighed against
the risks of losing the case and potential access to the market.
At this point in the biologics/biosimilar world, data exclusivity protections have yet to
play a role or even be triggered, but that is not to say that these provisions will never
have effect in the context of biosimilar regulation. Casting forward, however, it is
conceivable that the short 2 year window where the biosimilar application may be filed
prior to the expiry of data exclusivity period precluding market access may represent an
unwarranted extension of the biologic’s exclusivity.
Ultimately, the interconnectivity of the regulatory assessment of biosimilars, biologic
“patent thicket” strategies, data exclusivity idiosyncrasies, litigation realities and patent
scope uncertainties all work together to varying effect to delay the market entry of
biosimilars in Canada, as well as the US. Importantly, Canada is additionally susceptible
to the whims of commercial strategy dictated by what is happening in the US and EU by
biologic and biosimilar companies that negotiate the price and availability of critically
important drugs through litigation settlement arrangements.
There is a delicate tension created by various competing policy goals, namely,
encouraging the massive amounts of investments required for the development of
innovative biologics, promoting continued innovation beyond the initial biologic
development and cultivating competition through the development of biosimilars.
These goals will not be equitably achieved without striking an appropriate balance in the
patenting of biologics/biosimilars and their regulation.
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APPENDIX 1 – BIOSIMILARS APPROVED BY THE US FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND
MARKET LAUNCH DATES (IF APPLICABLE)
Biosimilar†

Biosimilar
Applicant†

Reference
biologic†

FDA Approval
Date†

US Market
Launch Date‡

1.

ZARXIO
(filgrastim-sndz)

Sandoz Inc.

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

3/6/2015

7/3/2015

2.

INFLECTRA
(infliximab-dyyb)

CELLTRION, Inc.

REMICADE
(infliximab)

4/5/2016

11/30/2016

3.

ERELZI
(etanercept-szzs)

Sandoz Inc.

ENBREL
(etanercept)

8/30/2016

1/1/2029

4.

AJEVITA
(adalimumab-atto)

Amgen Inc.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

9/23/2016

1/31/2023416

5.

RENFLEXIS
(infliximab-abda)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd.

REMICADE
(infliximab)

4/21/2017

7/24/2017

6.

CYLTEZO
(adalimumabadbm)

Boehringer
Ingelheim
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

8/25/2017

7/1/2023

7.

MVASI
(becavizumabawwb)

Amgen Inc.

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)

9/14/2017

7/18/2019

8.

IXIFI
(infliximab-qbtx)

Pfizer Ireland
Pharmaceuticals

REMICADE
(infliximab)

12/13/2017

Will never
launch417

9.

RETACRIT
(epoetin alfa-epbx)

Hospira, Inc.

PROCRIT (epoetin
alfa)

5/15/2018

11/12/2018

10. FULPHILA
(pegfilgrastimjmdb)

Mylan
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

6/4/2018

7/9/2018

11. NIVESTYM
(filgrastim-aafi)

Hospira, Inc.

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

7/20/2018

9/24/2018

12. HYRIMOZ
(adalimumab-adaz)

Sandoz Inc.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

10/30/2018

9/30/2023418

13. UDENYCA
(pegfilgrastim-

Coherus
BioSciences, Inc.

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

11/2/2018

1/3/2019

416

Mehr, 49 (2020).
Pfizer’s IXIFI biosimilar was a legacy agent developed by Hospira, which Pfizer acquired in 2015. With a
marketing agreement already in place with Celltrion for Inflectra, Pfizer decided not to launch IXIFI in the
US. Id. at, 45.
418
Id. at, 49.
417
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Biosimilar†

Biosimilar
Applicant†

Reference
biologic†

FDA Approval
Date†

US Market
Launch Date‡

cbqv)
14. TRUXIMA
(rituximab-abbs)

CELLTRION, Inc.

RITUXAN
(rituximab)

11/28/2018

11/7/2019

15. HERZUMA
(trastuzumab-pkrb)

CELLTRION, Inc.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

12/14/2018

3/16/2020

16. TRAZIMERA
(trastuzumab-qyyp)

Pfizer Ireland
Pharmaceuticals

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

3/11/2019

2/15/2020

17. OGIVRI
(trastuzumab-dkst)

Mylan
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

12/1/2017

12/2/2019419

18. ETICOVO
(etanercept-ykro)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd.

ENBREL
(etanercept)

4/25/2019

1/1/2029

19. KANJINTI
(trastuzumabanns)

Amgen Inc.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

6/13/2019

7/18/2019

20. ZIRABEV
(bevacizumabbvzr)

Pfizer Inc.

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)

6/27/2019

1/13/2020

21. RUXIENCE
(rituximab-pvvr)

Pfizer Ireland
Pharmaceuticals

RITUXAN
(rituximab)

7/23/2019

1/13/2020

22. HADLIMA
(adalimumabbwwd)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

7/23/2019

6/30/2023420

23. ZIEXTENZO
(pegfilgrastimbmez)

Sandoz Inc.

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

11/4/2019

11/15/2019

24. ABRILADA
(adalimumab-afzb)

Pfizer Inc.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

11/15/2019

11/20/2023

25. AVSOLA
(infliximab-axxq)

Amgen Inc.

REMICADE
(infliximab)

12/6/2019

12/12/2019

26. ONTRUZANT
(trastuzumab-dttb)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

3/20/2020

4/15/2020

27. NYVEPRIA
(pegfilgrastim-apgf)

Hospira Inc.

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

6/10/2020

Not Yet
Launched

419
420

Delayed launch due to licensing deal with Genentech. Id. at, 41.
Id. at, 49.
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Biosimilar†
28. HULIO
(adalimumab-fkjp)

Biosimilar
Applicant†
Mylan
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.

Reference
biologic†
HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

FDA Approval
Date†
7/6/2020

US Market
Launch Date‡
8/1/2023

† All information reported herein has been obtained from The Purple Book accessed electronically.
‡ All information obtained from publicly available sources as referenced in the following Appendix •
endnotes.
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APPENDIX 2 - BIOSIMILARS APPROVED BY THE EU EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY AND
MARKET LAUNCH DATES (IF APPLICABLE)
Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

EMA Approval
Date†

EU Market
Launch Date‡

1.

ALPHEON
(recombinant
human interferon
alfa-2a)

BioPartners GmbH

ROFERON-A
(recombinant
human interferon
alfa-2a)

Refused
07/20/2006

2.

SOLUMARV (insulin
glargine)

Marvel
Lifesciences Ltd

LANTUS (insulin
glargine)

Refusal 11/19/2015

3.

OMNITROPE
(somatropin)

Sandoz GmbH

GENOTROPIN
(somatropin)

12/4/2006

2006

4.

VALTROPIN
(somatropin)

BioPartners GmbH

GENOTROPIN
(somatropin)

4/24/2006

Withdrawn 05/10/2012

5.

ABSEAMED (epoetin Medice
EPREX/ERYPO
alfa)
Arzneimittel Pütter (epoetin alfa)
GmbH Co. KG

8/28/2007

end of 2007

6.

BINOCRIT (epoetin
alfa)

Sandoz GmbH

EPREX/ERYPO
(epoetin alfa)

8/28/2007

end of 2007

7.

EPOETIN ALFA
HEXAL (epoetin
alfa)

Hexal AG

EPREX/ERYPO
(epoetin alfa)

8/28/2007

8.

RETACRIT (epoetin
alfa)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

EPREX/ERYPO
(epoetin alfa)

12/18/2007

early 2008

9.

SILAPO (epoetin
alfa)

Stada Arzneimittel
AG

EPREX/ERYPO
(epoetin alfa)

12/18/2007

early 2008 - same
article as Retacrit different trade
names

10. BIOGRASTIM
(filgrastim)

AbZ-Pharma GmbH NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

9/15/2008

Withdrawn on
09/23/2015

11. FILGRASTIM
RATIOFARM
(filgrastim)

Ratiopharm GmbH NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

9/15/2008

Withdrawn on
09/15/2009

12. RATIOGRASTIM
(filgrastim)

Ratiopharm GmbH NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

9/15/2008

2008

13. TEVAGRASTIM
(filgrastim)

Teva GmbH

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

9/15/2008

2009

14. FILGRASTIM HEXAL
(filgrastim)

Hexal AG

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

2/6/2009
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Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

EMA Approval
Date†

EU Market
Launch Date‡

15. ZARZIO (filgrastim)

Sandoz GmbH

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

2/6/2009

16. NIVESTIM
(filgrastim)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

7/6/2010

17. INFLECTRA
(infliximab)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

REMICADE
(infliximab)

9/9/2013

2/16/2015

18. REMSIMA
(infliximab)

Celltrion
Healthcare
Hungary Kft.

REMICADE
(infliximab)

10/9/2013

Early 2015

19. OVALEAP
(follitropin alfa)

Theramex Ireland
Limited

GONAL-F
(follitropin alfa)

9/27/2013

8/1/2016

20. GRASTOFIL
(filgrastim)

Accord Healthcare, NEOPOGEN
SLU
(filgrastim)

10/17/2013

2014

21. BEMFOLA
(follitropin alfa)

Gedeon Richter
Plc.

GONAL-F
(follitropin alfa)

3/26/2014

Second quarter
2014

22. ABASAGLAR (insulin Eli Lilly Nederland
glargine)
B.V.
(PREVIOUSLY
ABASRIA)

LANTUS (insulin
glargine)

9/9/2014

8/26/2015

23. ACCOFIL (filgrastim) Accord Healthcare
S.L.U.

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

9/17/2014

2/27/2015

24. BENEPALI
(etanercept)

Samsung Bioepis
NL B.V.

ENBREL
(etanercept)

1/13/2016

2/16/2016

25. FLIXABI (infliximab)

Samsung Bioepis
NL B.V.

REMICADE
(infliximab)

5/26/2016

9/7/2016

26. THORINANE
(enoxaparin
sodium)

Pharmathen S.A.

LOVENOX
(enoxaparin
sodium)

9/14/2016

27. INHIXA (enoxaparin
sodium)

Techdow Pharma
Netherlands B.V.

LOVENOX
(enoxaparin
sodium)

9/15/2016

9/1/2017

28. TRUXIMA
(rituximab)

Celltrion
Healthcare
Hungary Kft.

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

2/17/2017

4/27/2017

421

2009

Withdrawn
9/15/2019421

Authorization lapsed because it had not been marketed in the EU in the 3 years following authorization
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Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

EMA Approval
Date†

EU Market
Launch Date‡

1/3/2017

Withdrawn
10/29/2018

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

3/21/2017

10/16/2018422

Amgen Europe
B.V.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

3/22/2017

withdrawn
06/15/2018

32. TERROSA
(teriparatide)

Gedeon Richter
Plc.

FORSTEO
(teriparatide)

1/4/2017

8/20/2019

33. RIXATHON
(rituximab)

Sandoz GmbH

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

6/15/2017

Prior to October
2019

34. RIXIMYO
(rituximab)

Sandoz GmbH

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

6/15/2017

35. ERELZI (etanercept)

Sandoz GmbH

ENBREL
(etanercept)

6/23/2017

36. BLITZIMA
(rituximab)

Celltrion
Healthcare
Hungary Kft.

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

7/13/2017

37. RITEMVIA
(rituximab)

Celltrion
Healthcare
Hungary Kft.

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

7/13/2017

First quarter 2018

38. RITUZENA
(rituximab)
(PREVIOUSLY
TUXELLA)

Celltrion
Healthcare
Hungary Kft.

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

7/13/2017

Withdrawn
04/10/2019

39. INSULIN LISPRO
SANOFI (insulin
lispro)

sanofi-aventis
groupe

HUMALOG (insulin
lispro)

7/18/2017

Jun-18

40. IMRALDI
(adalimumab)

Samsung Bioepis
NL B.V.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

8/24/2017

10/16/2018

41. CYLTEZO
(adalimumab)

Boehringer
Ingelheim
International
GmbH

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

11/10/2017

Withdrawn
1/15/2019

42. MOVYMIA
(teriparatide)

STADA
Arzneimittel AG

FORSTEO
(teriparatide)

1/11/2017

Aug-19

29. LUSDUNA (insulin
glargine)

Merck Sharp &
Dohme B.V.

LANTUS (insulin
glargine)

30. AMGEVITA
(adalimumab)

Amgen Europe
B.V.

31. SOLYMBIC
(adalimumab)

422

Launched upon the expiry of the main European patents. Mehr, 49 (2020).
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Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

EMA Approval
Date†

EU Market
Launch Date‡

43. ONTRUZANT
(trastuzumab)

Samsung Bioepis
NL B.V.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

11/15/2017

3/2018423

44. MVASI
(bevacizumab)

Amgen Technology AVASTIN
(Ireland) UC
(bevacizumab)

1/15/2018

Avastin retains
patent exclusivity
until 2022

45. SEMGLEE (insulin
glargine)

Mylan S.A.S

LANTUS (insulin
glargine)

3/23/2018

11/14/2018

46. KANJINTI
(trastuzumab)

Amgen Europe
B.V.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

5/16/2018

47. ZESSLY (infliximab)

Sandoz GmbH

REMICADE
(infliximab)

5/18/2018

Nov-18

48. HALIMATOZ
(adalimumab)

Sandoz GmbH

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

7/26/2018

10/16/2018

49. HEFIYA
(adalimumab)

Sandoz GmbH

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

7/26/2018

Expected October
2018

50. HYRIMOZ
(adalimumab)

Sandoz GmbH

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

7/26/2018

10/16/2018

51. TRAZIMERA
(trastuzumab)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

7/26/2018

April 1 2019 in
Spain

52. HERZUMA
(trastuzumab)

Celltrion
Healthcare
Hungary Kft.

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

8/02/2018

5/2/2018

53. HULIO
(adalimumab)

Mylan S.A.S.

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

9/16/2018

10/16/2018

54. PELGRAZ
(pegfilgrastim)

Accord Healthcare
S.L.U.

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

9/21/2018

55. UDENYCA
(pegfilgrastim)

ERA Consulting
GmbH

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

9/21/2018

Not yet launched

56. FULPHILA
(pegfilgrastim)

Mylan S.A.S

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

11/20/2018

4/28/2020

57. PELMEG
(pegfilgrastim)

Mundipharma
Biologics S.L.

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

11/20/2018

2/5/2019

58. ZIEXTENZO
(pegfilgrastim)

Sandoz GmbH

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

11/22/2018

423

Id. at, 42.
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Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

EMA Approval
Date†

EU Market
Launch Date‡

59. OGIVRI
(trastuzumab)

Mylan S.A.S

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

12/12/2018

60. ZIRABEV
(bevacizumab)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)

2/14/2019

Avastin retains
patent exclusivity
until 2022

61. IDACIO
(adalimumab)

Fresenius Kabi
Deutschland
GmbH

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

2/4/2019

5/3/2019

62. KROMEYA
(adalimumab)

Fresenius Kabi
Deutschland
GmbH

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

2/4/2019

withdrawn
12/17/2019

63. GRASUSTEK
(pegfilgrastim)

Juta Pharma
GmbH

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

6/20/2019

64. CEGFILA
(pegfilgrastim)
(PREVIOUSLY
PEGFILGRASTIM
MUNDIPHARMA)

Mundipharma
Corporation
(Ireland) Limited

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

12/19/2019

65. AMSPARITY
(adalimumab)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

2/13/2020

0/0/0

66. RUXIENCE
(rituximab)

Pfizer Europe MA
EEIG

MABTHERA
(rituximab)

1/4/2020

Anticipated late
2020

67. NEPEXTO
(etanercept)

Mylan IRE
ENBREL
Healthcare Limited (etanercept)

5/20/2020

not yet to market

† All information obtained from EMA accessed electronically.
‡ All information obtained from publicly available sources as referenced in the following Appendix •
endnotes.
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APPENDIX 3 - BIOSIMILARS APPROVED BY HEALTH CANADA AND MARKET LAUNCH DATES
(IF APPLICABLE)
Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

Date Of Market
Authorization

Can Market
Launch Date

1.

OMNITROPE
(somatropin)

Sandoz Canada
Incorporated

GENOTROPIN
(somatropin)

4/20/2009

4/20/2009

2.

INFLECTRA
(infliximab)

Celltrion
Healthcare Co Ltd

REMICADE
(infliximab)

1/15/2014

9/4/2014

3.

REMSIMA
(infliximab)
(MARKETED AS
INFLECTRA)

Celltrion
Healthcare Co Ltd

REMICADE
(infliximab)

1/15/2014

9/18/2014

4.

BASAGLAR (insulin
glargine)

Eli Lilly Canada Inc

LANTUS (insulin
glargine)

9/1/2015

12/18/2015

5.

GRASTOFIL
(filgrastim)

Apotex Inc

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

12/7/2015

3/17/2016

6.

BRENZYS
(etanercept)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd

ENBREL
(etanercept)

5/31/2016

9/23/2016

7.

ERELZI (etanercept)

Sandoz Canada
Incorporated

ENBREL
(etanercept)

4/6/2017

8/4/2017

8.

ADMELOG (insulin
lispro)

Sanofi-Aventis
Canada Inc

HUMALOG (insulin
lispro)

11/16/2017

11/22/2019

9.

RENFLEXIS
(infliximab)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd

REMICADE
(infliximab)

12/1/2017

3/22/2018

10. LAPELGA
(pegfilgrastim)

Apotex Inc

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

4/5/2018

2/27/2019

11. MVASI
(bevacizumab)

Amgen Canada Inc

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)

4/30/2018

8/1/2019

12. HADLIMA
(adalimumab)

Samsung Bioepis
Co., Ltd

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

5/8/2018

13. FULPHILA
(pegfilgrastim)

BGP Pharma Ulc

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

12/24/2018

2/7/2020

14. TRUXIMA
(rituximab)

Celltrion
Healthcare Co Ltd

RITUXAN
(rituximab)

4/4/2019

12/11/2019

15. OGIVRI
(trastuzumab)

BGP Pharma Ulc

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

5/3/2019

6/6/2019
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Biosimilar

Biosimilar
Applicant

Reference Biologic

Date Of Market
Authorization

Can Market
Launch Date

16. ZIRABEV
(bevacizumab)

Pfizer Canada Ulc

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)

6/14/2019

9/25/2019

17. TRAZIMERA
(trastuzumab)

Pfizer Canada Ulc

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

8/15/2019

10/22/2019

18. HERZUMA
(trastuzumab)

Celltrion
Healthcare Co Ltd

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

9/3/2019

12/11/2019

19. KANJINTI
(trastuzumab)

Amgen Canada Inc

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

2/27/2020

4/16/2020

20. AVSOLA (infliximab) Amgen Canada Inc

REMICADE
(infliximab)

3/12/2020

6/1/2020

21. NIVESTYM
(filgrastim)

Pfizer Canada Ulc

NEOPOGEN
(filgrastim)

4/16/2020

5/11/2020

22. ZIEXTENZO
(pegfilgrastim)

Sandoz Canada
Incorporated

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

4/21/2020

6/15/2020

23. RIXIMYO
(rituximab)

Sandoz Canada
Incorporated

RITUXAN
(rituximab)

4/28/2020

24. RUXIENCE
(rituximab)

Pfizer Canada Ulc

RITUXAN
(rituximab)

5/4/2020

† All information obtained from Health Canada • accessed electronically.
‡ All information obtained from Health Canada’s • accessed electronically.
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5/26/2020

APPENDIX 4 – COMPARISON OF BIOSIMILAR APPROVALS AND MARKET LAUNCH DATES IN
THE EU, US AND CANADA
Biosimilar

EMA
Approval
Date

HUMIRA
(adalimumab)

9/8/2003

Marketing
Launch
Date

US
Approval
Date

US Market
Launch
Date

3/21/2017 10/16/2018

9/23/2016

1/31/2023

2. IMRALDI
(adalimumab)
(HADLIMA in US
and Canada

8/24/2017 10/16/2018

7/23/2019

6/30/2023

8/25/2017

7/1/2023

9/30/2023

11/10/2017

Withdrawn
1/15/2019

4. HALIMATOZ
(adalimumab)

7/26/2018 10/16/2018

5. HEFIYA
(adalimumab)

7/26/2018

6. HYRIMOZ
(adalimumab)

7/26/2018 10/16/2018 10/30/2018

7. HULIO
(adalimumab)

9/16/2018 10/16/2018

8. IDACIO
(adalimumab)
9. AMSPARITY
(adalimumab)
(ABRILADA in the
US)

2/4/2019
2/13//2020

HERCEPTIN
(trastuzumab)

8/28/2000

10. ONTRUZANT
(trastuzumab)

11/15/2017

11. HERZUMA
(trastuzumab)
12. KANJINTI
(trastuzumab)

Canadian
Launch
Date

9/24/2004

1. AMGEVITA
(adalimumab)
(AJEVITA in the US)

3. CYLTEZO
(adalimumab)

Canadian
Approval
Date

5/8/2018

Expected
October
2018

7/6/2020

8/1/2023

5/3/2019
0/0/0 11/15/2019 11/20/2023

9/25/1998

3/2018

8/13/1999

3/20/2020

4/15/2020

2/8/2018

5/2/2018 12/14/2018

3/16/2020

5/16/2018

6/13/2019

7/18/2019
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9/3/2019 12/11/2019
2/27/2020

4/16/2020

Biosimilar

EMA
Approval
Date

Marketing
Launch
Date

US Market
Launch
Date

3/11/2019

2/15/2020

12/2/2019

Canadian
Approval
Date

Canadian
Launch
Date

13. TRAZIMERA
(trastuzumab)

7/26/2018

14. OGIVRI
(trastuzumab)

12/12/2018

12/1/2017

AVASTIN
(bevacizumab)

1/12/2005

2/26/2004

15. MVASI
(bevacizumab)

1/15/2018

Avastin 11/16/2017 11/22/2019
retains
patent
exclusivity
until 2022

4/30/2018

8/1/2019

16. ZIRABEV
(bevacizumab)

2/14/2019

Avastin
retains
patent
exclusivity
until 2022

6/14/2019

9/25/2019

ENBREL
(etanercept)

2/2/2000

17. BENEPALI
(etanercept)
(BRENZYS in
Canada; ETICOVO
in the US)

1/13/2016

18. ERELZI
(etanercept)

6/23/2017

19. NEPEXTO
(etanercept)

5/20/2020

EPREX/ERYPO /
PROCRIT (epoetin
alfa)

April 1
2019 in
Spain

US
Approval
Date

6/27/2019

1/13/2020

8/28/2007 End of 2007

21. BINOCRIT (epoetin
alfa)

8/28/2007 End of 2007

22. EPOETIN ALFA
HEXAL (epoetin
alfa)

8/28/2007

12/1/2000

1/1/2029

5/31/2016

9/23/2016

8/30/2016

1/1/2029

4/6/2017

8/4/2017

6/1/1989

20. ABSEAMED
(epoetin alfa)

6/6/2019

4/25/2019

not yet to
market

1/6/1989

5/3/2019
9/9/2005

11/2/1998

2/16/2016

8/15/2019 10/22/2019
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Biosimilar

EMA
Approval
Date

Marketing
Launch
Date

US
Approval
Date

23. RETACRIT (epoetin
alfa)

12/18/2007

Early 2008

24. SILAPO (epoetin
alfa)

12/18/2007 Early 2008 same
article as
Retacrit different
trade
names

FORSTEO
(teriparatide)

6/10/2003

25. TERROSA
(teriparatide)

1/4/2017

8/20/2019

26. MOVYMIA
(teriparatide)

1/11/2017

8/2019

GENOTROPIN
(somatropin)
27. OMNITROPE
(somatropin)

2006

10/20/1995

28. OVALEAP
(follitropin alfa)

9/27/2013

8/1/2016

29. BEMFOLA
(follitropin alfa)

3/26/2014

Q2 2014

30. INSULIN LISPRO
SANOFI (insulin
lispro) (ADMELOG
in Canada)
LANTUS (insulin
glargine)
31. ABASAGLAR
(insulin glargine)
(PREVIOUSLY

4/30/1996

7/18/2017

4/20/2009

6/14/1996

6/2018

6/9/2000

9/9/2014

Canadian
Launch
Date

1/19/1998

GONAL-F
(follitropin alfa)

HUMALOG (insulin
lispro)

Canadian
Approval
Date

5/15/2018 11/12/2018

8/3/1988

12/4/2006

US Market
Launch
Date

4/20/2009

10/8/1996

11/16/2017 11/22/2019

4/3/2002

8/26/2015
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9/1/2015 12/18/2015

Biosimilar

EMA
Approval
Date

Marketing
Launch
Date

US
Approval
Date

US Market
Launch
Date

Canadian
Approval
Date

Canadian
Launch
Date

ABASRIA)
(BASAGLAR in
Canada)
32. SEMGLEE (insulin
glargine)
LOVENOX
(enoxaparin
sodium)
33. INHIXA
(enoxaparin
sodium)
MABTHERA/
RITUXIMAB
(rituximab)

3/23/2018 11/14/2018
Pre-2000

9/15/2016

9/1/2017

2/06/1998

11/26/1997

34. TRUXIMA
(rituximab)

2/17/2017

4/27/2017 11/28/2018

35. RIXATHON
(rituximab)

6/15/2017

36. RIXIMYO
(rituximab)

6/15/2017

37. BLITZIMA
(rituximab)

7/13/2017

38. RITEMVIA
(rituximab)

7/13/2017

39. RUXIENCE
(rituximab)

Q1 2018

NEUPOGEN
(filgrastim)

3/1991

2/20/1991

40. RATIOGRASTIM
(filgrastim)

9/15/2008

2008

41. TEVAGRASTIM
(filgrastim)

9/15/2008

2009

43. ZARZIO (filgrastim)
(ZARXIO in the US)

2/6/2009

4/4/2019 12/11/2019

4/28/2020

7/23/2019

2/6/2009

11/7/2019

Prior to
October
2019

1/4/2020 Anticipated
late 2020

42. FILGRASTIM HEXAL
(filgrastim)

3/17/2000

2009
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3/6/2015

1/13/2020

5/4/2020
1/1/1992

7/3/2015

5/26/2020

Biosimilar

44. NIVESTIM
(filgrastim)
(NIVESTYM in the
US and Canada)

EMA
Approval
Date

Marketing
Launch
Date

7/6/2010

45. GRASTOFIL
(filgrastim)

10/17/2013

2014

46. ACCOFIL
(filgrastim)

9/17/2014

2/27/2015

NEULASTA
(pegfilgrastim)

22/08/2002

US
Approval
Date

US Market
Launch
Date

Canadian
Approval
Date

Canadian
Launch
Date

7/20/2018

9/24/2018

4/16/2020

5/11/2020

12/7/2015

3/17/2016

1/31/2002

3/12/2004

47. LAPELGA
(pegfilgrastim)
48. PELGRAZ
(pegfilgrastim)

9/21/2018

49. UDENYCA
(pegfilgrastim)

9/21/2018

Not yet
launched

11/2/2018

50. FULPHILA
(pegfilgrastim)

11/20/2018

4/28/2020

6/4/2018

51. PELMEG
(pegfilgrastim)

11/20/2018

2/5/2019

52. ZIEXTENZO
(pegfilgrastim)

11/22/2018

2/27/2019

7/9/2018 12/24/2018

2/7/2020

1/3/2019

11/4/2019 11/15/2019

53. NYVEPRIA
(pegfilgrastimapgf)
54. GRASUSTEK
(pegfilgrastim)

4/5/2018

6/10/2020

4/21/2020

6/15/2020

Not Yet
Launched

6/20/2019

55. CEGFILA
(pegfilgrastim)
(PREVIOUSLY
PEGFILGRASTIM
MUNDIPHARMA)

12/19/2019

REMICADE
(infliximab)

13/08/1999

56. INFLECTRA
(infliximab)

9/9/2013

2/16/2015

57. REMSIMA

9/10/2013

Early 2015

8/24/1998

179

4/5/2016 11/30/2016

6/6/2001

1/15/2014

9/4/2014

1/15/2014

9/18/2014

Biosimilar

EMA
Approval
Date

Marketing
Launch
Date

US
Approval
Date

US Market
Launch
Date

Canadian
Approval
Date

Canadian
Launch
Date

4/21/2017

7/24/2016

12/1/2017

3/22/2018

12/6/2019 12/12/2019

3/12/2020

6/1/2020

(infliximab)
58. FLIXABI
(infliximab)
(RENFLEXIS in the
US and Canada)

5/26/2016

9/7/2016

59. ZESSLY (infliximab)

5/18/2018

Nov-18

60. AVSOLA
(infliximab)424

424

Application before the EMA withdrawn due to a change in product strategy. Amgen Limited, AVSOLA
EU Withdrawal Amgen Letter (2019).
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